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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last few decades, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have become an 
integral part of the organisational landscape playing an intermediary role between 
donors and beneficiaries. To ensure the efficient utilisation of resources, NGOs are 
required to be accountable to the two main stakeholders: donors and beneficiaries (in 
what is termed upward and downward accountability respectively). Multiple 
institutional and environmental pressures have shaped and changed the face of NGOs’ 
response to accountability as a coping strategy, yet this dimension is inchoate in the 
literature. Therefore, the study examined the dimensions of accountability systems 
within an NGO in Ghana. Extending the new institutional sociology theory, 
particularly the normative forces elements to include the media and the other 
identified bodies, the study adopted an in-depth interpretive case study approach 
using a single community based organisation in Ghana. Data was gathered by way of 
interviews and documentary review.  In total 35 interviews were conducted with 
diverse groups both within and outside the case organisation. The findings of the 
study are analysed and interpreted through the lens of institutional theory, particularly 
the new institutional sociology. It was found that the dominant accountability systems 
in the studied NGOs are upward towards donors. Generally, downward accountability 
is not given much prominence by NGOs in Ghana, largely due to lack of commitment 
by donors. It is clear from the study that institutional pressures shape accountability 
systems of NGOs in Ghana. The result has implications for understanding the 
operations and reporting systems of NGOs, particularly, in developing countries like 
Ghana. It is argued that NGOs can strategically and actively respond to these 
institutional pressures for legitimacy. 
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1.0. Background to the Study 
 
The objective of the study on the accountability systems of NGOs is to investigate the 
nature of accountability systems in NGOs, examine how NGO accountability systems 
are influenced by the institutional environments of NGOs and to explore the various 
strategies that NGOs adopt to respond to the institutional pressures that confront 
them.  
 
The number of national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in developing 
countries has risen significantly over the last few years. While statistics about global 
numbers of NGOs are inconclusive, it is argued that between 6,000 and 30,000 
national NGOs operate in developing countries (Kharas, 2007). Several reasons 
account for the significant rise in the number of NGOs, especially after the end of the 
Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin wall in an era described as ‘the end of 
history’ (Bagci, 2007; Fukuyama, 1992; Kukkamaa, 2008). Edwards (2000) argues 
that the number of non-governmental organisations have increased in recent years 
because of the realisation that NGOs can better help promote growth and alleviate 
poverty contrary to the previously popularly held view that trade liberalisation was 
the best option (Hulme and Edwards, 2013; Nelson, 2007; Randel et al., 2013). There 
is increased awareness by donors of the failures of southern governments, especially 
in reducing poverty in spite of the billions of funds that have been channelled through 
them (Riddell, 2013; Smillie et al., 2013; World Bank, 1994). The level of failure is 
blamed on high levels of corruption, fraud, embezzlement and bureaucratic operations 
that constantly prevent designated assistance reaching the needy (Clark, 1991; 
Trivunovic, 2011). Therefore, NGOs are seen as an efficient, cost effective, 
innovative, responsive, flexible and a better alternative in delivering help to the 
marginalised (Bagci, 2007; Smillie et al., 2013).  This explains why they are preferred 
by organisations, including the World Bank, United Nations and other corporations 
for such a purpose (Doyle and Patel, 2008; Edwards, 2000; Sustainability, 2003; 
Zamitt, 2003).  
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Additionally, there is a rise in NGOs because societal trust in the public and private 
sector organisations has waned leaving NGOs as the only alternative that could help 
to promote and care for the masses as if they were the state (Ahmed et al., 2011; 
Chandhoke et al., 2002; Kaldor, 2013; Nelson, 2007). Also, as the number of rich and 
middle class people increase, especially in the western world, they tend to support 
good causes, including NGOs worldwide (Kaldor, 2013).  In fact, a recent worldwide 
survey revealed that between 64-80% of respondents positively perceive NGOs as 
better aid resource utilisers than both the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund  (Kharas, 2007). 
 
The imposition of the Structural Adjustment Programme on southern governments by 
the World Bank and other lending agencies in the 1980s forced governments to 
privatise, withdraw subsidies, cut back and share social services costs with 
beneficiaries.  This significantly reduced the provision of public goods by 
governments (Lewis, 2014; Randel et al., 2013; Ulleberg, 2009). NGOs were 
therefore left to pick up the pieces and provide the much needed help to the 
marginalised (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Lewis, 2014). 
 
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the 1990 hailed as the new policy 
agenda allowed donor governments to use NGOs as catalysts to promote democracy 
in these areas (Edwards and Gaventa, 2014; Fowler, 1995; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; 
Lewis, 2006; UNDP, 1994) and to provide voice to the masses in politics and 
decision-making. The evidence is clear in that in 1994, Germany and the US 
channelled US$ 2.6 billion and US$ 2.4 billion respectively through NGOs to these 
previous communist countries, leading to a significant rise in NGO activities within 
these countries. For example, as at 1996, there were about eighty thousand NGOs in 
Poland alone Fowler and James, 1994). In a similar vein, Nepal witnessed a 
significant increase in the number of NGOs over a three-year period (1991-1993) 
from 300 to 3000 NGOs after embracing democracy (Fowler and James, 1994; Hulme 
and Edwards, 2013).   
 
Since then the number of registered NGOs in Hungary, for example, has witnessed 
year on year growth (Ekiert, 2013). Data from the Hungarian Central Statistical 
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Office indicates that as at the end of 2010, 65,000 NGOs were registered providing 
educational (32%), sports (12%) and other social services to people in the country. 
Indeed, similar statistics are recorded elsewhere. For example, as at the end of 
December 2010, there were 37.409 registered NGOs in Slovakia, and 80,000 NGOs 
in Poland (Ekiert, 2013; Li, 2013). The European Economic Area (EEA) Grants setup 
to minimize social and economic disparities within the EEA region devoted €1.79 
billion between 2009 and 2014 to NGOs and other institutions for developmental 
initiatives. Within the period, €578.1 million was devoted to NGO activities in 
Poland; €305.95 million to Romania; €153 million to Hungary; and €131.8 million to 
the Czech Republic ((Ekiert, 2013; Li, 2013).  
 
Another reason for the significant increase in the number of NGOs over the last few 
decades could be attributed to an increase in the amount of funding received by the 
sector (Hulme and Edwards, 2013). Generally, NGOs obtain funding from two main 
sources: the public and private; mainly in the form of donations or grants (Smillie, 
2013). The exact amount obtained from each of these sources is vague but the bulk of 
NGO funding emanates from private sources including corporate, public donation and 
charitable trust (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). For example Irish development 
NGOs generated 70% of their funding from private sources (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 
2010) and similar trends have been recorded in the UK (Lewis, 2014; Smillie et al., 
2013). The exact amount of aid, especially development aid, attracted by NGOs 
globally for developmental purposes remains disputed (Agg, 2006; Morena, 2006; 
Oller, 2006; Sadoun, 2006) but it is evident that the amount keeps increasing e.g. 
from US$ 4.7 billion in 1980 to US$6.5 billion by 1999 (Greensmith, 2002; Reilly, 
1995). Similarly, the UNDP (1993) states that private and government funds 
channelled through NGOs increased from US$ 1 billion to US$ 7.2 billion between 
1970 and 1990.  
 
It can be seen from the above statistics that the providers of NGO funds (i.e. donors) 
are powerful and have exclusive rights in selecting the type of NGOs they want to 
partner for the implementation of projects (Edwards and Gaventa, 2014; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2012). In doing so, donors always assume uncompromising selection 
criteria. Hossain et al. (2003) suggest that donors generally lay much emphasis on 
their ability to control, access, regulate, and monitor an NGO during their partner 
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selection process (Fowler, 2013; Hulme and Edwards, 2013). In other words donors 
generally prefer to partner NGOs they can manoeuvre and control to operate as 
prescribed. This unfortunate situation tends to place premium on NGO accountability 
to donors than on the effectiveness on NGO interventions (Ahmed et al., 2012; Banks 
and Hulme, 2012; Doyle and Patel, 2008; Ebrahim, 2005; Kabeer et al., 2010; Lloyd, 
2005; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010; Teegen et al., 2004; World Bank, 2011).  
 
Since most NGOs particularly in Africa and other developing countries depend on 
donors for the bulk of their funding requirements, donors tend to control NGOs they 
sponsor (Elbers and Arts, 2011; Fowler, 2013; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; Mercer and 
Green, 2013). This situation often creates professional project administrators within 
the NGO arena who are capable of handling the enormous administrative demands of 
donors including reporting and other accountability options to the neglect of project 
effectiveness. Donors generally have low confidence in NGOs they cannot control 
(Fowler, 2013; Michael, 2004). There is evidence to the effect that donors considered 
weaker NGOs for funding opportunities but neglected stronger ones because they 
could not control them (Banks and Hulme, 2012). Because donors generally do not 
have any criteria to judge NGOs apart from control, they tend to support the same 
NGOs explaining why some NGOs always obtain referrals and funding whilst other 
do not. This explains why self-sufficient NGOs like Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) that depend less on donors for financial and other support are 
deemed to be more independent and are able to manage their accountability relations 
with minimal donor interference (Ahmed et al., 2011). 
 
Over the last few decades, the debate on NGO accountability has become interesting 
and thought-provoking among both academics and practitioners partly due to the 
significance of the subject on the immediate survival and the long-term sustainability 
of the sector (Bendell, 2006; Davison, 2007; Ebrahim, 2005; Gray et al., 2006; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Smyth, 2012; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2006b). The 
NGOs sector (also referred to as the third sector) has emerged to bridge the 
developmental gap created by the inability of both the first (public) and second 
(private) sectors to meet the needs of people (Lewis, 2006; Nelson, 2007; Teegen, 
2003). As a result, the needs of the majority of the citizenry particularly the poor and 
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the vulnerable are left unmet necessitating the emergence of a sector that is neither 
political nor profit oriented and committed to supplying these unmet societal needs.  
 
With support from sources including governments, corporations, donors, foundations 
and other benevolent institutions, NGOs are able to obtain the much-needed resources 
for their operations (Atibil, 2014). Several different types of NGOs exist worldwide 
and play different roles including: development of infrastructure; facilitating 
communication; capacity building; and advocacy, particularly for the vulnerable and 
towards the economic and social wellbeing of societies (Ebrahim, 2003a; Fowler, 
2013; Pinkney, 2009; Teegen et al., 2004; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). NGOs have 
assisted countless numbers of mostly deprived people and communities in both 
developed and developing countries, in their efforts towards improving livelihoods 
and poverty reduction (Ferguson and Heidemann, 2009; Jayasinghe, 2007; Kosic and 
Byrne, 2009). For example, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), an 
international NGO employs over a hundred thousand (100,000) staff; and renders 
developmental services to over one hundred and twenty-six (126) million people 
worldwide (Abed, 2009; Jackson, 2012; Pirson, 2010). Similarly, the NGO sector in 
Kenya serves as a source of employment for over 250,000 people (Abdel-Kader and 
Wadongo, 2011; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010).  
 
The general scope and operations of NGOs are such that they depend on resources 
from donors and other sources to provide the much needed but neglected 
interventions for the benefit of mostly the deprived people in societies, otherwise 
called beneficiaries (Brown and Moore, 2001; Hayfron-Benjamin, 2013). This 
arrangement categorizes NGOs as ‘middle organizations’ operating between donors 
on the one hand and beneficiaries on the other hand (see Figure 1.1 below).  
  













Figure 1. 1 NGOs' Scope of Operation  
Source: Researcher’s own construct 
 
Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between the three main stakeholders within the 
NGO sector: donors, NGOs, and beneficiaries. Donors provide the resources to NGOs 
for onward provision of goods and services to beneficiaries. As can be seen from 
Figure 1.1, there exist a one-dimensional flow of funds and other resources from 
donors to NGOs (‘intermediary’) for the provision of goods and services for 
beneficiaries. This implies that the withdrawal of the flow of resources by donors 
would invariably render the NGO sector non-functional.    
 
This arrangement projects donors as the dominant force without whom the whole 
NGO sector might crumble. Without the supply of the needed resources to NGOs, 
there will be no provision of goods and services to beneficiaries. This suggests that 
without the resource support from donors, NGOs might not even exist to operate to 
provide the much-needed support for beneficiaries. In effect, donors are the most 
compelling group of stakeholders within the NGO sector.  
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In fact, most NGOs depend heavily on donors for their operations. Thus the activities 
and operations of NGOs are generally determined and highly influenced by the 
providers of funds, an arrangement that could have serious implications for the 
effectiveness and neutrality of NGOs (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 
2012; Bebbington, 2005; Ebrahim, 2003b; Edwards and Gaventa, 2014; Goddard and 
Assad, 2006; Marshall and Suárez, 2013; Rugendyke, 2007; United Nations, 2008). 
For instance, Seub Nakhasatien Foundation (SNF), an environmental NGO in 
Thailand that had publicly criticized the operations of the Petroleum Authority of 
Thailand (PAT) since the 1990s, softened its stance upon receipt of about US$ 
851,000 in a sponsorship deal from PAT (Burger and Owen 2010; Fahn, 2008). This 
clearly suggests the level of power and influence that donors command within the 
NGO sector.  
 
This notwithstanding, there are a few NGOs that do not depend heavily on donors’ 
financial and other resources for survival.  As a result, they are sometimes able to 
negotiate and make compromises just to remain on favourable terms with donors for 
the purposes of future support (Assad and Goddard, 2010; Busiinge, 2010; Hulme and 
Edwards, 2013; Wallace, 2009). It has been argued that the only way NGOs could 
remain neutral in their activities and decision-making is to overcome the 
‘impossibility’ and refuse/reduce their dependence on donor support (Rahman, 2006).  
The ripple effect of the global economic crises has worsened NGO funding options 
and increased funding competition among NGOs (UNAIDS, 2012; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2012).  This has particularly been so since 2011 when the major developed 
nations decided to concentrate on re-building their own faltering economies.  The 
shortfall in funding contributed to the increasing influence that donors currently have 
over NGOs (Fowler, 2013; UNAIDS, 2012; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012)  
 
The scope, operations, and roles of the main stakeholder groups as depicted in Figure 
1.1 above has brought about two main forms of accountability relations within the 


















Figure 1. 2 The Two Types of NGOs' Accountability  
Source: Researcher's own construct 
Figure 1.2 depicts the two main types of NGOs’ accountability relations: upward and 
downward accountability. On the one hand, upward accountability looks at the 
relationship between NGOs and the donors; and downward accountability considers 
the relationship between NGOs and their beneficiaries (Agyemang et al., 2009; 
Bendell, 2006; Ebrahim, 2003a, b; Keystone, 2006). However, evidence presented in 
the literature has generally suggested that upward accountability as opposed to 
downward accountability is prevalent among NGOs and perhaps rightly so (Chenhall 
et al., 2010; Ebrahim, 2003a; Edwards and Fowler, 2002; Kilby, 2006; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2008; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). After all, the providers of the 
resources have every right to demand accountability on their efficient utilization.  
 
The issue is that donors generally might have good intentions to devote resources for 
the betterment of lives elsewhere but the over insistence on upward accountability to 
the neglect of downward accountability might not promote the realisation of those 
good intentions (Easterly, 2002; Howie et al., 2008). Some donors are of the view that 
a large proportion of their donations do not actually get to the intended beneficiaries; 
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hence, there is the need to institute an accountability system (upward) that is rigid 
enough to check that (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008; OECD, 2008).  
 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the emphasis on upward accountability has 
not had much effect on NGO efficiency amidst numerous NGO scandals (Doh and 
Teegan, 2002; Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Gray et al., 2006; Menzel, 2014, Lee, 
2004; Songco, 2006; Safire, 2004; Trivunovic, 2011) suggesting a review of the 
existing accountability relations. 
 
In line with that there has been an increase in the number of calls among practitioners, 
policy makers, and academics for a shift from the dominance of upward 
accountability systems to a system that integrates the views of all other stakeholders 
of the sector (Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Ebrahim, 2010; Edwards, 2000; Fowler, 2013; 
Gray et al., 2006). The main reasons for this demand is the perception that upward 
accountability systems brand donors as interested only in the efficient utilization of 
their resources to the detriment of the effective implementation of interventions 
(Bendell, 2006; Ebrahim, 2010, Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Gray et al., 2006). 
Upward accountability places a premium on efficacy rather than on helpfulness and 
suitability (Ebrahim, 2005; Kabeer et al., 2010; Lloyd, 2005; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 
2010; Teegen et al., 2004; World Bank, 2011).  
 
This notwithstanding, it is argued that how NGO accountability systems function is 
influenced by the institutional forces functioning within the environment of the 
particular NGO. It is argued that NGOs passively respond to these pressures since 
they are powerless in their relationship with donors (Pache and Santos, 2010b; Rauh, 
2010). However, a counter argument could be developed that would suggest that 
NGOs can actively and strategically respond to these institutional pressures (Crilly et. 
al., 2012; Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010b). The objective of this study is to 
examine the nature of accountability systems in NGOs and to explore the various 
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1.1. Statement of the Problem 
 
In recent years, the issue of NGO accountability has become topical and a major focal 
point of assessing the credibility and operations of NGOs such that those deemed 
unaccountable could face sustainability risks. In fact many NGOs have had challenges 
in their funding support, particularly from donors, for failures in their accountability 
(Antlöv et al., 2006; Banks and Hulme, 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Gray et al., 
2006; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2006b).  
 
For example, the perceived lack of accountability amongst NGOs in Mongolia has 
seriously affected their effective operations and sustainability in the country 
(Hoelman, 2014). Similarly, in Uganda, several foreign donors and governments, 
including Denmark and the UK withdrew funding and other aid to NGOs, citing 
among others, problems of accountability (Burger and Owens, 2010; Callamard, 
2006; McGann and Johnstone, 2006; Trivunovic, 2011). According to the Afghan 
Economics Ministry, the legitimacy of NGOs in the country is threatened on 
accountability grounds as over 60% of donor funds are unaccounted for leading to the 
disbandment of over 2000 NGOs (Denissen, 2009; Olson, 2009).  
 
The situation is no different in Ghana. For example, between 2009 and 2010 the 
Ghana AIDS Commission (GAC), a body set up by an act of Parliament to provide 
support nationally for HIV programmes, had problems with their accountability 
leading to a massive reduction in donor support towards the programme. Similarly, 
the Global Fund against Malaria, Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS threatened to withdraw 
support to Ghana in 2010 as a result of the lack of accountability by the Country 
Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), a body responsible for the fight against HIV, 
Malaria and Tuberculosis. In effect, the CCM withdrew funding to NGOs that did not 
follow accountability procedures and measures set up for the fund.  
 
Again, two NGOs with several years of operational experience in the Brong Ahafo 
Region of Ghana providing developmental services to millions of people in the region 
and beyond was closed down on the grounds of accountability failures.  
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These various examples cited above offer some explanation for why the issue of NGO 
accountability, particularly upward accountability, has become more prominent in the 
development discourse in recent years than ever before (Doh and Teegan, 2002; 
Ebrahim, 2003b, 2005; Edwards, 2000; Kamat, 2003; Salamon and Anheier, 1999). 
The basis of this discourse is that most NGOs obtain funding from foreign aid and 
state agencies with the latter stipulating that the former operates within prescribed 
guidelines (Ahmed et al., 2011). Data on the specific amount spent on NGOs 
worldwide for developmental and other purposes are scarce. However, in 2008, the 
bulk of over US$135 billion spent by Organisation for European Corporation (OECD) 
countries for development purposes was channelled through NGOs (Agyemang et al., 
2009). In addition, Abdel-Kader and Wadongo (2011) suggest that about $1.3 trillion 
was spent globally on NGOs in 2010 with an estimated annual growth rate of 10%.  
 
For example, NGOs in Africa received $3.5 billion from the international community 
in 1999, a 350% increase over the 1990 figure of $1 billion, and handled 54% of all 
approved World Bank projects in 1998 (Hearn, 2007).  Allard and Martinez (2008) 
argue that although NGOs also suffer from some drawbacks; chief among them their 
relative immunity from transparency and accountability and their dependence on 
donors for funds which are often scarce (Allard and Martinez, 2008; Kapstein, 2000), 
their strengths have led governments and multilateral institutions to direct more and 
more funding through them (Allard and Martinez, 2008). These analysts argue that 
although precise figures are difficult to obtain, it is noted that the funds that 
industrialized economies channelled through NGOs rose from 0.2% of their total 
bilateral official development aid (ODA) in 1970 to 17% in 1996 (Allard and 
Martinez, 2008; Woods, 2003). Focusing on Africa, the evidence shows that by 1994, 
already 12% of foreign ODA was being funnelled to the region through NGOs, and 
the number has continued to rise (Allard and Martinez, 2008; Chege, 1999). Reports 
show that transfers of official developed-country aid to NGOs in 2006 totalled more 
than $2bn of total ODA, about 123% more than in 2002 (Allard and Martinez, 2008; 
Epstein and Gang, 2006; OECD, 2008). 
 
Since then there has been a consistent increase in aid channelled to developing 
countries via NGOs to help reduce human problems. The World Bank for instance 
provides direct funding to NGOs through agencies such as the United Nations 
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Development Program (UNDP), Department for International Development (DfID) 
and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In addition, the Bank 
indirectly spends about 5% of its annual income (about US$1 billion) socially on 
Community Driven Development (CDD) projects (World Bank, 2014). 
 
Upward accountability is formal and focuses on the financial and operational 
relationship between donors and NGOs on the efficient utilisation of donor resources 
(Ebrahim, 2003a, b; Edwards and Hulme, 2002a, b; Najam, 1996a). It ensures NGOs’ 
conformance to donor-set accountability rules and standards (Najam, 1996a). 
Downward accountability on the other hand is informal and concentrates on the 
integration of all stakeholders in formulating NGOs accountability standards (Ahmed 
et al., 2011; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007; Najam, 1996a; Roberts and Scapens, 
1985).  
 
Upward accountability is the prevailing accountability system mostly practiced in 
NGOs because of their overdependence on donors for resources, character references 
and avoiding inappropriate accountability branding (Blagescu et al., 2005; Ebrahim, 
2005; Goddard and Assad, 2006; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007; Walsh and Lenihan, 
2006). What happens in the NGO-donor relationship is that the NGOs prefer to apply 
the upward accountability system because they depend on the donors for resources.  
In addition, the donors could also refer NGOs they have worked with before to other 
donors.  This process is what is termed character references.  On a negative note, 
donors could also brand NGOs as not accountable to other donors.  This could have 
repercussions for the operations of such an NGO.  Therefore, they conform to upward 
accountability so as to be able to attract favours from donors.  Similar instances have 
been documented in the literature (Calland, 2013).  
 
For example, the collapse of Idasa, a South African International NGO with 27 years 
of operational experience has been attributed to the extinction of donor funding 
(Calland, 2013). The strong position of donors gives them the opportunity to demand 
sometimes ‘impracticable’ accountability from NGOs (Smyth, 2012; Vielajus et al., 
2009). The ease at which NGOs, particularly in developing countries, could change 
processes in line with donor accountability requirements is amazing (Nelson, 2007; 
OECD, 2003; Ulleberg, 2009). For example, against public outcry and management 
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resistance some NGOs in Tanzania changed their local auditors in favour of 
multinational ones even at higher operational costs. The essence of the shift was to 
satisfy donors’ upward accountability criteria and build accountability credibility for 
purposes of survival and growth (Assad and Goddard, 2010; Goddard and Assad, 
2006). 
 
In spite of the imposition and adoption of upward accountability, there has been a 
significant increase in the number of mismanaged and failed NGO projects worldwide 
(Akintola, 2011; Walsh and Lenihan, 2006). For example, it is argued that in spite of 
continuous efforts to reduce poverty in Kenya, the expected results have not been 
realized because of the overemphasis on a top-down approach of the countless 
poverty alleviation and programs and the lack of beneficiary involvement (Nyamboga 
et al., 2014).  
 
As a result, emphasis is now shifting for NGOs to focus more on beneficiaries and 
embrace downward accountability (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Bendell, 2006; Islam 
and Sharmin, 2011; Najam, 1996a; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007). Downward 
accountability has the potential to help NGOs concentrate on effectiveness, as against 
efficiency, and improve their operations (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Fowler, 2013; 
Hulme and Edwards, 2013; O’Dwyer et al., 2005).  
 
Regardless of the numerous calls for greater NGO accountability, the majority of 
studies have focused mainly on upward accountability with limited focus on 
downward accountability. This is in spite of evidence suggesting a strong relationship 
between failed NGO developmental projects and the lack of downward accountability 
(Ebrahim, 2003a, b; Edwards and Hulme, 2002a, b; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; 
Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006a; Wallace, 2009; Walsh and Lenihan, 2006). In 
addition, NGO accountability research is limited compared to accountability in 
private and public sector businesses (Bebbington et al., 2014; Blagescu et al., 2005; 
Ebrahim et al., 2014; Teegen et al., 2004; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006a, United 
Nations, 2006).  
 
Given the increasing pressure on NGOs to adopt a more holistic form of 
accountability that embraces both upward and downward accountability, it is 
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surprising that not much academic research has examined how the two types of 
accountability function in NGOs. The empirical question that has remained 
unanswered is whether the two types of accountability can function at the same time. 
In other words, can an NGO adopt a holistic approach that integrates both upward and 
downward accountability mechanisms? Or does one system needed to be traded off to 
achieve the other? These are empirical issues that have not been addressed in the 
literature. In addition, the literature assumes that NGOs passively respond to pressures 
from donors to produce a particular form of accountability, mainly upward 
accountability: thus an NGO would adopt practices to please donors. There is no 
empirical evidence on what other strategic responses NGOs can adopt to manage their 
accountability relationship with donors. As a result the study investigates the various 
institutional pressures confronting the NGOs in their pursuit of accountability and 
what strategic responses they adopt to cope of these institutional pressures.  












Figure 1. 3 Summary of the Statement of the Problem 
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Figure 1.3 presents a summary of the problem statement. It can be seen that NGOs 
play a dual role as they take resources from donors to provide goods and services to 
beneficiaries and are also accountable to both the donors and the beneficiaries. This 
dual role ideally suggests that NGOs should at least account equally to these two main 
stakeholders upwardly and downwardly. However, due to the influential role of 
donors within this arrangement, the literature has suggested that NGOs account 
mostly to donors, and partially to beneficiaries (Andrews, 2014; Baur and Schmitz, 
2012; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). Indeed, due to the pressures under which NGOs 
operate within the donor environment, they are compelled to conform to upward 
accountability. Thus, upward accountability dominates the NGO-donor accountability 
relationship (Agyemang et al., 2012; Ahmed et al., 2012; Awio, 2011). Whilst it could 
be argued that NGOs passively react to the institutional pressures that promote these 
accountability relations, it is also believed that NGOs actively respond to these 
institutional pressures as a strategic measure towards survival (Elbers and Arts, 2011; 
Pache and Santos, 2010b).   
 
In view of the afore-mentioned, there is the need to investigate factors which 
influence NGOs to practice either upward or downward accountability in their 
relationship with donors and beneficiaries as well as how they respond to the kind of 
pressures that compel them to respond to donors and beneficiaries in their 
accountability relationships. Understanding these dynamics would help in formulating 
policies and strategies toward enhancing effective and efficient accountability systems 
in the NGO sector in Ghana in particular, and developing countries in general.  In this 
regard, an in-depth study was undertaken at KKP (a pseudonym for the case study 
NGO) and its subsidiary project sites in selected regions of Ghana.  
 
1.2. Objectives of the Study and Research Questions 
 
The main objective of the study is to examine the accountability systems of an NGO 
in order to understand how both upward and downward accountability functions at the 
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The main objective was achieved through the following specific objectives: 
1. To investigate accountability relations both upward and downward in a 
particular NGO in Ghana. 
 
2. To examine how accountability relations are shaped by the institutional 
environment within which the studied NGO operates. 
 3. To investigate the various strategies adopted by the studied NGO to respond to 
the institutional pressures it faces. 	  
 
In order to achieve the research objectives, the following questions are addressed in 
the study: 
 
1. What is the nature of accountability relations of the studied NGO? 
 
2. How are the accountability relations in the studied NGO shaped by the various 
institutional forces? 
 
3. What strategic responses are adopted by the studied NGO to cope with the 
institutional pressures? 
 
1.3. Summary of Key Elements of the Study 
 
This section summarizes some key aspects of the study including: the key literature; 
key theory; methods; key findings; and a summary of the contributions.  
 
1.3.1. Key Literature 
 
A review of the extant literature on NGO accountability revealed the presence of two 
main types of NGO accountability, namely upward and downward (Ahmed et al., 
2012; Goddard and Assad, 2006; Awio et al., 2011; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b, 2010; 
Jordan, 2005; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007; Unerman et al., 2010; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2010).  Based on the analysis of relevant literature, it is argued that NGOs 
operate with funding and other resources from donors to provide goods and services 
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for the benefit of society in an attempt to reduce societal sufferings and reduce 
poverty (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Brass, 2012; Fowler, 2013; Mercer and Green, 
2013; Smillie et al., 2013).  This arrangement where NGOs take resources from 
donors to provide goods and services to beneficiaries has brought about two main 
forms of accountability relations within the NGO sector: upward and downward 
(Ahmed and Hopper, 2014; Andrews, 2014; Awio et al., 2011; Banks and Hulme, 
2012; Burger and Seabe, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). 
 
It has been argued that upward accountability which, is the relationship between 
NGOs and their donors (Agyemang et al., 2012; Andrews, 2014; Baur and Schmitz, 
2012; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012) ensures that NGOs can access and spend 
designated amounts (money and other resources) from donors/funders on designated 
projects (Ahmed et al., 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b; 
Najam, 1996).  As a result, this provides assurance to donors about the NGOs’ 
efficient utilization of their resources or otherwise (Ahmed et al., 2012; Banks and 
Hulme, 2012; Hulme and Edwards, 2013). Generally, upward accountability also 
promotes the achievement of contractual obligations between the NGOs and the 
donors/funders.    
 
On the other hand, downward accountability is the relationship between NGOs and 
their beneficiaries (Agyemang et al., 2012; Andrews, 2014; Banks and Hulme, 2012; 
Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012).  The argument is put 
forward that downward accountability ensures that NGOs are able to involve 
beneficiaries in project decision-making and to learn and gain local knowledge of the 
process (Agyemang et al., 2012; Andrews, 2014; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; 
Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). It also seeks to encourage donors to be flexible in 
their approach to meeting the needs of beneficiaries holistically. It is informal and 
considers constant dialogue between stakeholders (Agyemang et al., 2009; Banks and 
Hulme, 2012). Importantly, downward accountability is qualitative, open and 
participative as well as serves multiple constituencies and permits pluralistic 
negotiation (Ahmed et al., 2012; Banks and Hulme, 2012; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 
2012). 
 
	   18	  
It is argued with evidence from literature that upward accountability dominates NGO 
accountability relations in comparison to downward accountability despite the 
realization that downward accountability has the potential to improve NGO 
accountability relations and aid delivery (Agyemang et al., 2012; Ahmed and Hopper, 
2014; Andrews, 2014; Awio et al., 2011; Banks and Hulme, 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 
2012).  However, in spite of the dominance, imposition and adoption of upward 
accountability, there has been a significant increase in the number of mismanaged and 
failed NGO projects and numerous NGO scandals worldwide (Doh and Teegan, 2002; 
Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Gray et al., 2006; Menzel, 2014, Lee, 2004; Songco, 
2006; Safire, 2004; Trivunovic, 2011).  This is why it is suggested further that the 
overreliance on a single one-dimensional upward accountability towards only one 
particular group of stakeholders is not sustainable (Burger and Owens, 2010; Cronin 
and O’Regan, 2002; Ebrahim, 2005; Lloyd, 2005; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008).  To 
this end, the literature review draws attention to the increase in the number of calls for 
NGOs to adopt a more inclusive or holistic accountability system that integrates both 
upward and downward accountability options.  
 
Setting the focus of the study by identifying the gap in the literature, the chapter 
postulates that regardless of the numerous calls for greater NGO accountability, the 
majority of studies have focused mainly on upward accountability with limited focus 
on downward accountability (Agyemang et al., 2012; Ahmed et al., 2012; Andrews, 
2014; Awio et al., 2011). Thus, given the increasing pressure on NGOs to adopt a 
more holistic form of accountability that embraces both upward and downward 
accountability, it is surprising that not much academic research has examined how the 
two types of accountability function in NGOs (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012).  
Consequently, it is revealed that NGO accountability research is limited compared to 
accountability research in private and public sector businesses (Bebbington et al., 
2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Teegen et al., 2004; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006a).  
Admittedly, it is argued that the empirical questions that have remained unanswered 
is: whether the two types of accountability system could function at the same time and 
whether NGOs could adopt a holistic approach that integrates both upward and 
downward accountability mechanisms?   
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1.3.2. Main Theory 
 
A review of extensive literature led to the adoption of the appropriate theoretical 
framework, which is used to explain the findings of the empirical study.  The study 
draws mainly on institutional theory, particularly new institutional sociology (NIS) 
[(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)].  New institutional sociology seeks to explain the 
effects of political, economic, social and other environmental factors on the 
operations of organisations (Powell and DiMaggio, 2012). The theory argues that the 
structures, procedures and principles adopted by organisations are highly influenced 
by external pressures rather than rational optimization of costs reduction and other 
rational motives (Powell and DiMaggio, 2012). NIS suggests that the existence of 
macro factors can have a significant effect on the operational policies of 
organisations.  Within this framework, three isomorphic pressures, namely coercive, 
mimetic and normative that could impact on the behavioural choices of organisations 
have been identified and explained (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tam and Hasmath, 
2014; Hasmath and Hsu, 2014).    
 
Firstly, coercive isomorphism occurs when pressure is mounted on subordinate actors 
by superior autonomous bodies to behave in a particular manner. It is the direct 
imposition of ‘an acceptable’ standard of procedures and rules to govern the 
operations of organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 
2012).  Secondly, mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisations operating within a 
sector mimics or benchmarks other organisations that are perceived to exercise best 
practice and are deemed to be legitimate or successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Pfeffer, 2003; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012).  Thirdly, normative isomorphism occurs 
when professional bodies that operate within an industry try to control and regulate 
operations of other entities with the introduction of rules and regulations that must be 
met by all parties within the industry (Andrews, 2009; Collins, 1979; Dillard et al., 
2004).  However, the chapter explains that the application of new institutional 
sociology alone could not help explain all the dynamics of NGO accountability and as 
a result integrates it with ideas of strategic responses to institutional processes 
(Clemens et al., 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011; Oliver, 1991; Munir et al., 2011; Scott, 
2013). 
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Applying it to the study, the chapter argues that the institutional forces within the 
environment influence NGO accountability relations.  This shows that the institutional 
pressures play a significant role in influencing the operations and principles adopted 
by NGOs.  Thus, the accountability systems adopted by NGOs may not be entirely 
rational but could be influenced by the institutional environment within which they 
(NGOs) operate as dictated by donors, governments, regulatory agencies, professional 
bodies, among others.  In effect, an organisation’s conformance to these institutional 
forces could warrant and promote legitimacy and survival.  Using the perspective of 
new institutional sociology (NIS) in relation to NGOs’ accountability, it is assumed 
that NGOs are passive conformers to the institutional pressures as they passively 
respond to pressures from donors to exhibit upward accountability.    
 
However, the application of strategic response suggests that organisations like the 
NGOs are not passive in their response to institutional pressures, but could adopt 
strategies and tactics to deal with them (Elbers and Arts, 2011; Hasmath and Hsu, 




The study adopts an interpretive philosophical stance because of the belief that reality 
about NGO accountability exists in the minds of the active players within the sector: 
donors, NGO employees, and beneficiaries. Due to this, knowledge of NGO 
accountability systems could be socially constructed from the experiences and 
perspective of the actors in an interpretive manner.  
 
To put it in theoretical perspective, a case study approach is adopted on the grounds 
that it provides a superior contextual analysis and has been used extensively to 
explore various management and organisational issues in NGO studies.  Besides, case 
studies allow the use of several types of evidence including: interviews; discussions; 
documentary reviews and observations that are prevalent in the study on NGO 
accountability systems.  
 
A total of 35 semi-structured interviews were conducted with the following research 
participants to collect primary data for the study: the Director of Department of Social 
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Welfare (DSW); the Executive Director of KKP; the Chief Executive and a senior 
member of the Coalition of NGOs; and other selected employees of KKP.  In 
addition, two separate focus group discussions (FGDs) consisting of eight (8) 
participants each were conducted among two beneficiary communities. These data 
were gathered, organised and analysed.  
 
1.3.4. Key Findings 
 
The findings of the study as analysed and interpreted through the lens of new 
institutional sociology (NIS) were that the accountability relations between the 
studied NGO and the main compelling stakeholders, particularly donors and 
government, are predominantly upward. This is evident through disclosure 
statements; reports – where formats and frequency are widely used but do not allow 
for compromises; review meetings; external monitoring and auditing as well as the 
use of pictorial evidences. It also emerged that donors mandates the studied NGO to 
share their work plans with them or other donor representatives including diplomatic 
missions, international auditing firms, and the coalition of NGOs who could pay 
unannounced visits to oversee the activities of the studied NGO. In addition, it 
became clear that the Government of Ghana (GoG) regulates NGOs as such KKP via 
the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) where it demands full compliance to set 
regulatory standards and guidelines, including the submission of: annual reports; 
annul renewal of operational certificates; revoking operational certificates; deprived 
or annul benefits; tax exemptions; and impose punitive measures. 
  
The research found that there is limited downward accountability between the studied 
NGO and their donors to beneficiaries. The findings show that this is demonstrated by 
the fact that there is a lack of donor commitment to ensuring its adoption and 
implementation; no contractual guidelines; no defined format; no enforceable 
mechanisms; no encouragement or flexibility to the incorporation of lessons learnt; 
and the fact that beneficiaries bring no resources to the table. 
 
However, it was found that the studied NGO tries to exhibit some efforts towards 
downward accountability in line with their organisational and operational philosophy 
and mission which are seen in the following: joint durbars; volunteering selection; 
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community structures, where it encourages beneficiary involvement; using 
community registers; forming community project teams constituting chiefs and elders, 
opinion leaders; and occasional provision of report extracts to the community.  
 
The research observes that the three institutional isomorphic pressures i.e. coercive, 
mimetic and normative - influence the observed accountability relations in varying 
degrees. It is clear that donors, GoG and the Coalition of NGOs all exert coercive 
forces on the studied NGOs and are able to push through practices and standards in all 
aspects of project implementation decisions. Again it was observed that donors and 
the coalition of NGOs exert mimetic influences on the studies NGOs’ accountability 
systems via the imposition of various mimicking initiatives. Furthermore, it was 
observed that the media and, to a lesser extent, local authorities, district assemblies, 
the communities through opinion leaders, traditional authorities and volunteers also 
exert some subtle normative pressures on KKP. 
 
The above notwithstanding, the study found that the studied NGO actively designs 
methods to sidestep some of the accountability requirements imposed by the 
institutional pressures via varied levels of acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, 
defiance and manipulation 
 
1.3.5. Major Contribution 
 
The study is among the few that have applied NIS as a theoretical framework with 
elements of strategic responses to studies on NGOs accountability in Ghana in 
particular and in the NGOs context in general. Again, contrary to the assertion that 
professional bodies generally promote normative pressures, the study found that the 
media in particular and to some extent local authorities and district assemblies exert 
normative influences on the accountability systems of the studied NGO. Thus the 
study extends the NIS theory, particularly the normative forces elements to include 
the media and the other identified bodies. The study makes a significant contribution 
to knowledge in the areas of practice and theory. In practice, the findings of the study 
have been discussed with the management of the studied NGO who have agreed to 
improve their accountability process, in particular relating to beneficiaries.  
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1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
 
To ensure the effective achievement of the purpose of the study; answer the research 
questions; and for easier reading and understanding, the research is organized into 
nine chapters as explained below. 
 
Chapter One examines several issues related to the research. It begins with a 
discussion of the background of the study followed by a series of discussions, 
including the statement of the problem, objectives of the study and the research 
questions. The chapter also looks at the key literature as far as the accountability 
systems of NGOs is concerned. It also discusses the main theory for the study and the 
methodology used. Finally, the chapter examines the key findings as well as a 
summary of the major contributions to the study. The chapter is important as it 
highlights the focus of the study, the motivation and well as the key issues to be 
examined. The research is motivated by the need to identify how the various forms of 
accountability work in NGOs, how institutional forces shape NGO accountability 
systems and how NGOs in turn respond to these institutional forces.  
 
In Chapter Two, the extant literature on NGO accountability is reviewed where the 
main types of NGO accountability, namely upward and downward, are discussed. The 
purpose of the chapter is to review and examine what other researchers have done in 
the area of NGO accountability systems. The two main areas of focus are upward and 
downward accountability within the NGO sector.   
 
Chapter Three provides a brief background to Ghana, where the study was conducted 
in terms of the socio-economic environment. The chapter also discusses the NGO 
environment in the country as well as a discussion of the case study NGO. The 
essence of the chapter is to help contextualise the study within the environment 
undertaken.  
 
Chapter Four examines the theoretical framework underpinning the research. The 
study draws mainly on institutional theory; particularly new institutional sociology 
(NIS) [(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)] however integrates it with Oliver’s (1991) 
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ideas of strategic responses to institutional processes. The theory was adopted to 
provide a lens through which the findings of the study could be explained.   
 
Chapter Five presents the methodology adopted for the research. The chapter starts 
with a discussion of the philosophical assumptions underpinning the research; and is 
then followed by a discussion of the reasons for the use of an interpretive case study 
to examine NGO accountability. The chapter concludes with an examination of how 
data was gathered, organized and analysed for the research.    
 
In Chapter Six, the findings of the research are presented in line with the themes that 
emerged from the research.  
 
Chapter Seven provides a discussion of the results by integrating the empirics, the 
theory and the literature. This chapter is necessary to understand how institutional 
forces shape NGO accountability and how NGOs in turn respond to these pressures.  	  
Chapter Eight, which is the final chapter, provides the conclusion and summary of the 
research findings together with a discussion of the contribution of the research to 
knowledge and policy. The limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research are also discussed in this research.  
 
The next chapter of the study, Chapter Two, presents a review of the extant literature 
on NGO accountability. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: A REVIEW 
 
2.0.  Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses accountability as perceived in NGOs. Section One looks at the 
various forms of NGO accountability and the arguments for and against an increase in 
the level of calls for NGOs accountability; Section Two continues with a discussion 
of the various NGO accountability mechanisms including upward, downward, holistic 
and identity accountabilities; and Section Three examines the two main accountability 
frameworks mostly used in NGOs, namely Najam’s conceptual framework and 
Ebrahim’s integrated approach.  Finally, Section Four provides a summary of the 
main ideas addressed in the chapter. 
 
2.1.  Understanding the Concept of NGO  
 
Defining NGO remains highly contested and ambiguous such that in some cases it 
even becomes meaningless trying to define it (Clark, 1991; Gray et al., 2006; Kaldor 
et al., 2003; Kendall and Knapp, 1995; Korten, 1992; Teegen et al., 2004). NGOs 
may include several different types of organisations within Civil Society but they are 
basically non-commercial organisations (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). In most 
cases, NGO depends heavily on others particularly the private and public sectors as 
well as some private individuals for funding. However, some NGOs such as Safe the 
Children, Oxfam, Red Cross, BRAC and other International ones are quite 
autonomous except to operate within the laws of the countries where they function 
(Anheier, 2014; Lewis, 2013). This therefore put some limitations on what they can 
and would want to do at specific times.  
 
NGOs are difficult to define because of the level of diversity and heterogeneity in 
terms of the various types, size, views and functions within the sector. In addition, 
there are no clear distinguishing characteristics that separate NGOs from other 
organisations. As a consequence, Vakil (1997, p. 2057) states that the ‘lack of 
consensus on how to define and classify NGOs has inhibited progress on both the 
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theoretical and empirical fronts in the effort to better understand and facilitate the 
functioning of the NGO sector.’ The outcome of a lack of a clear-cut definition for 
NGOs has resulted in numerous definitions within the literature. Notwithstanding this, 
there does seem to be some consensus among researchers and practitioners as to what 
NGOs are.  
 
Many (including Fowler, 1991b; Kilby, 2006; Martens, 2002; Salamon and Anheier, 
1992; Teegen et al., 2004) perceive NGOs as voluntary and independent formally 
registered organisations that act as a link between the giver (donor) and the receiver 
(beneficiary) for public benefit. NGOs tend to bridge the developmental gap that 
exists between the rich and the poor and to reduce poverty for the benefit of 
worldwide stability (Fowler, 2013; Simms, 2000). The former UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan describes NGOs as the ‘conscience of the world’ (Alger, 2014; 
Jammulamadaka, 2009). Others also believe that NGOs are non-profit, independent 
and campaigning organisations that seek the interest of society (Banks and Hulme, 
2012; Fowler, 2013; Gray et al., 2006; Lewis, 2014; Ryfman, 2007).  
 
Edwards (2000) argues that NGOs are duly registered civil society organisations, 
overseen by a board of trustees with voluntary contribution as its main source of 
income (Anheier, 2014; Banks and Hulme, 2012; Patel et al., 2011; Smillie et al., 
2013). On other occasions, NGOs are seen as privately managed independent non-
profit-making organisations that are outside the control of governments and seek the 
welfare of the marginalised in society (Chenhall et al., 2010; Holloway, 2013; 
Jammulamadaka, 2009; Teegan et al., 2004). This is similar to how the World Bank 
sees NGOs. In the view of the Bank, NGOs privately provide goods and services to 
minimise the suffering of the poor and to safeguard the environment (Doh and 
Boddewyn, 2013).  
 
This is because the Bank argues that there are only two sectors of every economy: the 
public, state or government sector and the private, markets or corporate sector. It 
further subdivides the private sector into two sub-sectors, namely the for-profit and 
non-profit (World Bank, 1993). This explains why under the World Bank’s lens, 
NGOs are seen as private economic organisations and also as non-profit organisations 
responsible for the provision of social goods (Anheier, 2014; Banks and Hulme, 
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2012). Each of these sectors plays specific roles for efficient societal benefit (Teegen 
et al., 2004). The role of the private sector, for example, is the provision of goods and 
services purely on economic grounds whilst the public sector is responsible for the 
provision of public goods (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Florini, 2003, 2013)  
 
Contrary to the World Bank assertion, some researchers argue that there are more 
than two sectors of the economy beyond the private and public sector dichotomy to 
which NGOs belong (Giddens, 2013; Korten, 1992; Teegen et al., 2004). Several 
names have been associated with this extra sector such as: the civil sector; associative 
sector; third sector; collective action sector; civil society; voluntary; or NGO sectors 
(Anheier, 2014; Giddens, 2013; Teegen et al., 2004). There is, therefore, a common 
consensus that NGOs neither belong to the private nor public sectors but rather to the 
civil society sector (Carroll, 1992; Fowler, 2013). The World Bank definition of 
NGOs does not clearly define the boundaries of NGOs as the definition includes 
private profit maximising organisations.  
 
In spite of this, Uphoff (1993) states that NGOs are dynamic entities and can 
sometimes conveniently straddle between the private and the public sectors (Fowler, 
2013). The straddling occurs when the goals, workers, operations and the 
environment within which an NGO operates changes in response to a success or 
failure criteria. For example, an NGO like Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) has been so successful that it straddles between the various 
sectors generating finance from various sources (governments, self and through 
multilateral agencies); undertaking government projects; and interacting with the 
private sector.  
 
To clarify the above confusion in the World Bank definition and to exclude private 
profit maximising organisations, the United Nations (UN), which has been credited 
with the popularisation of the usage of the term NGO, defines Non governmental 
Organisations as: 
 
… a not-for-profit, voluntary citizens group which is organized 
on a local, national or international level to address issues in 
support of the public good (Unerman and O’Dwyer: p5) 
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The UN definition suggests that NGOs occupy the organisational space between the 
public and private profit maximising companies to provide support to the needy. 
However, the use of the term ‘non governmental’ has been criticised on the grounds 
that most NGOs in the world accepts donations, funding and other benefits from 
governments, undertake projects on behalf of governments and collaborate with 
governments on a number of issues.  In fact there is a strong relationship between 
NGOs and the State (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Farrington and Bebbington, 1993).  In 
most cases, NGOs are seen to complement governments’ efforts at addressing 
pertinent developmental issues of communities; for example, poverty alleviation, 
healthcare provision, relief operations and so on (Hulme and Edwards, 2013; Lewis, 
2013).  
 
Different countries use different terminologies to describe the NGO sector. The UK 
for example mostly uses the voluntary, charitable or third sector (Brown and Moore, 
2001; Courtney, 2002; Lewis, 2013). However, the increased involvement of paid 
professional and consultants in the sector has cast doubts about the appropriateness of 
the term. In the USA terms like the third sector, independent, non-profit or not-for-
profit sectors are used (Courtney, 2002; Guthrie et al., 2010). But the use of such 
terms in the USA has also been criticised on the basis that it focuses on only a single 
characteristic of non-profit distribution to members (Courtney, 2002). The term NGO 
is used in Africa and South America whilst the international community uses the civil 
society sector tag. Other terms used to describe the NGO sector include voluntary and 
non-profit organisations, the private non-profit sector and value-led organization 
because the sector is uniquely characterized as providing a voice for the marginalised 
(Ahmed et al., 2011; Anheier and Kendall, 2012; Fowler, 2013).   
 
In addition, many countries including Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, 
Serbia and Uganda have enshrined their specific context definition of NGOs in some 
sort of ‘legal framework’ that stipulates the ‘dos and don’ts’ of NGOs in their 
respective countries (Hayman et al., 2013).  
 
In effect, the NGO concept has no clear single tern and definition. However, for the 
purpose of this research, the term NGO will be used because it is the most universally 
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and internationally recognised term amongst practitioners, evaluators, governments, 
bilateral and multinational donor agencies and analysts. In addition, the UN definition 
of NGOs is selected as the working definition of NGOs for this thesis. In that regard, 
an NGO is seen as any ‘not-for-profit, voluntary citizens’ group, which is organized 
on a local, national or international level to address issues in support of the public 
good.’ The adoption of this definition encompasses several organisations with the 
above characteristics and with the intention of supplementing the efforts of the public 
and private sectors towards alleviating societal problems.     
 
The precise number of NGOs operating worldwide is also highly contested (Unerman 
and O’Dwyer, 2010). In addition to the several locally based NGOs, there are over 
50,000 International NGOs operating worldwide (Modrow, 2004). Some of these 
NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children, and UNICEF are very large and well 
known whilst others are very small and unknown (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  
 
2.1.1.  Sources of NGO Funding 
 
NGOs generally obtain funding from public and private sources in the form of grants 
and donations but the bulk of its finances emanates from donors (Mahoney and 
Beckstrand, 2011). Prominent donor groups include United Nations Agencies, 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) Agencies, International Foundations, 
Multilateral Development Banks, International Church-Based or Religious 
Organizations, Global Corporations, Host Country Sources, and International 
Nongovernmental Organizations  (Appendix A) [(Smillie et al., 2013; World Bank, 
2003)]. 
 
Countries such as Canada, Australia, Japan and most European countries provide 
funding to NGOs through departments specifically established in their respective 
embassies (Randel and German, 2013). These embassies oversee and manage grants 
and funds channelled to donor countries and ensure their efficient utilisation. For 
example, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) oversees aid 
disbursements from the government of Canada to developing countries (Fowler, 2013; 
Smillie, 2013). In addition, some United Nations Agencies such as the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) closely work with NGOs by providing funding and 
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other resources to them (Edwards and Gaventa, 2014). Although the main objective of 
multilateral development banks such as the African Development Bank is the 
provision of loans and policy advice to governments, they also provide funding to 
NGOs to enhance their activities (Edwards and Gaventa, 2014). Another funding 
option available to NGOs is through international foundations such as the Ford 
Foundation (Edwards, 2011; Meyer and Seims, 2010). These foundations are 
autonomous bodies that mobilises funds from wealthy benefactors, an endowment, or 
from corporations for NGOs to undertake activities.  
 
As part of their social responsibilities many global and local corporations such as 
Coca-Cola, Microsoft and Shell often support the activities of NGOs, particularly 
those that operate within their jurisdiction. Another source of funding to NGOs is 
through religious organisations such as Christian Aid, World Vision, Catholic Relief, 
and Adventist Development and Relief Agency (Smillie et al., 2013). These church 
based organisations undertake humanitarian projects on their own as well as provide 
funding and collaborating with other NGOs to undertake projects. In addition to these 
sources of funding, NGOs generally obtain funding from host country government 
sources and other local businesses and foundations (World Bank, 2003). For the 
purposes this study all the various sources of NGO funding will collectively be 
referred to as donor sources.  
 
2.1.2.  Classification of NGOs 
 
Classifying NGOs into categories is very difficult because there is considerable 
overlap in their activities (Banks and Hulme 2012). Classifying NGOs has always 
been a thorny issue among academics with some broadly classifying NGOs into two 
categories, some into three, with some others unable to make any classification 
(Pinkney, 2009). Irrespective of the challenges associated in classifying NGOs, Bagci 
(2003) argues that it is worth doing for purposes of effective analysis and 
understanding. 
 
The World Bank for example categorises NGOs broadly into either operational or 
advocacy (Ebrahim, 2003a; Hulme, 2013; Teegen et al., 2004; Vakil, 1997). In the 
view of the Bank, operational NGOs are community, national or international NGOs 
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that design and implement developmental projects whilst the advocacy NGOs create 
awareness on specific issues for the benefit of people (Roff, 2004).  
 
Again, Vakil (1997) classifies NGOs based either on their orientation or level of 
cooperation. Vakil (1997) further classified NGOs by orientation into four categories, 
namely: charitable, service, participatory, or empowerment orientations. Similarly, 
other researchers have classified NGOs into the three main functions they perform as 
membership organisations, service organisations and advocacy networks (Ebrahim, 
2003a, b; Kaldor, 2003; Pinkney, 2009; Teegan et al., 2004); or the main activities 
they perform i.e. welfare provision, social-purpose, capacity building and hybrid as 
discussed below (Ahmed et al., 2011; Nelson and Dorsey, 2003). 
 
Charitable or welfare oriented NGOs generally provide relief/emergency and other 
developmental services for the poor via the distribution of food, clothing, medicine 
and other essential items (Ahmed et al., 2011; Nelson and Dorsey, 2003; Vakil, 
1997). For example, during the late December 2004 tsunami disaster, charitable 
NGOs such as the Red Cross, CARE International, Action Against Hunger and World 
Vision were integral in the provision of food, shelter, water, medical relief, and other 
services to the affected.  
 
Service oriented, operational, or philanthropy NGOs are those NGOs that provide 
critical and essential unmet goods and services such as educational, healthcare, 
nutrition, accommodation and poverty alleviation support for beneficiaries (Ebrahim, 
2003a; Kaldor, 2003; Teegen et al., 2004). The service function is the minimum 
characteristics of NGOs and this explains why most NGOs provide a wide range of 
services to enhance societal welfare (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Pinkney, 2009; Vakil, 
1997). The Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, Save the Children and other NGOs 
provide relief, humanitarian and medical services to beneficiaries. 
 
Participatory oriented NGOs is the coming together of groups of people to provide 
solutions to a common identifiable need in a self-help manner via contributions of 
resources such as labour, tools, money and the like. Participation oriented NGOs are 
similar to membership NGOs except for the distribution of profit. Membership 
organisations also called self-help; mutual support; club; or inward-looking 
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association is the collective pooling of resources from people with common interests 
to advance the collective interests of members for mutual benefits (Brenton, 1985; 
Coote and Angel, 2014; Teegen et al., 2004). Membership organisations such as 
cooperatives, unions, business associations, church groups, clubs and societies tend to 
distribute profit to members, a characteristic that make their inclusion as NGOs 
debatable (Birchall, 2013; Vakil, 1997).  
 
Empowering oriented, advocacy or pressure groups NGOs assist the poor to better 
appreciate socio-economic and political occurrences via awareness and for possible 
subsequent action. Such NGOs provide voice to the poor and marginalised by 
influencing global economic and political policies and decision makers on vital 
legislative and economic changes and their effects on people and economies (Teegen 
et al., 2004; Woller and Parsons, 2002). They use lobbying, boycotting, research, 
conferences, shareholder activism, and information dissemination as tools of 
enforcement to ensure collective societal benefit (Christmann and Taylor, 2002; 
Delmas and Terlaak, 2001; Doh and Guay, 2004).  
 
Pressure group NGOs like Human Rights, Oxfam, Greenpeace, Amnesty 
International, Shelter, the Child Poverty Action Group, Liberty and the Sierra Club 
seek fairer treatment for vulnerable citizens; women, children, disabled and the 
mentally challenged. As a result, governments and private businesses generally 
dislike advocacy groups. For example, until recently Amnesty International were 
denied charitable status in several countries including the UK and Canada (Levasseur, 
2012; Pinkney, 2009) whilst Oxfam have been warned to desist from certain activities 
or risk loosing its charitable status in the UK. In addition, an empirical study 
conducted in Spain to determine the relationship between NGOs and businesses in the 
public arena (Valor and Merino, 2009) concluded that businesses generally shun 
advocacy NGOs and constantly seek to push for their withdrawal from forums that 
discuss policy-making including issues related to corporate social responsibility 
(CSR).  
 
Again, NGOs could be classified on their level of co-operation i.e. the extent of their 
operational coverage (Vakil, 1997). By that classification, NGOs could be seen as a 
community based organisation (CBO), citywide, national or international (Ebrahim, 
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2003a; Hulme, 2013; Teegen et al., 2004; Vakil, 1997). CBOs are people centred 
local initiatives (participative/membership) aimed at providing social services for a 
localised poor (Chechetto-Salles and Geyer, 2006). Citywide organizations such as 
the Rotary Club are setup to provide sporadic services to members and the needy. 
National NGOs operate within the confines of a country whilst international ones 
such as Save the Children and CARE International operate across national borders 
(Anheier and Themudo, 2002). In the view of SustainAbility, (2003), international 
NGOs are hybrid in nature because they have the capacity to combine the 
characteristics of several other types of NGOs. Care International, for example, is able 
to integrate the roles of both welfare provision and advocacy NGOs.  
 
Capacity building NGOs are generally large and international in nature with greater 
expertise and large financial resources to help build and improve the capabilities of 
national and local NGOs towards the effective delivery of their services (Brown and 
Moore, 2001). Such NGOs tend to focus narrowly on building the capacity of others 
in specific contexts such as the age, children and the eye among others. It is therefore 
not surprising that an NGO like Age Concern or HelpAge International has a focus on 
the aged; Save the Children on children affairs; and SightSavers specialising on issues 
pertaining to the eye. 
 
Further, NGOs could be classified on the basis of their level of resource control. In 
that case, two types exists namely Northern NGO (NNGO) and Southern NGO 
(SNGO). NNGOs are predominantly large and international with a lot of resources at 
their disposal and operate mostly in developed economies. In comparison, SNGOs are 
smaller in size, operate mostly in developing countries especially in Africa, and have 
minimal power (Michael, 2004; SustainAbility, 2003). Most SNGOs rely on NNGOs 
for support and play intermediary roles between NNGOs and their beneficiaries 
(Agyemang et al., 2009; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 
2006a).  
 
It can be seen from the above discussions that the literature on NGO classification is 
inconclusive with considerable overlaps (Brass, 2012; Burger and Owens, 2010) 
Smillie et al., 2013). It is therefore possible for some NGOs to perform dual or even 
multi-functions.  For example CARE, an international NGO undertake projects on 
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animals, human rights, sports, children, health, climate change, education, democracy 
and governance, environment and disaster recovery.  
 
2.1.3.  Roles of NGOs 
 
NGOs play key roles in filling the gaps left by the failure of particularly the public 
sector towards the poor and vulnerable in societies in wide-ranging spheres (Banks 
and Hulme, 2012). It is argued that the role played by the public sector is shaped by 
statute and that of the private sector by company laws and profit maximisation  
(Rubery, 2013). However, the roles played by NGOs are not fixed and could vary 
significantly depending on the situation (Anheier, 2013; Uphoff, 1993; Van Rooy, 
2013). It is common and easier for particularly the International NGOs to switch roles 
in response to a situation. For example, during the 2004 Tsunami, most international 
NGOs hitherto not into relief operations either collaborated with other NGOs or 
shifted focus to relief operations just to provide relief services to the affected 
(Ryfman, 2007).  
 
In general, NGOs undertake varied roles in societies including welfare provision, 
developmental activities, education networking, research and advocacy (Chenhall et 
al., 2010). Unerman and O’Dwyer (2010) argue that whilst the roles of some NGOs 
such as Amnesty International are restrictive and specifically relate to advocacy 
issues, other usually larger NGOs such as CARE International combine roles and 
perform several activities for the benefit of societies. The roles played by NGOs can 
also be categorised on the basis of their geographical operational levels (scope of 
operations). With this categorisation, the operational levels of NGOs could be at the 
local, community and grassroots, national, international and in some cases 
intergovernmental levels (Awio et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2012; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2006a).  
 
The above discussions suggest that, in general, NGOs perform different and varied 
roles in society depending on their size, area of operation, and the situation. In an 
attempt to make sense of the roles played by NGOs, Kaldor et al. (2003) identifies 
eleven main roles of NGOs that were later summarised into four integrated roles 
(Banks and Hulme, 2012; Kaldor et al., 2003).  Some of the specific roles performed 
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by NGOs include: conflict management (Cochrane, 2000; Rugendyke, 2007; Kolk 
and Lenfant, 2012); partakers of global policies ((Brown et al., 2012; Teegen et al., 
2004); enforcement of corporate social responsibilities (Valory and Merino, 2009; 
Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Bendell, 2004; Valory and Merino, 2009); delivery of 
neglected goods (Zarsky, 2002; Najam and Robins, 2001; Woods, 2003; Florini, 
2003; Offenheiser and Holcombe, 2003); and poverty reduction (Banks and Hulme, 
2012; Fowler, 2013; Kilby, 2006).  Additionally, some roles are described as: 
addressing societal needs (Najam, 1996a; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010; Bagci, 2007; 
Igoe and Kelsall, 2005; Smillie et al., 2013); provision of employment (Courtney, 
2002; Anheier, 2002; Abed, 2009; Jackson, 2012; Pirson, 2010); and humanitarian aid 
(Ferris, 2005; Ryfman, 2007; Abolurin, 2014).  Other roles played by NGOs may be 
in the development of infrastructure, human capacity, environmental protection, and 
education (Overall and Goodman, 2011). 
 
2.2.  The Concept of Accountability 
 
The accountability concept has extensive usage in the academic literature yet there is 
limited consensus regarding its definition. The concept has different use and meaning 
across the spectrum of academic disciplines however, the commonality among the 
variations is the notion that accountability is a relational concept that looks at the 
connection between two or more entities. For example, the World Bank sees 
accountability as a virtuous relationship between defined actors that provides an 
opportunity to demonstrate transparency, credibility and trustworthiness (Davenport 
and Low, 2013; World Bank, 2003). The Bank argues that accountability should have 
five cardinal features of delegation, financing, performance, evaluation and enforcing 
(World Bank, 2003). Although the concept of accountability dates back in history, it 
has taken a new dimension and meaning over the last few decades and has become a 
worldwide buzzword (Gray, 2014). In fact, in today’s dynamic business world, 
accountability is critical in assessing the performance of many organisations because 
it ensures the efficient utilisation of resources entrusted (Zadek et al., 2013).  
 
Although there is a common thread amongst the various definitions of accountability, 
precisely defining it is a highly contested issue among academics and practitioners 
(Jacobs and Wilford 2010). For example, accountability is seen as the right that 
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emerges from the relationship between an accountable institution and the accounted 
(Edward and Hulme, 1996b; Fox and Brown, 1998; Hooks et al., 2004). Some writers 
argue that accountability is mainly about responding to the views and queries of 
others (Edward and Hulme, 1996b; Fox and Brown, 1998; Jordan, 2005).  Meanwhile, 
other writers see accountability as encompassing both responding to others and taking 
responsibility for one’s self (Chisolm, 1995; Fry, 1995; Cornwall et al., 2000; Lloyd 
et al., 2007). In particular, Fox and Brown (1998) see accountability as making others 
answerable. On the contrary, Edwards and Hulme (1996b: 967) perceive 
accountability as “the means by which individuals and organisations report to a 
recognised authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions”.  
 
Similarly, other researchers notice accountability as a two-way affair of responding to 
others externally and to one’s self internally (Chisolm, 1995; Fry, 1995; Cornwall et 
al., 2000; Kaldor, 2013; Lloyd et al., 2007). Whilst the external component ensures 
conformance to proposed standards, the internal dimension warrants an inner 
obligation to achieve a set mission (Fry, 1995). In the view of Lloyd et al. (2007) 
accountability is ‘the processes through which an organization makes a commitment 
to respond to and balance the needs of stakeholders in its decision making processes 
and activities, and delivers against this commitment’ (p. 11). 
 
What is common to all accountability definitions is that it concentrates on the 
relationships among various actors, with some giving accounts of their behaviour and 
others receiving and judging those accounts. The definitions further suggest that the 
essence of accountability is equivalent to the principal-agent relationship in which the 
principal holds the agent to account for their actions.  
 
The literature identifies four main components of accountability to include 
transparency, justification, compliance and enforcement (Ebrahim and Weisband, 
2007). Transparency in this context connotes the unreserved provision of 
accountability information for public scrutiny whilst justification ensures the 
provision of adequate reasoning for all decision making options. Accountability 
compliance is the process of ensuring that set procedures are thoroughly followed; 
and lastly, enforcement is the imposition of punitive measures for lack of 
transparency, justification or compliance (Ebrahim and Weisband, 2007). In most 
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cases, all four components of accountability may be present in an accountability 
framework and organisations are required to operate within these confines for 
legitimacy or otherwise face punishment. 
 
In terms of this study, Lloyd et al.’s (2007) definition of accountability will be 
adopted because it looks at accountability from a more holistic perspective by 
attempting to objectively meet the needs of all stakeholder groups and involving them 
in project decision-making, implementation and evaluation processes. 
 
2.3.  Accountability: An NGO Perspective 
 
The overarching objective of this research is to examine the accountability systems of 
NGOs in Ghana and their strategic responses to institutional pressures on their 
accountability relations. The study sought to understand the accountability 
mechanisms of NGOs in order to theorise NGO accountability relations and to 
develop a more holistic accountability system that integrates all stakeholders 
operating in the NGOs arena. The issue of accountability in general has been widely 
documented in the finance and accounting literature (Lloyd et al., 2007) but there is 
limited research with regards to accountability in NGOs (Ebrahim, 2003b; Jordan, 
2005; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007, 2008). 
 
There are several stakeholders within the NGO sector; key amongst them are donors, 
government/governmental agencies and beneficiaries. Donors are the main providers 
of funding to NGOs for the delivery of an intervention to beneficiaries. In most cases, 
these donors are far away from the intervention location and the operations of the 
NGOs. It is therefore necessary for the establishment of some form of accountability 
mechanisms within the NGO arena to ensure the efficient utilisation of donor and 
other stakeholder resources for the intended beneficiaries. NGO accountability 
subjects NGOs to scrutiny by its stakeholders (Goddard and Assad, 2006; Gray et al., 
2006; Peters and Pierre, 2000; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2006b). McDonald (1999) 
asserts that NGOs accountability is difficult because the variables involved are 
multiple, complex and diffuse with limited tools for enforcement. NGO accountability 
is difficult because it lacks a formal clearly defined constituent membership to whom 
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they are required to be accountable (Burger and Owens, 2010; Ferejohn, 1999; Jordan 
and van Tuijl, 2006; Kilby, 2006; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2010). 
 
Research on NGO accountability is limited but growing (Gray et al., 2006; O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2007, 2008; Teegen et al., 2004). One of the debates on the issue of 
NGO accountability has been the determination of what constitutes the best mode of 
NGO accountability. Some researchers argue that NGOs are just like any other 
organisation and should equally be subjected to applicable accountability standards 
including the preparation of annual audited accounts and effective control 
mechanisms (Gray et al., 1997; Gray et al., 2013). There are also others who argue 
that it is difficult to accurately predict an acceptable composition of NGOs 
accountability (Najam, 1996a; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2005; Gray et al., 2006; Lewis, 2003). 
These researchers argue that the terrain within which NGOs operate are completely 
different from other organisations, and therefore call for different accountability 
mechanisms for NGOs (Najam, 1996a; Ebrahim, 2003b, 2005; Kamat, 2003).  
 
The researcher tends to subscribe to the later argument on the premise that by 
definition and operations, NGOs are completely different from other organisations 
and necessitate the development and implementation of a different accountability 
system: a focus of this research. Irrespective of the mode of NGO accountability, it is 
increasingly being recognised that for NGOs to be accountable, it is important to 
adopt a holistic approach to accountability in order to account to all stakeholders. This 
requires both upward and downward accountability (Najam, 1996a; Ebrahim, 2003b, 
2005). 
  
NGO accountability is important because evidence suggests that without effective 
NGO accountability, the legitimacy of NGOs will be severely threatened (Tandon, 
1995; Ebrahim, 2003; Fries, 2003; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). This realisation is 
one of the reasons for the development of the INGO Charter that stipulates ten (10) 
core INGO accountability commitments (Lloyd et al., 2008; Schofield, 2013). The 10 
core accountability include: Respect for Human Rights, Independence, Transparency, 
Good Governance, Responsible Advocacy, Participation, Diversity/Inclusion, 
Environmental Responsibility, Ethical Fundraising and Professional Management. 
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The Charter recognises NGO accountability as paramount to the long-term 
sustainability of the sector as it states: 
 
…we [INGOs] commit to strong principles and practices of 
accountability. These are essential for our legitimacy, the quality 
of our work and the trust that we depend on. Accountability is 
more than a retrospective assurance mechanism. It defines what 
we are to be held accountable for, influences what we want to 
achieve and how we work (The Accountability Charter 2014: p. 
3).  
 
One of the key issues that could impact negatively on the legitimacy of NGOs is 
accountability (Doh and Guay, 2006; Edwards, 2000; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2006a). 
This is why some key drivers of accountability have been identified to include: 
morality, performance, political space, and wider democratisation to help NGOs deal 
effectively with the issues of accountability (Gray et al., 2006; Sustainability, 2003).  
 
Different types of NGO accountability exist in the literature, the main ones being 
upward accountability, downward accountability and horizontal accountability 
(Ebrahim, 2003b, 2005; Najam, 1996a).  These have been discussed (see section 2.6).  
 
2.4.  Increased Awareness of NGO Accountability  
 
There has been a significant increase in the demand for the nature and discharge of 
NGO accountability in the last few decades, particularly from governments, the 
private sector and public sector (Bagci, 2003; Ebrahim, 2010; Edwards, 2000; Gray et 
al., 2006). Proponents argue that there is no difference between NGOs and any other 
form of organisation; hence, equal accountability measures should apply in all sectors 
of the economy (Fowler, 2013; Gray et al., 1997).  
 
One reason for the call for greater NGO accountability is the lack of trust amongst 
players within the NGO sector, especially as failures in NGOs operations and the 
number of scandals abound (Ebrahim, 2010; Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Gray et 
al., 2006; Okinda, 2013; Trivunovic, 2011). NGOs’ credibility has been tainted as a 
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result of accountability failures that have been widely reported in the literature and in 
the media (Gibelman and Gelman, 2001, 2004; McGann and Johnstone, 2006). The 
loss of NGO credibility ranges from corruption (Safire, 2004; Trivunovic, 2011) 
mismanagement (Safire, 2004) to fraud (Carr, 2000). It is also obvious from literature 
that the loss of credibility due to accountability failures is not a regional phenomenon 
(Gibelman and Gelman, 2004).  
 
There are reports of such incidences all over the world including Australia, USA, 
England, Ukraine, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uganda, Afghanistan, South Africa, Nigeria, 
Ghana and Kenya, among others (Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; McGann and 
Johnstone, 2006; Smith, 2010; Songco, 2006). The evidence suggests that as a result 
of the lack of NGO accountability, several NGOs’ management have either been 
forced to resign or are imprisoned; some NGOs have gone into receivership; others 
have had their asset frozen and their funds withdrawn (Doig and Theobald, 2013; 
Gibelman and Gelman, 2004). Gibelman and Gelman (2004) argue that the lack of 
trust among the key stakeholders in the NGO sector has brought about increased calls 
for accountability and that if NGOs are to legitimise their existence then issues of 
accountability must be taken seriously.  The issues discussed above are some of the 
reasons behind the recent increase in the level of awareness calls among practitioners 
and academics for NGOs to be accountable (Fowler, 2013; O’Dwyer et al., 2011). 
 
In spite of the above, there are suggestions that the increasing calls for NGO 
accountability have no strong basis, are politically motivated and intentionally created 
as a ploy to discredit the good work of NGOs (Gray et al., 2006; Lindblom, 1997, 
2001; Smillie, 2001; Sustainability, 2004). The introduction of the new public 
management (NPM) framework by the Australian Government in the 1990s increased 
the pressure on NGOs in Australia to adopt improved accountability and formal 
reporting mechanisms; and to apply more quantitative accounting performance 
indicators at the expense of the more traditional qualitative accountability approach 
(Aucoin, 1990; Chenhall et al., 2010; English et al., 2005; Guthrie et al., 2004; Taylor 
et al., 2014).  
 
In addition, the establishment of NGO Watch by the American Enterprise Institute to 
investigate the activities of NGOs testifies to this political dimension argument (Gray, 
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et al., 2006; Naidoo, 2004). NGO Watch seeks to scrutinise the activities of NGOs 
and has, since its inception, launched a series of attacks on NGOs to discredit their 
credibility and legitimacy (Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Sustainablity, 2004). It is argued 
that in as much as the establishment of bodies like NGO Watch could help NGOs to 
sit up and improve their accountability, the constant negative attacks could derail the 
sector from the good work they do (English et al., 2005; Chenhall et al., 2010). 
  
Another reason why there are calls for improved NGO accountability is the opinion 
that the private sector is much more accountable whilst NGOs are not (Baur and 
Schmitz, 2012; Burger and Owens, 2010; Edwards and Gaventa, 2014; Gray et al., 
2006). The argument is that whilst private organisations have clearly defined financial 
measurement bottom lines, NGOs have no such unique and acknowledged bottom 
lines.  It is argued that the lack of defined bottom lines in NGOs make it very difficult 
to clearly define NGOs performance (Edwards, 2000; Hulme and Edwards, 2013).  
This bottom line argument is shared by Jegers and Lapsley (2001:1) who state: 
 
…pressure for systems of performance which overcome the 
absence of a “bottom line”…and capture the complexities of non-
profit activities, and the need to conform to what is generally 
accepted practice in accounting arrangements for other sectors…  
 
The problem with this financial measurement bottom line is that it is one-dimensional 
and tends to suppress all other equally important qualitative performance 
measurements like social impact (Agyemang et al., 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 2012). 
Thus, to insist on such a one-dimensional accountability mechanisms for NGOs is 
inappropriate since economic performance is somehow unimportant in the operations 
of NGOs as far as they operate within their means (Kolk, 2003). (Kolk, 2003; Kovach 
et al., 2003). After all, NGOs are charities hence any accountability comparisons 
should be against charities, instead of the one-dimensional accountability 
measurement of the corporate world (Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Gray et al., 2006). 
Nonetheless, it is erroneous to say that NGOs are unaccountable because of the lack 
of formal channels of accountability in the eyes of private organisations (Gray et al., 
2006; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; Smillie et al., 2013). 
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One other reason for the increase in awareness of NGO accountability is that it 
assures donors of the efficient utilisation of their donations; governments for the 
provision of the needed public goods to warrant tax exemptions; and other benefits 
enjoyed by NGOs (Anheier and Leat, 2013; Hedlund and Hamm, 1978). It is argued 
that the presence of improved accountability mechanisms within the NGO sector is a 
better proposition compared to no accountability (Anheier and Leat, 2013; Ebrahim, 
2010; Hedlund and Hamm, 1978).   
 
2.5.  Arguments Against NGO Accountability 
 
In spite of the increasing calls for more NGO accountability, the feasibility and 
desirability of such increased NGO accountability has been questioned considering 
the numerous stakeholder groups involved and the difficulties thereof (Ebrahim, 
2010). NGOs are accountable to multiple stakeholders with different interests and 
demands. In most cases, NGOs have to be accountable upward to donors, downward 
to beneficiaries and horizontally/internally to themselves (Edwards and Hulme, 
1996a; Kearns, 1996; Najam, 1996a; Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001).  
 
Upward accountability considers the relationship between NGOs and their key 
stakeholders, including donors and government mostly regarding the effective use of 
funds (Agyemang et al., 2012; Andrews, 2014; Ebrahim, 2010). Downward 
accountability on the other hand looks at the relationship between NGOs and 
beneficiaries whilst internal or horizontal accountability relates to how NGOs are able 
to achieve their mission. The question is: which of these numerous stakeholder groups 
should NGOs be accountable to? This makes NGO accountability relationships 
multifaceted and complex, a situation described by many as multiple accountabilities 
disorder and inconsistency (Andrews, 2014; Awio et al., 2011; Ebrahim, 2010).  
 
Another argument against NGO accountability is the determination of what NGOs 
should be accountable for (Agyemang et al., 2012; Banks and Hulme, 2012; Baur and 
Schmitz, 2012). NGOs are accountable for multiple purposes in a multifaceted and 
complex manner because of the different demands from the different stakeholder 
groups. Four ‘what’ interrelated NGO accountability categories have been identified 
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to include: accountability for finances, governance, performance and mission (Behn, 
2001; Ebrahim, 2010).  
 
Accountability for finance abounds and is generally: coercive in nature; relies on 
legislature for implementation; imposes sanctions for non-compliance; and focuses on 
financial transparency (Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001). Governance accountability 
ensures the implementation of set guidelines in management deliberations. 
Performance based accountability is shaped by donor reporting standards that ensures 
the achievement of expected measurable outcomes. Performance based accountability 
is criticised for promoting short-termism and for discouraging relationship building in 
NGO operations (Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001; Myers, 2013).  
 
Mission accountability is an emerging type of accountability that ensures the 
achievement of NGOs core mission, which is the provision of public goods (Baur and 
Schmitz, 2012; Ebrahim, 2010). Mission accountability promotes mission 
internalisation, social learning and long term mission performance evaluation 
constantly updated to reflect external environmental changes (Cooper et al., 2014; 
Ebrahim, 2010) with the view to solving societal problems (Ebrahim, 2005). The 
nature and complexities associated with NGO accountability, particularly to whom 
and for what to be accountable, generally challenges NGO management to prioritise 
accountability relations both to whom and for what (Ebrahim, 2010).  
 
Again, it is argued that NGOs are different from private profit making organisations 
in that they are not profit oriented; and they tend to interact more closely with their 
stakeholders and the environment within which they operate (Gray et al., 2006). As 
Rawls (1972) puts it: formal accountability is unnecessary in close relationships and 
since NGOs are particularly close to the grass roots, issues of accountability need to 
be carefully considered. Besides, the relationship between NGOs and their 
stakeholders is complex in terms of attitudes and interactions, less formal with 
emphasis on mutuality, trust, conscience, social contracts, emotions and limited 
economic focus compared to private organisations (Jegers and Lapsley, 2001). 
Therefore, it is difficult to capture the entire nature of the complexity into a one-
dimensional bottom line accountability measure for NGOs as in the case of private 
organisations (Gray et al., 2006).  
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Furthermore, the accountability in NGOs occurs naturally through NGO actions and 
activities; and the imposition of any unnecessary and artificial accountability 
mechanisms could be disastrous, particularly for smaller NGOs (Gray et al., 2006) 
and could become an inappropriate exercise of power (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). 
The outcomes of most NGOs’ activities are physically visible for contact and 
inspection. For some stakeholders, the presence of NGOs like Red Cross to deliver 
relief aid at a disaster stricken area, the construction of a hospital by say Oxfam in a 
war torn area to serve the poor, the prevention of dumping at sea by Greenpeace and 
so on is good enough accountability (Gray et al., 2006). These writers contend that 
the imposition of inappropriate accountability mechanisms on NGOs could be 
counterproductive (Gray et al., 2006; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2010).  
 
2.6.  NGO Accountability Mechanisms 
 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2010) explain that NGO accountability mechanisms seek to 
ensure the effective utilisation of aid-donated funds for the benefit of all, especially 
those living in the developing world. Indeed, several NGO accountability mechanisms 
exist including, among others, upward accountability, downward accountability, 
holistic accountability and identity accountability (Ahmed et al., 2012; Goddard and 
Assad, 2006; Awio et al., 2011; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b, 2010; Jordan, 2005; 
Unerman et al., 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). 
 
2.6.1.  Upward Accountability 
 
Upward accountability (Wenar, 2006), also called functional accountability (O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2007), formal accountability (Dixon et al., 2006), bureaucratic 
accountability (Andrews, 2014; Khan, 2003; Zafarullah and Siddiquee, 2001) or 
technical accountability (Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Slim, 2002) is the accountability 
that ensures: ‘spending designated monies for designated purposes’ (Najam, 1996a: 
342). It is concerned with the relationship between NGOs on the one hand and 
donors, trustees, foundations, governments and the international financial institutions 
that have the power to influence key resource decisions on the other (Edwards and 
Hulme, 2002a, b; Ebrahim, 2003a, b).  
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Upward accountability is the most significant accountability mechanism within 
NGOs, particularly in development NGOs. This is because the bulk of development 
NGOs’ funding comes from external sources (private sector, public sector and the 
government); hence the need to render accounts to these external parties (Chenhall et 
al., 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). It flourishes because of increased 
competition for the limited funding among NGOs. The over-dependence of most 
Australian NGOs like ‘Carewell’ on the Australian Government for funding made it 
relatively easier for the government to coercively impose a new public management 
framework that mandated NGOs to somehow adopt upward accountability 
mechanisms (Aucoin, 1990; Chenhall et al., 2010; Guthrie et al., 2004). 
 
Upward accountability prioritises accountability to these powerful stakeholders and 
ensures that NGOs abide by imposed rules set by donors to achieve set objectives 
(Andrews, 2014; Fowler, 2013). It ensures the provision of accounts on the 
acquisition and usage of designated amounts to the providers of funds (Assad and 
Goddard, 2010; Edwards and Hulme 2002a; Ebrahim 2003a, 2003b; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2010) and is akin to rendering accountability solely to shareholders, 
neglecting all other stakeholders (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  
 
Researchers Ahmed and colleagues argue that upward accountability is concerned 
with the conventional, technical, formal, economic and top-down accounting reports 
that are geared towards satisfying donors (Ahmed et al., 2011). It ensures the 
provision of formal rule bound report ‘on mechanistic project ends’ (Dillon, 2004: 
107); and the effective utilisation and delivery of NGO’s contractual obligations to 
external parties (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007). What must be realised is that since 
there are several other stakeholder groups operating within the NGO arena, it is 
somehow unrealistic for NGOs to be accountable to only one group of stakeholders. 
 
In some cases, it stands to reason that because donors are the main finance providers 
of NGOs, it makes sense to at least ensure that these donors are satisfied. But donor 
satisfaction does not necessarily guarantee beneficiary satisfaction (O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2007). It is on this premise that the research seeks to understand NGO 
accountability mechanisms; assess the effects of the institutional pressures on such 
	   46	  
accountability systems; and determine the strategic responses of NGOs to the 
pressures.  
 
Supporters of upward accountability argue that it ensures the efficient allocation of 
resources based on past performance and gives assurance to donors about the efficient 
utilisation or otherwise of their funds expended (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). This 
is because in most cases, donors are remote from NGO project levels and may not 
know the efficiency of projects without upward accountability. This argument is true 
to a large extent but it is difficult to judge the efficient allocation of resources in an 
environment where the outcome of most NGO interventions are either long term in 
nature or are difficult to quantify (Andrews, 2014; Johnston and Gudergan, 2007).  
 
As a result, several criticisms have been levelled against upward accountability in the 
literature (Andrews, 2014; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Ebrahim, 2003; Johnston and 
Gudergan, 2007; Najam, 1996a). One such criticism of upward accountability is that 
it is formal with a fixed and pre-defined mode of accounts preparation, mostly 
dictated by donors (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). It provides a fairly rigid formal 
account to the utilisation of funds such that issues of accountability flexibility are not 
considered by upward accountability implementation (Messner, 2009). In addition, 
the mode of accountability can greatly vary from donor to donor meaning that NGOs 
with several donors may have to prepare and submit different accountability 
documents to the various donors they relate. This can be argued to be a waste of time 
and resources that could be used judiciously elsewhere (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 
2010).  
 
Related to the above is the argument that upward accountability is short-term oriented 
with emphasis on resources utilisation and immediate accomplishments using 
impersonal rules and predetermined technical, quantitative financial categories 
(Ebrahim, 2003b; Edwards and Hulme, 2002a; Messner, 2009; Najam, 1996a) and 
creates top-down governance (Johnston and Gudergan, 2007). The nature of most 
NGO interventions cannot be fully realised within a short time and the use of 
predetermined imposed performance measures may be inappropriate. This explains 
why there is the need to develop a more holistic accountability system that integrates 
all stakeholders. Upward accountability is one-dimensional and concentrates on 
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selected narrowly defined functions of NGOs (Goddard and Assad, 2006; Ebrahim, 
2003a). It perceives accountability as a form of external oversight and control over 
ones actions via demonstration of results of conduct (Andrews, 2014; Awio et al., 
2011; Ebrahim, 2010).  
 
Some analysts posit that upward accountability concentrates on very rigid and 
formalised procedures that are dictated, restrictive and bias towards donors and 
favours efficiency over efficacy and effectiveness (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2005; Messner, 
2009; Najam, 1996a; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). In most cases, donors would be 
happy if NGOs conform to set rigid rules in purchasing items (efficiency) and may 
not be too worried whether the items bought can actually serve the right purpose 
(effectiveness). Since donors are generally remote from NGO project sites, a 
collaborative approach involving donors, NGOs, partners at grassroots and 
beneficiaries (Agyemang et al., 2009) to determine effective and workable solution 
would be a preferred option instead of stressing on efficiency (Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2010).  
 
This form of accountability encourages one-way decision-making (Johnston and 
Gudergan, 2007), promotes self-centred organisations and ignores ethical and political 
views (Shearer, 2002). It is donor driven and has only become a common and 
dominant feature in NGO accountability because the international donor community, 
governments, development practitioners, the international financial institutions, 
among others, have the power to suspend funding and take several other punitive 
actions against NGOs that are perceived to be unaccountable (Wenar, 2006). 
 
One other criticism of upward accountability is that it is too simplistic and seeks to 
make light of the complex political and social environment within which NGOs 
operate (Ebrahim, 2002). NGOs operate in a more complex environment and account 
to several different stakeholders differently, in a manner that cannot be represented 
simplistically only via reporting without regard to other stakeholders, especially the 
beneficiaries of the various NGO interventions (Najam, 1996a; Ebrahim, 2003a, 
2005). 
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It is argued that there is a direct relationship between the level of donor funds to 
NGOs and the extent of upward accountability (Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Dixon et al., 
2006; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). The more dependent an NGO is on donors, the 
higher the level of upward accountability (Andrews, 2014).  Upward accountability 
does not create room for learning and sharing in a partnership and open environment 
and can have a damaging effect on the ability of NGOs to act as effective catalysts for 
social change (Agyemang et al., 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Edwards and Hulme, 
2002a; Ebrahim, 2005, 2003b; Dixon et al., 2006) because it concentrates too much 
on control functions at the expense of knowledge sharing. Upward accountability to 
donors breeds tensions between associated parties with NGOs criticising donors as 
unfair (Edwards and Hulme, 1996a; Ebrahim, 2002). Another risk of upward 
accountability is that it can hinder the effectiveness of implemented projects (Khan, 
2003). It creates fear and anxiety amongst NGO management with the challenge to 
demonstrate performance capabilities to seemingly ‘difficult to satisfy’ masters 
(Ebrahim, 2003a, b; Najam, 1996a).  
 
The emphasis on upward accountability restrains the imagination, intuition and 
flexibility of NGOs and restricts NGO accountability relations (Najam, 1996a; 
Ebrahim, 2003a, b, 2005). Also different funds providers have different upward 
accountability requirements, meaning that NGOs with multiple funders may have 
different upward accountabilities to deal with (Agyemang et al., 2009). 
Accountability feedback is limited in upward accountability due to the rigid nature of 
the formats used. As a result, upward accountability neither encourages accountability 
dialogue and feedback nor supports the provision of supplementary narrative 
information (Agyemang et al., 2009).  
 
The over dependence on upward accountability in which only a limited number of 
stakeholder groups is satisfied is flawed (Blagescu et al., 2005; Ebrahim, 2010). The 
dominance of upward accountability has led to the distortion of accountability 
priorities leading to calls for a more holistic social accountability that considers the 
needs of all stakeholders, particularly beneficiaries (Blagescu et al., 2005; Ebrahim, 
2003a, b, 2005; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007).  
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2.6.2.  Downward Accountability 
 
The counterproductive impacts of upward accountability have led to an increase in the 
campaign by governments and other proponents to encourage international NGOs to 
incorporate downward or social accountability mechanisms into NGOs’ 
accountability systems (Agyemang et al., 2009; Ahmed et al., 2011; Ebrahim, 2005; 
Lloyd, 2005; Najam, 1996a; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). The increase in the 
pressure to implement downward accountability has raised issues of imbalance in the 
power relationships between donors, NGOs and their beneficiaries with the latter 
scared and reluctant to question or criticise the former (NGOs and donors) for fear of 
losing out on future intervention opportunities (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010).  
 
Downward accountability mechanism argues that NGOs should be accountable both 
upwardly to donors and downwardly to beneficiaries and ensures the existence of 
effective dialogue between all parties (Edwards and Hulme 2002a; Ebrahim 2003a, 
2003b; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  It is concerned with the notion that 
accountability systems should be multifaceted and involve all stakeholder groups, 
especially beneficiaries and local institutions (Lloyd, 2005; McKernan and 
MacLullich, 2004; Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Unerman and Bennett, 2004) on the 
premise that all stakeholders of NGOs have the moral right to partake in decisions 
relating to accountability irrespective of the level of their power or influence 
(Unerman and Bennett, 2004).  
 
Downward accountability ensures that NGOs are able to involve beneficiaries in 
project decision-making and to learn and gain local knowledge in the process. It also 
seeks to encourage donors to be flexible in their approach to meet the needs of 
beneficiaries (Agyemang et al., 2009). Downward accountability is akin to being 
answerable to only the customers of a business overlooking all other stakeholders 
(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). It is informal and considers constant dialogue 
between stakeholders (Edwards and Hulme, 1996a). It is qualitative, open and 
participative, serves multiple constituencies and permits pluralistic negotiation 
(Ahmed et al., 2011; Messner, 2009).  
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In addition, downward accountability promotes two-way communication (Dixon et 
al., 2006); involves stakeholders in project decision-making (Edwards and Hulme, 
2002a; Ebrahim, 2003b; Unerman and Bennett, 2004; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008); 
ensures the achievement of core objectives (Kilby, 2006; O’Dwyer et al., 2005; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008); and considers socio-cultural, political and ethical 
issues (Roberts, 1991; Messner, 2009). It ensures that ‘accountability becomes a 
process of negotiation among stakeholders rather than imposing one’s definition of 
effectiveness over another, as often happens with upward accountability’ (O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2006: 6).  
 
Downward accountability allows the NGOs’ community to draw on the knowledge 
and expertise of local beneficiaries and donors to be flexible in adapting new ideas to 
meet the needs of beneficiaries (Agyemang et al., 2009). The increase in the scope of 
NGO accountability process provides the opportunity for NGOs to learn from their 
mistakes. The flexibility inherent in downward accountability makes it possible to 
report mistakes and learn from them without fear of negative consequences, which 
provides learning opportunities to help improve aid effectiveness in future projects 
(Agyemang et al., 2009). NGOs need to be accountable to the community they serve 
to prove the lack of abuse of power by management (Fries, 2003; Gray et al., 2006).  
 
Downward accountability can lead to better understanding of the activities of NGOs, 
particularly at the grassroots’ level and can help in the effective delivery of aid (Baur 
and Schmitz, 2012; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) 
indicate that the involvement of beneficiaries from the grassroots in the accountability 
process can provide better realisation of pressing issues bothering beneficiaries that 
need resolution and help donors identify areas that need attention and reinforcement. 
It is argued that downward accountability stands the risk of failing if donors are 
allowed to dictate its precise shape.  
 
Kilby (2006) argues that the lack of any requirements for downward accountability 
have caused NGOs to develop a range of downward accountability mechanisms both 
formal and informal (Andrews, 2014; Banks and Hulme, 2012; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2012). These accountability mechanisms can be categorised into depth of 
accountability and the level of formality. The depth of accountability determines how 
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engrossed NGOs relate to their beneficiaries as reflected in the frequency of meetings 
held between NGOs and their beneficiaries; the formulation of agenda; the selection 
of discussion topics; frequency and variation of topics; level of voice variation at 
meetings; level of feedback; and the level of beneficiaries’ access to NGO 
management, among others (Burger and Seabe, 2014; Kilby, 2006; O'Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2010).  
 
Kilby (2006) explains that the deeper the relationship, the better open discussions 
could occur to collectively determine societal needs. Thus, the depth of accountability 
is very important for downward accountability to flourish and achieve its purpose 
(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). The level of formality determines, among others, the 
formality or optionality of meetings, possibility of the incorporation of beneficiary 
views in the agenda and the nature of minutes. He concludes that the higher the level 
of formality and depth of NGO accountability, the higher the level of beneficiary 
involvement and ownership of NGOs interventions (Agyemang et al., 2012; Ahmed 
et al., 2012; Kilby, 2006).  
 
2.6.2.1.  Problems of Downward Accountability 
 
Downward accountability is not without criticisms. It is argued that a major problem 
with downward accountability is its practical implementation challenges, especially in 
an environment dominated by upward accountability (Andrews, 2014; Ebrahim, 
2003b, 2005; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). The lack of donor commitment and their 
unwillingness to transfer power to local NGOs and involve beneficiaries in decision-
making makes the practicality and implementation of downward accountability 
difficult (Banks and Hulme, 2012; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). Indeed, O’Dwyer 
and Unerman (2010) argue that downward accountability is difficult to implement 
because of the lack of support from donors and other key stakeholders and the 
unwillingness of beneficiaries to partake in any accountability dialogue because of 
lack of skills, time and capacity (Andrews, 2014; Burger and Seabe, 2014; Hulme and 
Edwards, 2013). It is therefore not surprising to witness the slow pace of its 
development and acceptability.   
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Furthermore, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) revealed that donor support for 
downward accountability is only theoretical and rhetorical with limited practical 
commitment to pressurise local partner NGOs to engage in downward accountability 
mechanisms (Andrews, 2014). There is also evidence to suggest that even in cases 
where downward accountability is somewhat practised, lead NGOs in developed 
countries still dictate and influence the modalities of downward accountability, 
leading to rigidity in the accountability mechanism, thus, defeating the entire aim of 
downward accountability (Andrews, 2014; Banks and Hulme, 2012; Baur and 
Schmitz, 2012; Burger and Seabe, 2014). Problems of unwillingness on the part of 
beneficiaries to contribute to any accountability dialogue as a result of factors 
including lack of education have been documented (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).   
 
Moreover, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) stress that most beneficiaries are scared to 
criticise or even recommend solutions for fear of been side-lined for future projects. 
For downward accountability to work, the fear factor that results from the existence of 
power inequalities between donors, NGOs and beneficiaries needs to be resolved 
(Andrews, 2014; Basu and Basu, 2003; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). For effective 
implementation of downward accountability, there is the need for a systematic series 
of accountability dialogue that runs through all NGO stakeholder groups: donors, 
international NGOs, local NGOs and beneficiaries (Andrews, 2014; Basu and Basu, 
2003; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). 
 
Another reason why downward accountability is difficult to implement is the 
unwillingness of donor NGOs to transfer power downwards to locals (Banks and 
Hulme, 2012; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010). There is the 
notion that local NGOs are generally run by the local elites in society who because of 
their level of education and middle class status are equally isolated from those in 
abject poverty that badly need NGO interventions (Basu and Basu, 2003; O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2010). 
 
The lack of downward accountability within NGOs can be attributed to the existence 
of external pressures, particularly governments and donors (Burger and Seabe, 2014; 
Kilby, 2006; Smillie et al., 2013). These external pressures favour upward 
accountability and can impose legal sanctions, including difficult registration 
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processes, elimination of tax exemptions or grant cancellations to ensure compliance 
(Burger and Seabe, 2014; Ebrahim, 2010; Fox and Brown, 1998; Najam, 1996a). 
However, the same cannot be said when it comes to downward accountability. 
 
A survey conducted by Keystone (2006) to investigate how NGO stakeholders view 
downward accountability revealed that in spite of the rhetoric and the numerous 
accountability mechanisms and standards, downward accountability to beneficiaries 
remains elusive (Awio et al., 2011; Baur and Schmitz, 2012). The outcome of the 
survey confirmed that many NGOs do not engage and build relationships with 
beneficiaries in a way that promotes learning and the sharing of knowledge for future 
projects. The reason for the lack of downward accountability to beneficiaries is 
blamed on donor dictation; the complexities of engaging in downward accountability; 
coupled with lack of resources, time and the required skills (Keystone, 2006).  
 
It has been revealed that although most donors profess to appreciate the importance of 
downward accountability, they lack the practical knowledge for implementation 
(Chiweza, 2010; Eyben, 2008; Hilhorst and Guijt 2006; Keystone, 2006; O’Dwyer 
and Unerman 2007; Wellens and Jegers, 2011). This is because none of the donors’ 
imposed reporting formats neither promotes downward accountability relationship 
between NGOs and their beneficiaries nor encourage learning, sharing and 
improvement (Agyemang et al., 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Islam et al., 2013; 
Jordan and van Tuijl, 2006, Pham et al., 2010). For downward accountability to be 
encouraged, donors should simplify the reporting requirements and burden on NGOs 
and provide training on how to do it. They should incorporate downward 
accountability reporting into their overall reporting format and encourage NGOs to 
abide by them. There is the need for collaboration between donors, NGOs and 
beneficiaries in shaping the criteria for effective accountability (Buss, 2013; Chiweza, 
2010; Fowler, 2013; Islam et al., 2013; Keystone, 2006). 
 
2.6.3.  Holistic Accountability 
 
The holistic accountability mechanism seeks to combine both upward and downward 
accountability together with other multidimensional accountability mechanisms. 
Holistic accountability seeks to satisfy all stakeholders of NGOs (Bebbington et al., 
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2014; Davison, 2007; Musallam, 2011; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2006b) and not only donors in the case of upward accountability or 
beneficiaries in the case of downward accountability (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  
Holistic accountability promotes a learning environment and gives NGOs the 
opportunity to report operational mistakes, learn from their mistakes and gain 
transferrable experience for future project improvements. In most cases, the rigidity of 
donor-led upward accountability scares NGOs from reporting any operational 
mistakes in projects for fear of future funds suspension or reputational damage 
(Burger and Seabe, 2014; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010, 2012). 
 
The adoption of holistic accountability for NGOs is highly recommended as a moral 
obligation (Ahmed et al., 2012; Ryan and Irvine, 2012; Sinclair, 2010; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2010). The whole idea of donor contribution is the realisation of a moral 
need to help the most deprived people in society better their lives and meet their basic 
human rights based on the ‘rights-based approach’ (Unerman and O’Dwyer 2012). It 
therefore makes moral sense to engage beneficiaries and other stakeholder groups in a 
dialogue to select and implement the most pressing projects and any accountability 
mechanism thereof.  Both downward and holistic accountability have a lot in common 
as they both encourage accountability dialogue amongst the various NGO stakeholder 
groups, promote beneficiaries’ empowerment and improve the effectiveness, 
transparency and sustainability of NGO operations (Burger and Seabe, 2014; Cronin 
and O’Regan, 2002; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2006; Smillie et al., 2013; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2010). 
 
2.6.4.  Identity Accountability 
 
Identity accountability is fundamentally accountability based on what an NGO and its 
management believe is the right thing to do; hence, do not see the need to seek the 
opinion or be accountable to other stakeholders (Baur and Schmitz, 2012). Proponents 
of identity accountability ethically and strongly believe in the correctness of their 
actions such that limited consultation is sought with other stakeholders, including 
donors on accountability issues. Identity accountability is mostly used in smaller 
pressure group NGOs with limited external funding options but uncommon in 
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development NGOs that basically depend on external funding for survival (Unerman 
and O’Dwyer, 2010).   
 
2.7.  Existing NGO Accountability Frameworks: Accountability how? 
 
The literature identifies two main accountability frameworks widely used in NGO 
accountability relations studies (Ebrahim, 2010). These are the Najam conceptual 
framework and the Ebrahim Integrated Approach (Ebrahim, 2003b, 2010; Najam, 
1996a).  
 
2.7.1.  Najam’s Conceptual Framework 
 
Najam’s conceptual framework looks at NGO accountability from three different 
perspectives: accountability to patrons; accountability to clients; and accountability to 
themselves (Candler and Dumont, 2010). These three accountability perspectives 
broadly cover the whole scope of NGO accountability (Najam 1996a) as depicted in 












Figure 2. 1 NGO Interactions  
Source: Researcher’s construction 
Accountability to 
Patrons/Donors 
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Figure 2.1 above depicts that NGOs interact with three key stakeholders in 
accountability relations. NGOs firstly interact with donors / patrons who are the main 
providers of most of the resources (whether financial or otherwise) needed for the 
operations of NGOs. Secondly, NGOs also interact with beneficiaries who are the 
recipients of NGO-donor activities and finally interact among themselves horizontally 
(Najam, 1996a). Following on from this, Najam (1996a) identified three categories of 
NGO accountability mechanisms, namely, accountability to patrons, clients and 
themselves. These three accountability mechanisms are explained below.  
 
2.7.1.1.  Accountability to Patrons 
 
NGO donors are bodies and individuals who are concerned with the provision of 
resources used by NGOs for the benefit of beneficiaries (Agyemang et al., 2009; 
Burger and Seabe, 2014; Ebrahim, 2005; Fowler, 2013; Jordan, 2005). In the view of 
Najam (1996a), NGOs accountability to patrons looks at the relationship between 
NGOs and donors and how donors make NGOs responsible by ensuring that 
donations are used for their intended purpose. This may be achieved through effective 
controls like financial and policy controls. NGO donors could be external or internal 
(Edwards and Gaventa, 2014; Fowler, 2013).  
 
NGOs external donors can be looked at from two angles; either as providers of 
resources or as selected overseers who ensure the efficient operations of NGOs. 
Whether or not donors/patrons are providers of resources NGOs must account to 
them. Examples of external stakeholders are governments, organisations and 
foundations and in some cases, other NGOs. These external bodies are powerful 
because of their level of control of resources or other governing powers. Internal 
donors on the other hand are individuals who contribute money in the form of dues 
and others towards the efficient operations of NGOs.  
 
NGOs are accountable to each of these donor groups differently. For example, NGOs 
will always demonstrate the efficient utilisation of resources provided to foundations 
or to government to justify the enjoyment of benefits like tax reliefs, accreditation and 
license to operate and other support (Ahmed et al., 2011; Anheier, 2013; Bratton, 
1989). In each case, the inability of an NGO to demonstrate efficient accountability to 
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the external donors could result in the withdrawal of resources, revoking of a licence, 
a bad reference and withdrawal of membership dues (Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2008). Thus, because external donors have the power to take punitive 
actions against presumed unaccountable NGOs, accountability to patrons tends to be 
formal, imposed, coerced and in some cases abusive. The over emphasis of donor 
imposed accountability often leads to misplaced objectives; reduced local legitimacy, 
priorities and culture; and a threat to national sovereignty (Bratton, 1989; Hulme and 
Edwards, 2013; Najam, 1996a).   
 
2.7.1.2.  Accountability to Clients 
 
NGO clients (mostly called beneficiaries) are the intended recipients of NGOs 
interventions or outputs (Najam, 1996a). NGO beneficiaries are many and may 
include individuals, groups, communities or a nation. It is upon this basis that NGO 
accountability to beneficiaries is important. However, in practice, accountability to 
clients is non-existing and even if it does exist, it is a sham (Najam, 1996a).  
Accountability to clients is achieved by extensive participation of beneficiaries in 
NGO decision-making and to develop extensive community co-operation. But this is 
not the case in practice since in most cases beneficiaries are only informed of what 
NGOs had to offer with little or no inputs from beneficiaries whatsoever. This 
situation does not promote community participation. Thus, when it comes to NGO-
client accountability, the latter have little say for their lack of power to impose 
sanctions on the former (Najam 1996a).  
 
2.7.1.3.  Accountability to Themselves 
 
NGO accountability to themselves is not extensively covered in the academic 
literature but it is a form of accountability that concerns the achievements of the 
stated vision, mission and goals of the NGOs in the eyes of its stakeholders such as 
employees, donors and beneficiaries (Najam, 1996b). NGOs accountability to 
themselves can vary considerably amongst the various types of NGOs, particularly 
membership and non-membership NGOs (Carroll, 1992).  
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The challenge for example, is whether to regard the members in a membership NGO 
as donors, beneficiaries or employees as each classification brings different 
implications. NGO accountability to themselves can be influenced severely by donors 
and strong leadership (Assad and Goddard, 2010). Another critical issue in NGO 
accountability to themselves is the challenge of monitoring the relationship and 
attitude that employees of particularly INGOs face administratively when confronted 
with varied cultural and ideological differences (Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Clark, 
1991; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; Lewis, 2014). To be effective in their accountability 
to themselves and their operations, such internal accountability challenges must be 
handled properly (Lewis, 2014). 
 
2.7.2.  Ebrahim’s Integrated Approach 
 
Another accountability mechanism is Ebrahim’s (2003b) integrated approach to NGO 
accountability relations.  The approach identifies five non-exhaustive practical 
accountability mechanisms that can either be a tool or a process. The five mechanisms 
are: reports and disclosure statements; evaluations and performance assessments; 
industry self-regulation; participation; and adaptive learning (Table 3.1) [(Ebrahim, 
2003b)]. Whilst accountability mechanism tools are time specific and tangible 
documents like financial statements and other related documents prepared and 
submitted as accountability evidence; accountability processes mechanisms are less 
tangible and time bound courses of action used to achieve accountability in NGOs 
(Ebrahim, 2010). In terms of classification, reports and disclosure statements, and 
evaluations and performance assessments are tools; whilst industry self-regulation, 
participation and adaptive learning are processes (Table 3.1) because they are broader, 
multifaceted, intangible and less time-bound (Ebrahim, 2003a, b; Kaldor, 2003) 
 
2.7.2.1.  Disclosure Statements and Reports 
 
Disclosure statements and reports are widely used accountability tools that impose 
obligations on NGOs to produce and submit detailed information about their activities 
and legal status including registration status, annual financial reporting and 
organisational structure and programmes (Ebrahim, 2010). Disclosure statements and 
reports are important accountability tools that seek to provide some degree of 
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accountability to particularly donors and other interested stakeholders who wish to 
access such reports.  
 
However, the potency of this tool is reduced, especially as clients and the general 
public have limited powers to challenge the legal status of NGOs, particularly in the 
United States (Ebrahim, 2010; Odugbemi and Lee 2011). Again, there is evidence to 
suggest the abuse in the use of these legal requirements by governments as a punitive 
mechanism to suppress the activities of NGOs (Bloodgood et al., 2013; Malo et al., 
2008; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). For example, in their bid to control the 
activities of foreign funded NGOs in her country, the Russian government instituted 
new laws that classify such NGOs as foreign agents, a tag similar to that of ‘spy’ 
(Elder, 2012, 2013). As a result of which USAID was banned from operating in the 
country (Elder, 2012, 2013). In addition, some Islamic NGOs in particular have been 
subjected to intense legal scrutiny particularly since 11th September 2001 (Jordan and 
Van Tuijl, 2006). Also, the multiplicity and the wide variations of these reports 
demanded by donors and governments consume the valuable time of NGO staff 
which otherwise could be used in the provision of services to the needy (Smillie, 
2013). Furthermore, disclosure statements and reports are criticised for being too 
upward to the neglect of downward accountability to other stakeholder groups 
(Bendell, 2006; Bendell and Doyle, 2014; Burgers, 2010; Ebrahim, 2010; Jordan and 
Van Tuijl, 2006).  
 
2.7.2.2.  Evaluation and Performance Assessment 
 
Evaluation and performance assessment are internal or external accountability tools 
that are used to appraise the progress of NGO projects (Ebrahim, 2010). To evaluate 
the performance of NGOs, donors particularly employ external performance and 
evaluation assessment criteria either in the course of the project (mid-term) or at the 
end of it (end of term). In most cases, the outcome of such external evaluations goes a 
long way to determine the level of future funding from donors and referrals that may 
accrue to the associated NGO. In addition, internal evaluation tools are used to assess 
the performance of NGO employees towards some set standards including among 
others the organisation’s mission, objectives and projects. The benefit of the 
evaluation and performance mechanism is its ability to help NGOs focus on achieving 
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project results and to gather valuable performance information useful for learning for 
future projects (Davies, 2001; Ebrahim, 2005; Jordan, 2005). 
 
The evaluation and performance assessment mechanism have been criticised for 
focusing on short-term NGO results and for promoting conflict amongst the multiple 
stakeholders in relation to whether the mechanism should measure NGO processes, 
activities or impacts (Ebrahim, 2010; Edwards and Hulme, 1996a; Roche, 1999). It is 
argued that this mechanism generally wastes the already limited time and resources of 
NGOs in their efforts to meet the requirements of the mechanism (Davies, 2001; 
Ebrahim, 2010; Roche, 1999). 
 
2.7.2.3.  Self-Regulation 
 
Self-regulation is the development and implementation of formal standards and codes 
of behaviour by standardisation bodies such as InterAction, Maryland Association of 
Nonprofit Organizations (MANO) and Bond-UK to guide the operations of NGOs, 
address challenges and restore integrity within the sector (Ebrahim, 2010; Lloyd et 
al., 2008; Schofield, 2013; Schweitz, 2001).  
 
MANO for instance developed a process called the ‘standard of excellence’ to cover 
NGO finances, governance, integrity, public involvement, and management 
recruitment processes. The standard on governance provides guidelines on the 
composition, operations and responsibilities of NGO’s Board of Directors whilst 
integrity standard handles employee issues relating to honesty, credibility and conflict 
of interest. An NGO’s ability to abide by these standards signifies good housekeeping 
in the eyes of donors in a self-regulatory manner. Thus, Ebrahim (2010) argues that 
the value of self-regulation is ‘symbolic, sending signals about sector identity and 
values to an increasingly sceptical public’ (p. 17).  
 
In effect, the proliferation of these accountability standards in recent years is an 
attempt by NGOs to bring some level of sanity into a sector saddled with corruption 
and mismanagement, improve the quality of delivery and avoid the imposition of 
potentially damaging government (external) regulation (Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; 
Gugerty and Prakash, 2010; Lloyd et al., 2008; Schofield, 2013). In fact, Ebrahim 
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(2010) argues that NGO self-regulating standards and certification process has the 
potential to either improve the performance of NGOs or weed-out sham ones and to 
assure the outside world of the presence of good governance structures within the 
sector.  
 
However, the constantly increasing number of standards has created confusion 
amongst users as to which standards needs to be applied. This has led to calls for the 
clarification and consolidation of standards to ensure effective usage (Bornstein, 
2006; Jordan, 2005; Lloyd, 2005). Also, the self-regulation standards seem to 
concentrate on NGO’s internal operations with little emphasis on accountability to 
other key stakeholders (Almog-Bar and Schmid, 2014; Ebrahim, 2003a, b; Jordan, 
2005; Jordan and van Tuijl, 2006).  
 
2.7.2.4.  Participation 
 
Participation is an accountability mechanism process that seeks to continuously 
involve all stakeholders, especially beneficiaries, in a NGO’s decision-making 
process (Andrews, 2014; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Ebrahim, 2005; Jordan and Van 
Tuijl, 2006; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010; Wellens and Jegers, 2011). Four main 
levels of participation have been identified between NGOs and the general public 
(Awio et al., 2011; Ebrahim, 2005; Fowler, 2013; Lewis, 2014).  
 
The first level of participation involves the provision of planned project information 
by NGOs to the public via public hearings and consultation (Awio et al., 2011). It is 
argued that the level of public consultation in NGO activities and project 
conceptualisation, planning and implementation decision is limited and remains 
within the remit of donors of the project implementing NGO (Anheier et al., 2011; 
Ebrahim, 2005; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010) 
 
The second level of participation occurs when the project beneficiaries actually 
partake in the activities of the project (Awio et al., 2011; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 
2010; Wellens and Jegers, 2011). It happens where the beneficiary community 
provides support and services including labour, materials, money, maintenance 
services and the like toward the successful completion and implementation of the 
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project. This level of participation is virtually limited to occasional supply of 
community volunteers towards project implementation.      
 
The third level of participation occurs where beneficiary communities are able to 
negotiate, bargain and in some cases reject project decisions made by NGOs (Baum, 
2012; Ebrahim, 2010). This level of participation provides beneficiaries the powers to 
exercise greater control over local resources and the development of activities for the 
project. The fourth level of participation involves independent community project 
initiatives organised by say social groups for the betterment of societies (Fowler, 
2013; Hulme and Edwards, 2013).  
 
It is argued that the first two levels of participation are externally motivated by donors 
and NGOs on the premise that societal problems could better be dealt with by an 
increase in societal access to services. However, in practice decision-making virtually 
rests with these external powers with little or no community involvement. As a result, 
these two levels of participation have been branded as sham participation (Andrews, 
2014; Ebrahim, 2003b; 2010; Kilby, 2006; Murray et al., 2010; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2008). In the view of Najam (1996a) community participation is: 
 
…a ‘sham ritual’ functioning as little more than ‘a feel-good 
exercise for both the local community and the NGO.’…‘the sham 
of participation translates into the sham of accountability’ 
because ‘unlike donors, communities cannot withdraw their 
funding; unlike governments, they cannot impose 
conditionalities…(p. 346-347).  
 
In addition, Mulgan (2003) argues that the relationship between NGOs and their 
beneficiaries is not one of civic entitlement but ‘grace and favour’ implying that 
beneficiary participation is only symbolic with little bite. Thus, there is the need for 
effective participation in NGO activities if it is to promote effective downward 
accountability via effective participation (Fowler, 2013; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; 
O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012; Wellens and Jegers, 
2014). However, there have been a number of initiatives in recent years that combine 
accountability tools of evaluation and performance assessment with processes of 
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participation to enhance downward accountability.  These initiatives allow 
communities to evaluate the activities of NGOs and at the same time NGOs to 
evaluate the activities of donors (Awio et al., 2011; Hulme and Edwards, 2013).  
 
2.7.2.5.  Adaptive Learning 
 
The process of adaptive learning ensures a critical reflection of previous project 
experiences for the purpose of leaning and transfer of knowledge into subsequent 
ones (Ebrahim, 2010). It is argued that effective learning leads to better understanding 
of NGO issues, promotes inferences and guides collective behaviour (Ebrahim, 2004; 
2005; Najam, 1996a; Teegen et al., 2004). According to Garvin et al. (2008) the key 
elements necessary for the implementation of an adaptive leaning process are: 
 
1. supportive learning environment;  
2. concrete learning processes and practices; and  
3. supportive leadership.  
 
These researchers indicate that the establishment of a supportive learning 
environment is a process of given opportunity, psychological safety and time to 
employees of NGOs to dialogue, discuss mistakes, and agree and disagree on issues to 
enhance learning.  It is argued that concrete learning promotes capacity building via 
knowledge transfer. While supportive leadership ensures a resounding commitment 
from management towards learning, supportive leadership ensures the availability of 
time, resources and a conducive leaning environment within their organisation 
(Garvin et al., 2008).  
 
The challenge to the implementation of an adaptive learning as an accountability 
mechanism within NGOs is the practical difficulty in developing and adopting a 
collective systematic learning process suitable for the achievement of long-term 
organisational mission (Brown et al., 2012; Ebrahim, 2003a). In addition, the 
environment within which NGOs operate does not encourage and promote learning. 
In most cases, donors do not tolerate mistakes and failures in the delivery of NGO 
projects; discourage the revealing of mistakes; and have the capacity to punish NGOs 
for non-conformance (Igoe, 2003; Townsend and Townsend, 2004). Such an 
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environment does not promote the adoption of an adaptive learning process. In 
addition, the amount of data and the level of scrutiny dictated by donor-imposed 
functional accountability do not promote internal learning and knowledge sharing 
(Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Burger and Seabe, 2014; Ebrahim 2005, 2010; Lloyds, 
2005). 
 
The realisation of the importance of leaning and knowledge share in recent years has 
prompted many NGOs, especially multi-site NGOs (CARE and Oxfam), to alter their 
accountability processes to enhance and incorporate learning into their daily work 
schedules (Fowler, 2013; Gray et al., 2006). The introduction of the Learning and 
Planning System (ALPS) by ActionAid International in 2000 was to reduce internal 
bureaucracies, reshape their reporting process and to enhance learning and knowledge 
transfer (ActionAid International, 2006; David and Mancini, 2004; Ebrahim, 2009; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008).  In addition, there has been an increase in the 
development of learning and evaluation tools, including constituency feedback and 
outcome mapping (Earl et al., 2001; Davies and Dart, 2005; Bonbright et al., 2009) to 
enhance learning and knowledge transfer.  
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Table 2.1 below summarises the elements (tools and processes) of Ebrahim’s 
integrated approach as discussed above. 
 
Table 2. 1 Characteristics of Accountability Mechanisms 
Accountability How?                       
(Tools or Process) 
Accountability to Whom?                                                          
(Upward, Downward, Internal) 
Accountability for What?                                                       
(Finance, Governance, Performance and 
Mission) 
   Disclosures / Reports (tool) Mainly upwards to donors Finances and performance, depending on what is 
being reported 
 Partly downwards to beneficiaries who read 
these reports 
 
   
Evaluation and Performance 
Assessment (tool) 
Upwards to funders Performance, often short-term outputs but with 
increasing emphasis on impacts 
 Significant potential for downwards from 
NGOs to communities and from funders to 
nonprofits 
 
   
Self-Regulation (tool and 
process) 
To nonprofits themselves, as a sector Finances and governance, depending on what the 
codes or standards emphasise 
 To donors as a seal of good housekeeping  
   
Participation (process) Downwards from nonprofits to clients and 
communities 
Depends on the purpose of participation, e.g., 
whether it is seeking input on implementation 
(performance) or to influence agendas 
(governance) 
 Internally to nonprofits themselves  
 Significant potential downwards from funders 
to nonprofits 
 
   
Adaptive Learning (process) To nonprofits themselves Mission and performance 
  Downwards and upwards to stakeholders   
Source: Ebrahim (2010, p. 28) 
 
Thus, Table 2.1 depicts a diagrammatical representation of the characteristics of the 
various NGO accountability mechanisms based on Ebrahim’s integrated approach 
(Ebrahim, 2003a, b, 2010). The five main accountability mechanisms identified by 
Ebrahim are shown in the first column together with whether these mechanisms are 
processes or tools. The other two columns depict to whom and for what NGOs are 
accountable to respectively. It can be seen from Table 2.1 that both disclosure 
statement and performance assessment basically concentrates on upward 
accountability with minimal effort on downward accountability. Self-regulation 
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focuses on NGOs themselves and donors upwardly whilst participation and adaptive 
learning tend to focus on downward accountability (Ebrahim, 2003a, b, 2010). 
 
2.8 Institutional Pressures on NGOs 
 
NGOs face mounting institutional pressures including legal, social, economic, 
political and regulatory (Pache and Santos, 2010b; Ramanath, 2008). For example, 
Tam and Hasmath, (2014) argue that NGOs face legal challenges, especially via 
regulation (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b; Edwards and Gaventa, 2014). The prominence of 
NGOs in comparison to governments, especially towards the provision of unmet 
public goods naturally creates some level of political uneasiness among governments 
(Brass, 2012; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Doh and Guay, 2006). Although 
governments have in many instances neglected their developmental obligations which 
are virtually undertaken by NGOs, they are reluctant to allow credit for 
socioeconomic progress to accrue to NGOs (Hoque and Parker, 2014; Islam, 2014; 
Smith, 2014). Thus, instead of regarding NGOs as developmental allies, some 
political leaders distrust NGOs and use state power to institute political pressures to 
impede and sometimes discredit their operations (Bratton, 1989). It is common for 
governments to resist any act that seeks to undermine their authority and their 
leadership role in development. To demonstrate their superiority, governments 
establish political and other conditions to control the operations of NGOs within their 
jurisdiction (Holloway, 2013; Smillie et al., 2013; Smith, 2014; Tam and Hasmath, 
2014). 
 
As a result, most countries worldwide have established legal and regulatory 
requirements to guard the effective operations of NGOs (Hulme and Edwards, 2013; 
Wu and Chan, 2012). It is argued that the main function of governments is the 
imposition and maintenance of order (Bloodgood et al., 2013; De Jasay, 2014). As a 
consequence, they tend to eliminate and stifle any independent centres of power via 
an act or regulations and legal mandates. For example, Clark (2003) argues that 
governments coordinate and influence the operations and activities of NGOs via a 
myriad of ways such as the quality of governance, taxation policies and via the legal 
framework such as NGO registration (Trivunovic et al., 2011; Wang and Liu, 2009).  
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In another breath, Bloodgood et al. (2013) identified three ways that NGOs could be 
regulated within the confines of a country to include: barriers to entry; restrictions on 
their political activities; and restrictions on their economic resources. Governments 
can deploy an array of regulatory instruments including laws and other political 
pressures to ensure effective compliance with set norms and standards by NGOs. One 
such regulatory instrument is the act of monitoring that allows governments to 
regulate the NGO sector (Bloodgood et al., 2013; Brass, 2012). To operate as a legal 
entity in most jurisdictions, NGOs must register under a legal statute (Bloodgood et 
al., 2013; Brass, 2012; Hsu and Hasmath, 2014). Under the registration requirement, 
the onus is on the government to discretionally grant an NGO’s registration request or 
otherwise. The activities of NGOs are highly frowned upon by the government of 
Somalia to the extent that NGO registration in that country is discouraged (Brass, 
2012; Bratton, 1989; Fowler, 2014; Smillie et al., 2013). The NGO monitoring 
function of governments allows them to demand regular reports from NGOs as a way 
of information gathering (Brass, 2012; Bratton, 1989; Smillie et al., 2013). 
 
These legal requirements mandate NGOs to attain a certain status and obey set 
guidelines to be eligible to operate legitimately within certain jurisdictions. In the 
United States of America, for example, NGOs are required to fulfil certain regulatory 
requirements to warrant their continual operations (Ebrahim, 2003). Similarly, a 
three-option legal registration process awaits NGOs with aspirations to operate in 
Kenya (Kameri-Mbote, 2000). Under this arrangement, community and other 
relatively small NGOs with limited geographical operational coverage are required to 
register with the Ministry of Culture and Social Services, whilst national, regional and 
international NGOs register with the NGO Coordination Bureau (under the Office of 
the President).  In addition, the NGO Coordination Act No. 19 of 1990 mandates the 
establishment of agencies, including the NGO Co-ordination Board and the Kenya 
National Council of NGOs to regulate the activities of NGOs (Kameri-Mbote, 2000).  
 
Other similar situations have been recorded in the literature elsewhere (Brass, 2012; 
Fowler, 2014; Smillie et al., 2013). For instance, to curb the inculcation of religious 
beliefs among the citizenry, the state of China uses legal regulations to control, 
particularly the operations of religious NGOs (Hasmath, 2010; Tam and Hasmath, 
2014; Wu and Chan, 2012). Under the regulations, NGOs are forbidden to provide 
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religious education to anyone under 18 years old or openly exhibit religious beliefs 
within public sector organisations (Hasmath, 2010; Tam and Hasmath, 2014). Again, 
the registration processes of religious NGOs (RNGOs) in China significantly differ 
from that of other NGOs.  
 
In fact, contrary to others, RNGOs are registered and managed by either the Religious 
Affairs Bureau (RAB) or the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) at 
the local or central levels respectively. These legal and regulatory pressures, to a large 
extent, affect the operations of NGOs in diverse ways. Although the establishment of 
governmental legal and regulatory function is essential to safeguard public interests 
and to guard against resource misappropriation, the rate at which it is done has a lot to 
be desired (Ahmed et al., 2012; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011).  It is against this 
background that Kameri-Mbote (2000) argues for the necessary promulgation of 
‘sensible’ laws, regulations and administrative systems, particularly in Kenya and 
other parts of the world.  
 
Over the last few years the funding to governments from the International community 
has somehow shifted from a focus on governments to NGOs and most governments 
interpret the shifts in funding patterns by foreign donors in political rather than 
economic terms (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Brass, 2012; Fowler, 2013; Smillie et al., 
2013; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). As a result, governments tend to institute 
stringent political pressures to control the operations of NGOs. It is suggested that 
advocacy NGOs like Oxfam, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Shelter, the Child 
Poverty Action Group, Liberty and the Sierra Club are constantly pressured by 
governments to soften their political and advocacy stance (Ahmed et al., 2012; 
Andrews, 2014; Brown et al., 2012). Amnesty International for example, is denied 
charitable status whilst Oxfam have been warned on numerous occasions to refrain 
from certain campaigning activities or risk losing its charitable status in the UK 
(Levasseur, 2012; Pinkney, 2009). An empirical study conducted in Spain to 
determine the relationship between NGOs and businesses in the public arena (Valor 
and Merino, 2009) concluded that business, just like most governments, shun 
advocacy or political NGOs and constantly seek to push for their withdrawal from 
forums that discuss policy-making, including issues related to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). 
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Bloodgood et al. (2013) argue that the level of NGO regulation significantly varies 
between corporatist and pluralist countries (Bloodgood, et al., 2013). These writers 
suggest that the level of NGO regulation and legal restrictions are higher in 
corporatist systems like Japan than in pluralist systems like the USA. The difference, 
they argue, is that whilst corporatist countries view NGOs as agents capable of 
destabilizing political systems (thus imposing restrictive regulations), pluralist 
countries see NGOs as effective collaborators capable of providing useful societal 
voice for the masses and the provision of essential welfare options which are 
otherwise lacking (Bloodgood et al., 2013). As a result, pluralist countries encourage 
NGOs to concentrate on the provision of services to their citizens rather than 
complying with regulations. 
 
Again, it is argued that governments have the ability to restrict opportunities for 
NGOs to raise financial and other economic resources, including governmental grants 
(Bloodgood et al., 2013). Resource constraint is another form of pressure that forces 
NGOs to accept uncompromising conditions to project implementation. It is argued 
that the main economic pressure on NGOs is financial (Baur and Schmitz, 2012; 
Hasmath and Hsu, 2014). NGOs depend on the international community, institutions, 
governments, and other donors for their economic resources. Meanwhile, the sheer 
numbers of NGOs in comparison to the number of donors put some level of economic 
pressures on NGOs. In fact, it is suggested that the number of worldwide NGOs 
competing for the limited donor funding are many (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Brass, 
2012; Fowler, 2013). This situation pitches NGOs against each other when soliciting 
for funding from donors; thus forcing them to accept harsh donor conditionalities for 
funding purposes.  
 
Furthermore, Ramanath (2009) observes that NGOs are under severe societal 
pressures to fill the developmental and other social gaps created by the inability of 
both the private and public sectors to provide adequately for the masses (Edwards and 
Gaventa, 2014; Fowler, 2013; Smillie et al., 2013). This is particularly so as 
governments, mostly in developing countries, have retreated and retracted from their 
responsibilities to sponsor socioeconomic development (Campbell, 2012; Giddens, 
2013). It is argued that the public sector under the control of governments has 
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demonstrated limited capacity to reduce poverty and raise rural standards of living 
(Fowler, 2013; Smillie et al., 2013). In its real sense, it is the responsibility of the 
public sector to ensure the adequate provision of societal needs for the masses; 
however, as a result of several factors, including mismanagement and corruption, the 
public sector is unable to do so (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Fowler, 2013; 
Gibelman and Gelman, 2004). The corrupt nature of the public sector has over the 
years forced many donor agencies to channel resources rather to NGOs to fill the 
developmental gaps (Ahmed and Hopper, 2014; Fowler, 2013). There is evidence to 
suggest a very high acceptability rate for NGOs among the public (Ahmed et al., 
2011; Chandhoke, 2002; Kaldor, 2013; Kharas, 2007; Nelson, 2007). This level of 
acceptability tends to put pressure on NGOs. It is suggested that instead of blaming 
the public sector for the precarious nature of their developmental status, the various 
communities tend to blame NGOs (Ahmed and Johnson, 2014; Ramanath, 2009). 
This situation tends to put severe social pressures on NGOs to help fill the gap.  
 
In some cases, NGOs could face significant societal pressures mostly from 
beneficiaries to their interventions (Andrews, 2014; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Burger 
and Seabe, 2014; Kilby, 2006a, 2006b; Tam and Hasmath, 2014; O'Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2010). Ramanath (2009) observes the presence of beneficiary (slum and 
squatter dwellers in Mumbai) pressure on NGOs to implement accommodation 
changes in India.  
 
2.9.  Identified Gap 
 
Generally, accountability is very important because it encourages agents to be 
responsible for their actions.  Particularly, NGO accountability is very crucial as it 
helps in scrutinising the activities of actors for the betterment of the sector.  A review 
of the literature has revealed that NGO accountability is predominantly upward to the 
neglect of a more holistic accountability approach (Agyemang et al., 2009; Bendell, 
2005; Jordan, 2005; Najam, 1996a; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Venugopal and 
Yilmaz, 2010).  This is the focus of this study.  
 
The literature has helped in establishing that upward accountability prevails within the 
NGO sector because it ensures the efficient utilisation of resources, especially as 
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efficient accountability of funds provided provides assurance to donors as well as 
promotes the achievement of contractual obligations (Ebrahim, 2003a; Goddard and 
Assad, 2006; Lloyd, 2005).  
 
Even as upward accountability is essential for the effective operations of NGOs, the 
review of literature has helped in pointing out the reality that it is equally criticised 
and branded as inflexible, over simplistic, donor driven, short-termism, bias, stifles 
creativity and one-dimensional with significant variations amongst donors 
(Agyemang et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2004; Fowler, 2008; Islam et al., 2013; O'Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2010; Schmitz et al., 2012; Wenar, 2006).  
 
In fact, Ramanath (2009), argues that upward accountability inhibits the 
inventiveness, spontaneity and unpredictability attributes of NGOs (Andrews, 2014; 
Ramanath, 2014). In addition, upward accountability has been criticised on the 
grounds that besides its effective application and the fact that donors emphasis on 
upward accountability in their relationship with NGOs, this system has so far failed to 
curb the number of scandals that have beset the NGO sector worldwide: even at the 
UN level over the last few years (Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Gray et al., 2006; 
Safire, 2004; Trivunovic, 2011).  This has led to a situation where only a smaller 
percentage of designated amounts have reached the intended beneficiaries: examples 
are the case of the Iraqi-oil-for-food program, the Diana Fund (UK) and the Ukrainian 
Fund to fight HIV (Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Otterman, 2005). These incidents 
provide a strong backup to the argument that over reliance on upward accountability 
has not been able to prevent NGO’s loss of credibility and failures (Burger and Seabe, 
2014; Gibelman and Gelman, 2001, 2004; Safire, 2004).  
 
There is limited coverage of holistic accountability in the literature and this is doing 
NGOs a great dis-service (Ryan and Irvine, 2012; Sinclair, 2010; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2012). Characteristically, NGOs are different from other forms of 
organisations. This could be attributed to the fact that most of the activities of NGOs 
are very difficult to measure, account for and quantify. For example, it is difficult to 
determine the accountability of Greenpeace on the basis of the number of ships caught 
dumping at sea since the presence of Greenpeace alone serves as a deterrent (Bernard, 
2012; Parakrama, 2007). Similarly, the provision of relief and humanitarian services 
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by an NGO like the Red Cross or any other relief agency may be difficult to account 
for purely and simply on the basis of the number of people who benefit or how well 
financial resources are utilised (Bernard, 2012; Parakrama, 2007).  The number of 
variables and stakeholders involved in NGO accountability are many and diffused to 
the extent that an overreliance on a single one-dimensional upward accountability 
towards only one particular group of stakeholders is not sustainable and as such 
flawed in the literature (Burger and Owens, 2010; Cronin and O’Regan, 2002; 
Ebrahim, 2005; Lloyd, 2005; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008).  
 
While the adoption of a holistic accountability system that incorporates all 
stakeholder groups and integrates both upward and downward accountability has been 
emphasised in recent years, there is limited research on this kind of system (Ryan and 
Irvine, 2012; Sinclair, 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012).  Thus, a review of the 
NGO accountability system so far has revealed that both the accounting and 
accountability literature have not explored the holistic nature of accountability 
considering both upward and downward accountability (Agyemang et al., 2009; 
Burger and Seabe, 2014; Sinclair, 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012).  
 
Thus, there is limited evidence of studies that focus on exploring how NGOs account 
to all stakeholders. This is the reason why it has been recommended that a multi-
purpose stakeholder social approach to accountability is necessary to take into 
account the nature of NGOs so as to provide a holistic assessment of NGOs’ 
accountability (Fowler, 1995; Pearce, 2003). Although the above issue has been 
recognised, there is limited systematic empirical research that has examined the 
integration of these multi-purpose stakeholder approaches to examining NGOs’ 
accountability system (Assad and Goddard, 2010; Doh and Guay, 2006; Ebrahim, 
2005; Fox and Brown, 1998; Hug, 2011).  
 
Again, it is suggested that NGO accountability systems are highly influenced by the 
institutional forces functioning within the operational environment of NGOs. 
However, the extent to which these institutional pressures impacts on NGO 
accountability has attracted limited focus in the literature. Again the response of 
NGOs to these institutional pressures has not been much investigated. It is claimed 
that NGOs passively respond to these pressures because of their limited power and 
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influence in comparison to donors towards NGO accountability relations (Pache and 
Santos, 2010a, b; Rauh, 2010). This not withstanding, there is a counter argument that 
suggests the active and strategic responses of NGOs to these institutional pressures 
(Crilly et. al., 2012; Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010b). In effect, the effect of 
institutional pressures on NGO accountability relations and the responses of NGOs to 
these pressures have limited focus in the literature. 
 
Therefore, this study is designed to address the identified gaps in the literature. 
Specifically, the study sought to examine the nature of accountability systems in 
NGOs and to explore the various strategies that NGOs adopt to respond to the 
institutional pressures that confront them. Thus, the study seeks to investigate the 
limited focus of a holistic accountability system that incorporates both upward and 
downward accountability systems; examine the effects of institutional pressures on 
NGO accountability systems; and the various strategic responses available to NGOs 
in handling these institutional pressures. 
 
2.10. Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, the pertinent literature on NGOs accountability systems has been 
reviewed. It is established that NGO accountability tends to be predominantly upward 
partly because donors have the power to punish NGOs that are perceived not to be 
accountable (Agyemang et al., 2009; Bendell, 2006; Ebrahim, 2010; Jordan and van 
Tuijl, 2006; Najam, 1996a; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). However, upward 
accountability is seen to be inefficient because it is one dimensional, donor driven and 
stifles creativity and leaning. There is, therefore, the need for the adoption of a more 
holistic NGO accountability mechanism if the sector is to fully achieve its potential. 
The chapter also discussed the institutional pressures faced by NGOs, including legal, 
social, economic, political and regulatory pressures as documented (Bloodgood et al., 
2013; Brass, 2012; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010b; 
Ramanath, 2008; Tam and Hasmath, 2014). These set the tone for critical examination 
of how NGOs respond to these pressures.   
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CHAPTER THREE  
THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY AND CASE BACKGROUND 
 
3.0.  Introduction 
 
Chapter Three examines the case context and presents the background of the studied 
NGO. The chapter commences with a discussion of the background to Ghana, the 
country within which the research is undertaken with particular emphasis on the 
demographic, political, economic, and the social environments of the country. This is 
followed by a discussion of the general NGO environment in Ghana with regards to 
the history, growth and their role towards improving the livelihoods of the deprived 
and marginalized communities in the country. The chapter then examines KKP, the 
case study for the research in terms of its mission and vision. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the issues discussed.  
 
3.1.  Background to Ghana 
 
Ghana, previously known as the Gold Coast, is an English speaking West African 
country flanked by three Francophone countries and the Atlantic Ocean (Asante, 
1996; Boafo-Arthur, 2009). Ghana shares boarders with La Côte d'Ivoire on the west, 
Togo to the east, at the north is Burkina Faso and to the south is the Atlantic Ocean. 
Some Portuguese traders initially identified Ghana in 1470 and the English, Dutch, 
and the Swedes followed in 1553, 1595, and 1640 respectively. After fierce resistance 
particularly from the Ashantis, the British eventually established Ghana as its colony 
in 1901 and ruled until 1957 (De Smith, 1957). Ghana was the first sub-Saharan 
country to obtain independence and eventually became a republic in 1960 (Nelson et 
al., 2013). Although the country has over a hundred ethnic groups with equal numbers 
of ethnic dialects, the English language is the official one.  
 
The next part of the discussion focuses on the demographic, political, economic and 
the social environments of Ghana. 
 
 
	   75	  
3.2.  Demographic Characteristics 
 
The Republic of Ghana is a tropical, sub-Saharan country situated alongside the Gulf 
of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. It has a total land area of about 238,537 square 
kilometres (Figure 3.1) with a population of about 24,658,823 constituents according 
to the 2010-population census constituting an increase of 30.4 percent over the 2000 
census population figure of 18.8 million (Table 3.1) [(Adarkwa, 2013; Ghana 


















Figure 3. 1 The Map of Ghana 
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Age Range                       
(15-64) Years 
All Regions 238,533 24,658,823 12,545,229 12,113,594 14,040,893 
Western 23,921 2,376,021 1,007,969 1,368,052 1,359,590 
Central 9,826 2,201,863 1,037,878 1,163,985 1,213,660 
Greater Accra  3,245 4,010,054 3,630,955 379,099 2.611,312 
Volta 20,570 2,118,252 713,735 1,404,517 1,168,070 
Eastern 19,323 2,633,154 1,143,918 1,489,236 1,471,315 
Ashanti  24,389 4,780,380 2,897,290 1,883,090 2,772,031 
Brong Ahafo  39,557 2,310,983 1,028,473 1,282,510 1,274,454 
Northern 70,384 2,479,461 750,712 1,728,749 1,260,064 
Upper East 8,842 1,046,545 219,646 826,899 540,345 
Upper West 18,476 702,110 114,653 587,457 367,065 
Source: Ghana Statistical Services (2013) 
 
The average life expectancy of men in Ghana is 61 years and that for women is 64 
years (WHO, 2012). About 56.9% of the total population of Ghana is between the 
ages of 15 and 64 years whilst about 50% (49.5%) of the youthful age group is 
between 15 and 50 years (Table 3.1) [(Ghana Statistical Service, 2013)].  
 
Table 3. 2 Regional Distribution of the Main Ethnic Groups 
Regions Akan Ga-Dangme Ewe Guan Gurma 
Mole-
Dandme Grusi Mande Others 
All Regions 11,321,568 1,766,287 3,323,072 879,861 1,363,502 3,963,017 594,248 296,842 342,197 
Western  1,809,148 71,048 143,891 17,397 21,728 199,044 18,691 18,515 14,809 
Central 1,744,332 53,863 131,944 112,665 19,261 37,278 10,594 8,001 16,990 
Greater Accra  1,528,722 1,056,153 75,332 73,409 62,435 200,735 48,822 28,656 75,568 
Volta 55,736 31,130 1,482,180 162,981 227,282 9,473 2,214 1,591 36,313 
Eastern 1,312,977 460,814 486,136 137,386 42,291 83,311 19,412 6,771 20,377 
Ashanti  3,449,358 54,968 175,456 70,956 130,209 525,742 94,509 94,676 50,014 
Brong Ahafo 1,314,500 28,649 82,123 92,571 153,692 405,286 85,956 40,029 29,197 
Northern  74,320 7,688 40,677 204,442 651,083 1,258,657 88,599 12,843 50,664 
Upper East  23,306 1,245 2,542 2,542 47,083 750,205 86,158 56,568 34,242 
Upper West 9,169 722 2,737 5,512 8,433 439,286 139,293 2,192 14,023 
Source: Ghana Statistical Services (2013) 
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This suggests that the country has a youthful population (56.9%). Ghana is ethnically 
heterogeneous with the main ethnic groups being the Akans (47.5%), followed by the 
Mole-Dagbane (16.6%), then the Ewe (13.9%) among others (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2013). About 50.9% of the population lives in the urban cities whilst 49.1% 
are in the rural communities (Table 3.2). In spite of the fact that about 12,113,594 of 
the population are in the rural areas of the country, in terms of resource allocation and 
development, the rural areas and most parts of the urban communities are neglected 
primarily by the private/public sectors necessitating the involvement of the NGO 
sector to fill the developmental gap.  
 
Table 3.3 suggests that Christianity (71.2%) dominates the religious landscape of 
Ghana followed by Islam (17.6%). [(Ghana Statistical Service, 2013)]  
 
Table 3. 3 Regional Distribution of Religion in Ghana 
Regions No Religion Catholic Protestant Pentecostal Other Christians Islam Traditionalist Others 
All Regions 1,302,077 3,230,966 4,534,178 6,980,792 2,800,871 4,345,723 1,270,272 193,914 
Western  160,229 385,970 502,524 701,540 361,966 222,351 17,972 23,469 
Central 144,892 243,835 461,962 655,298 470,673 190,719 14,089 20,395 
Greater Accra  136,711 300,466 892,537 1,786,519 358,792 475,497 21,045 38,507 
Volta 139,688 372,695 455,352 563,560 151,251 121,062 297,699 16,945 
Eastern 172,381 208,043 652,772 955,336 407,694 175,579 36,707 24,642 
Ashanti  259,989 608,602 941,093 1,440,589 729,509 728,741 34,685 37,172 
Brong Ahafo 168,839 464,771 408,957 566,878 229,395 393,908 62,847 15,388 
Northern  65,826 187,846 124,011 156,832 52,903 1,486,937 395,756 9,350 
Upper East  29,243 208,471 73,981 123,945 29,829 283,188 291,808 6,080 
Upper West 24,279 250,317 20,989 30,295 8,859 267,741 97,664 1,966 
Source: Ghana Statistical Services (2013) 
 
3.3.  Political Environment 
 
The political environment of Ghana is a blend of two systems namely the traditional 
and modern systems of governance working together to ensure political stability in 
the country. The traditional system of governance dates back in history and has 
Chieftaincy as its cardinal institution. It hinges on the ability of the traditional leaders 
(chiefs and elders) to ensure effective governance of their communities (Olowu and 
Wunsch, 2004). The traditional leaders specifically the Chief, sub-chiefs and a 
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Queenmother are elected by royalty lineage to ensure among others the effective 1) 
resolution of disputes, 2) mobilization of resources towards community development 
and 3) mobilise communal labour for development (Tweneboah, 2012).  
 
The modern system of governance in Ghana is the constitutional democracy, a system 
of governance overseen by an elected executive president, a vice-president, members 
of parliament, and an independent judiciary. There is currently two hundred and 
seventy-five (275) elected members of parliament (Kessey, 2006). Politically, Ghana 
obtained independence from British colonial rule in 1957 and the country has since 
been divided into ten geographic and administrative regions, subdivided into 164 
districts/municipals and 6 metropolitan areas (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013; Saleh, 
2012). Administratively, the 10 regions and 170 districts/metropolitans are managed 
by regional ministers, deputy regional ministers, district chief executives (DCEs) and 
municipal chief executives (MCEs) on behalf of the President (Adamtey, 2012; Takyi 
et al., 2010). These two political systems (traditional and modern) work together to 
ensure efficient resolution of problems (Boafo-Arthur, 2006; Brempong, 2006; 
Owusu-Mensah, 2014).   
 
3.4.  Economic Environment  
 
Economically, Ghana is a developing country with a huge economic disparity among 
the ten administrative regions (Abor and Quartey, 2010; Al and Diao, 2007; Andrew 
and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). About 54.2% (11,519,666) of the total population is 
economically active (employed formally or informally) with the Greater Accra 
Region having the most active population (3,540,203) [(Ghana Statistical Service, 
2013)]. Agriculture, forestry and fishing are the most active economic activities in 
Ghana with about 41.5% of the active population being involved; and cocoa is the 
major cash crop and an active foreign exchange earner for the country.  
 
Ghana experienced an acute economic recession in the early 1980s in which virtually 
all-economic conditions worsened with inadequate basic amenities leading to a 
worsened standard of living (Alagidede et al., 2013). The economic crisis situation 
was compounded with the destruction of large portions of cocoa plantations by 
bushfires in 1983. As a consequence the state was unable to adequately provide for its 
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citizens leading to an increase in the level of self-reliance activities among the 
population (Azarya and Chazan, 1987; Pinkney, 2009; Rothchild, 1991). The situation 
brought untold economic hardship on Ghana necessitating the immediate intervention 
of both the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These 
economic assistance packages resulted to the introduction of economic reforms 
including the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) in 1983 (Afriyie, 2009). The impact of both interventions on the 
economic recovery of Ghana is highly contested with some claiming its positive 
impact (Hutchful, 1995; 2002; Owusu, 2005) whilst others argue they rather worsened 
the crisis and further widened the gap between the rich and the vulnerable poor 
(Adarkwa, 2013; Yeboah, 2003). The unequal allocation of resources dictated by SAP 
meant the suffering of untold hardships of the poor (Amankwah et al., 2014; Katsriku, 
1996) that led to a significant increase in NGO activities in the country to help bridge 
the gap left by the system.  
 
Since then, there has been several other economic initiatives including a shift of focus 
towards a market orientation that saw the active involvement of the private sector as 
an engine for economic growth and export drive and import reduction initiatives 
aimed at improving the economic conditions of Ghana. However, the intended impact 
of these initiatives could not be achieved as the level of the external debt kept rising 
reaching $6.2 billion in 2006. With support from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, Ghana joined the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) initiative in 2002 culminating in a total debt relief to the tune of US$ 3.7 
billion (Dartey-Baah et al., 2012; Tetteh, 2003).   
 
3.5.  Social Environment  
 
A social policy framework ensures the provision of basic social services including 
among others education and health to the citizens (Asante, 2007; Mancini, 2009; 
Shepherd et al., 2006). However, Ghana has no clearly defined social policy hence 
different political regimes have attempted to provide ad-hoc social interventions on 
health, education, housing and other social services initiatives with no clear cut 
direction and focus (Aryeetey and Goldstein, 2000; Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). 
The disjointed and unfocused provision of these social services has left many 
	   80	  
inhabitants, especially those in the rural and deprived areas neglected as far as the 
provision of social goods are concerned. It is sad to note in the 21st century, many 
children in Ghana are malnourished, have no access to medical care and receive 
education under trees (if at all) [(Adjei-Frempong et al., 2012; Asafo-Agyei et al., 
2013)]. It is also common practice, for example, to witness communities with no 
potable water and lacks other essential basic needs of life (Adjei et al., 2012).  
 
Most communities in Ghana are cut off from other parts of the country due mainly to 
inaccessible roads (Armah et al., 2010).  For instance, Yahaya  (2014) enumerates the 
deplorable state of the road network particularly, in the Sissala East District of the 
country. Diseases abound in some communities and neither the government nor the 
private sector alone can handle these social challenges (Addai and Adjei, 2014). In 
effect, the provision of social services in Ghana is woefully inadequate especially, in 
some of the deprived districts of Ghana including Chereponi, Jirapa, Bole, Atebubu-
Amantin, East Gonja, Saboba, Tolon, Zabzugu (Armah et al., 2010; Boateng and 
Ansah, 2014; Buadi et al., 2013). The situation is worsened by the unequal gender 
distribution of resources/wealth between the northern and southern sectors of the 
country (Oduro et al., 2011). These challenges present persistent high poverty levels 
and deteriorating social services levels (Debrah, 2013; Ghana Statistical Service, 
2013; UNDP, 2004).  The adoption of the World Bank-International Monetary Fund 
(WB-IMF) led ERP, and SAP interventions worsened the social welfare status of 
Ghana (Aryeetey and Goldstein, 2000).  
 
The demographic, political, and economic factors of Ghana are such that neither the 
public nor the private sector (or both) are capable of solving the social problems of 
the people of Ghana. This is why the NGOs sector is important to help improve the 
social needs of the Ghanaian population.  
 
What cushions the social pressures a little is the traditional setup of the typical 
Ghanaian extended family system that ensures the timely and collective provision of 
the social and other needs of communities. In an extended family system, the 
upbringing of children, organisation of communal labour for community 
development, and the general welfare of community members is the collective 
responsibility of all.   
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Thus in the absence of governmental social welfare support communities have always 
been ‘each other’s keeper’. The situation is however, changing rapidly. Studies on the 
makeup of modern families particularly, in the deprived areas of Ghana have reported 
large numbers of households that are run by women alone. These women obtain 
minimal support from families within communities and mostly struggle to feed and 
clothe their children (Songsore, 2012).  
 
3.6.  Historical Perspective of NGOs in Ghana 
 
The voluntary activities (NGO) concept has been part of the social makeup of 
Ghanaian communities for years. Community and group based associations shaped by 
the indigenous Ghanaian culture existed in the pre-colonial era (Amamoo, 2011; 
Atingdui et al., 1997). Records have it that many community based associations 
(CBOs) existed to ensure the collective welfare of community members even before 
the colonial era (Anarfi et al., 2003; Ayee, 2000; Darkwa et al., 2006). For example 
the Fante Confederacy (1868-1874) and the Aborigines Rights Protection Society 
(1897) were pre-colonial NGOs established to address collective societal concerns 
(Agyemang and Ofosu-Mensah, 2013; Amamoo, 2011; Boahen, 2011; Gyimah-Boadi 
and Oquaye, 2000). The Nsawam-Aburi Cocoa Farmers Association for instance was 
setup in the 1930s specifically to protest the unfair treatment and practices meted out 
to cocoa farmers by the European Cocoa Purchasing Companies (Abdul-Gafaru and 
Quantson, 2008).  
 
The NGO sector in Ghana integrates both the indigenous and western voluntary 
traditions. 
 
The traditional setup of a typical Ghanaian community is one ruled and governed by a 
traditionally selected royal family member/chief and his elders with a mandate to 
among others marshal communal forces for developmental and other purposes 
including the construction of footpaths, roads, wells, sanitation and the provision of 
other social amenities for communal benefit (Akrofi and Whittal, 2011; Amanor et 
al., 1993; Korboe, 1998). Any identified developmental projects are collectively 
discussed for consensus and possible implementation via communal human resources 
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mobilization (Korboe, 1998). Once consensus have been reached, a ‘town crier’ is 
instructed to inform community members of an impending communal labour activity 
which normally takes place on market or sacred days (Acheampong, 1994; Tsey, 
2011). Although such collective community discussions waste time, it usually serves 
as a source of social interaction, improves community communication and enhances 
the level of consensus decision-making. However, the possibility of such discussion 
forums being hijacked by the elites and opinion leaders in society is high such that the 
outcomes might not reflect and address the needs of the majority (Aheampong, 1994).  
 
The main source of funding for community projects at that time was from a ‘fair’ 
calibrated levy system on all community adults. In that levy systems, community 
members who resides in other towns or cities pay the highest levy because they were 
deemed to be richer (Aryeetey et al., 2013). Male residents paid a higher levy with 
women residents generally paying the smallest contribution. Korboe (1998) asserts 
that although these personal levies are generally insignificant to finance projects, they 
served as a unifying mechanism and symbolise commitment levels.  
 
At the group level, individual members of communities always joined forces as a 
‘self-help group’ to assist each other particularly in their farming activities on a 
rotation basis. For instance most Akan speaking communities had group-based 
associations called the `nnoboa' system where individuals agreed to be bonded by a 
common motive to help each other on a rotational basis to conduct farming activities 
(Arko-Achemfuor, 2011; Dadson, 1984; Katsriku, 1996). The nnoboa system 
promotes unity and synergy among members as far as farm sizes and efficiency are 
concerned. Similar group-based schemes are found in other parts of the country 
(Arko-Achemfuor, 2011; Opoku et al., 2009).  
 
The pre-independent period saw the proliferation of missionary activities that 
culminated in the establishment of religious groups mostly in rural communities 
(Amanor et al., 1993; Atingdui et al., 1997 Grischow, 2008). With help from the 
colonial administration and minimal resistance from government, these groups setup 
their own hospitals; schools and other institutions to assist rural communities within 
the country better their lot (Atingdui et al., 1997). Katsriku (1996) assets that the pre-
independent period also saw the establishment of foreign NGOs such as the Red 
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Cross Society and the Society for the Prevention of Tuberculosis to help the 
vulnerable people in urban cities in Ghana.  
 
The formation of NGOs further intensified after the Second World War in line with 
the desire and determination of the citizenry to obtain independence from colonial 
rule and to resist racial discrimination (Mohan, 2002). It can be argued that NGOs 
were very instrumental in the struggle for independence (Abdul-Gafaru and Quantson, 
2008).  The activities of these foreign NGOs were expanded to rural areas of the 
country after independence. 
 
At the time of independence in 1957, the NGO sector in Ghana was blossoming. 
However, the period after independence marked the beginning of an era of NGO 
control as the government of the first republic embarked on a crackdown exercise to 
suppress the activities of NGOs (Drah, 2014; Crawford and Abdul-Gafaru, 2012; 
Diamond et al., 1988; Gyimah-Boadi, and Yakah, 2012; Ninsin and Drah, 1993). The 
suppression of NGOs in Ghana continued until the adoption of the all-inclusive Union 
Government approach of the 1976 regime.  The government at the time realizing the 
important role NGOs could play to alleviate societal hardships attempted to re-
energise the activities NGOs but that attempt was criticized especially by the Ghana 
Bar Association as a strategy by the government to rather marginalize NGOs (Abdul-
Gafaru and Quantson, 2008). 
 
As in the era of the first republic, the 1980s saw another attempt by the Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC) government to sabotage the activities of NGOs to 
the extent that almost all existing NGOs were under governmental influence 
(Hutchful, 2002). However, upon the introduction of the Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP) and with pressure from donors, the government changed focus and 
begun encouraging NGOs to bridge the developmental gap (Drah, 2014; Crawford 
and Abdul-Gafaru, 2012; Gyimah-Boadi, and Yakah, 2012). The international 
community affirmed their commitment to encourage the active involvement of NGOs 
in the development of Ghana in 1987 at a donor conference. At that conference, it was 
agreed that the government should actively involve NGOs in the disbursement of the 
US$80 million towards poverty alleviation under the Program of Action to Mitigate 
the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) programme. The international 
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community intervention significantly improved relations between the major 
stakeholders i.e. donors, NGOs, and the government (Darkwa et al., 2006; Gary, 
1996). However, in 1993 the government introduced an NGO bill that was perceived 
as a subtle attempt by the government to undermine the autonomy of NGOs in the 
country (Gary 1996; Mohan, 2002). The bill was eventually withdrawn and a 
consensus on a bill to regulate the operations on NGOs in Ghana is yet to be finalized.  
 
Different types of NGOs including indigenous grass root organizations, religious 
organizations, community-based organizations and international development and 
relief organisations amongst others operate in Ghana (Atingdui et al., 1997; Simpson, 
2008). In fact, TechnoServe, an American International NGO was established in 
Ghana in 1968 to help improve the livelihood of deprived communities. For purposes 
of clarification, the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) categorizes NGOs in Ghana 
into four groups, namely: 1) Indigenous - community organization without external 
affiliation; 2) National indigenous - national organisations without external affiliation; 
3) National affiliates of international organizations with indigenous leadership; and 4) 
International organizations operating locally (Simpson, 2008).  
 
To obtain official status and recognition, all NGOs in Ghana must register with the 
DSW, which is under the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection. The 
current number of registered NGOs (Table 3.4) from the statistics of the DSW 
database since registration started over two decades ago is five thousand nine hundred 
and eight (5298) and increasing annually. NGOs in Ghana exist to provide services to 
mostly deprived communities in areas such as education, sanitation, health, research 
and development, water development, agriculture, environmental protection, 
vocational skills, food security, and capacity building.  
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Table 3. 4 Number of Registered NGOs 
Year Number of Registered NGOs Percentage change 
1980 80 100 
1996 652 815 
2000 1211 186 
2010 4463 369 
2013 5298 119 
Source: Compiled by researcher with data from DSW (2013)  
 
Although NGOs are found in all of the ten administrative regions of Ghana, the three 
mostly deprived northern regions: Northern, Upper West, and Upper East, houses the 
majority of them (USAID, 2010). This section host what is perceived as ‘the NGO 
capital of Ghana’ – Tamale (Agyemang et al., 2012). It is argued that in 2010, Ghana 
received about US $1.5 billion from 19 ODA the bulk of which went into NGO 
activities in the three northern regions towards the provision of health, education and 
agriculture (Agyemang et al., 2012). This trend has been historical. For instance, 
between 1994 and 1997, DANIDA built 22 and rehabilitated 22 health centres in the 
northern part of Ghana.  As a result, access to health facilities in general increased 
from 50% to over 84% whilst children immunisation increased by 30% over the same 
period (Particip GmbH, 2008). This is in sharp contrast to what happens elsewhere in 
say Tanzania where over 45% of NGO activities are concentrated in Dar es Salaam 
alone (Hakikazi Catalyst, 2002a; Mason, 2011).  
 
A two-part NGO registration process operates in Ghana. Firstly, all NGOs must 
register under the Company Code, 1963 (Act 179) and obtain a certificate to 
commence business and incorporation from the Registrar General’s Department under 
the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General as a Company Limited by Guarantee. 
The second stage of the NGO registration process is with the Department of Social 
Welfare (DSW), which is under the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare as 
either a local or an international NGO. The DSW is mandated to regulate and oversee 
the activities of all NGOs operating in Ghana. NGOs in Ghana are relatively small in 
operations, under funded with non-functional board of directors and generally depend 
largely on foreign sources for their funding requirements (USAID, 2010). The board 
of directors is generally appointed to oversee the effective operations of NGOs. This 
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effectively determines the mission and the strategic direction and also monitors the 
dealings of the executive director. Local funding options for NGOs are virtually non-
existent and the GoG does not directly provide funding to support NGOs except when 
the government directly contracts an NGO. The limited sources of funding breeds 
‘fund chasing’, a system where NGOs simply vary their scope of operations in line 
with operational areas that resonates with donors. It is therefore common to see a 
typical NGO in Ghana operating in several operational areas: health, education, 
climate change and the like all in the name of chasing funding options. This situation 
does not promote specialization (USAID, 2010).  
 
There is currently no specific law on NGOs in Ghana since the 1993 attempt by the 
GoG to introduce a bill to regulate NGOs in the country has still not been finalized. In 
1993, a draft bill to regulate NGOs was rejected by the NGO community citing lack 
of consultation and the restrictive nature of the bill. Following that, a joint initiative of 
relevant stakeholders produced the Draft National Policy for Strategic Partnership 
with NGOs. Finally, a trust bill to regulate NGOs and other private sector 
organisations was again rejected by an umbrella body, the Ghana Association of 
Private Voluntary Organizations in Development (Darkwa et al., 2006). As it stands 
now, there is no law on NGOs in Ghana. In effect, ‘the proposed Trust Bill to govern 
NGO activities as well as the relations between NGOs, the government and the donor 
community, remains a bone of contention between NGOs, which are dissatisfied with 
its contents, and the government’ (USAID, 2010: p. 64). In addition although NGOs, 
particularly the coalition of NGOs, have the capacity to influence policy makers such 
as the right of Information Bill, there is no established framework of the modalities 
within which NGOs could be engaged in policy issues (USAID, 2010). Also, there is 
no defined national body for NGOs in Ghana except for pockets of sector specific 
coalitions such as the Ghana Anti-Corruption, and regional specific coalitions 
including the Northern Ghana Network for Development. However, the biggest 
amongst the coalitions is the Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organizations in 
Development (GAPVOD). 
  
NGOs play a very important role in the economic development of Ghana. However, 
they are generally weak resource wise (Drah, 2014). Resource support from the GoG 
and other local sources is inadequate necessitating NGOs to fully depend on donors 
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for particularly financial resources (Buadi et al., 2013). For NGOs to continuously 
play their roles effectively, a clearer understanding of their accountability systems is 
necessary. This will help the various stakeholders appreciate the accountability 
challenges within the sector and to develop a practicable accountability system with 
particular reference to NGOs peculiarities.  
 
3.7.  The Case Organisation 
 
The case selected for the study (henceforth referred to as KKP for purposes of 
anonymity) is one of the several CBOs/NGOs operating in Ghana. KKP has 
accountability as one of its core values and is mainly concerned with ensuring 
improvements in the welfare of particularly women and children in deprived 
communities. Established in 2001, and with support from donors, key personnel 
(Appendix B) and community volunteers, KKP provides mostly health and 
educational needs for their clientele and for poverty alleviation purposes. KKP 
operates in all the ten regions and communities in Ghana. KKP belongs to several 
NGO coalitions including: Ghana Coalition of NGOs in Health; Ghana HIV and 
AIDS Network (GHANET); Coalition of NGOs for the Prevention of Malaria; Ghana 
Coalition of NGOs for the Rights of the Child; and Gender Violence Survivor Support 
Network (GVSSN).  
 
It is true that ‘portmanteau NGOs’ are occasionally setup by dishonest individuals to 
swindle money / resources from donors. Chris Dadzie of the Ghana Academy of Arts 
and Science argues that NGOs exist in ‘every other house’ in the northern part of 
Ghana yet there is little to show in terms of outcome. The unfortunate legacy is the 
perception that NGOs are not accountable and relevant. However, the importance of 
NGOs in Ghana towards improving social issues cut across sectors. This explains why 
the UN and other International agencies for example see NGOs in Ghana and 
elsewhere as developmental partners (Bagci, 2007; Bendell, 2006; Ulleberg, 2009). 
 
The greater number of the citizenry in most developing countries are dissatisfied with 
the level and quality of services delivered by the public sector including health, water, 
education, and job creation (Akinboade et al., 2012; Deininger and Mpuga, 2005; 
Owusu, 2006). Consequently, NGOs are seen as instrumental in the provision of 
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health, environmental and educational services for the benefit of a major proportion of 
the population. The contribution of NGOs in the provision of health services to the 
masses worldwide is enormous (World Health Organization, 2010). For instance, 
NGO hospitals in sub-Saharan Africa improved health care delivery by 43% in 
Tanzania and 34% in Ghana (Loewenson, 2003). Again NGOs are key in sensitizing, 
educating and developing the masses on national issues, conflict management, and on 
environmental issues (Darko-Mensah and Okereke, 2013; Derkyi et al., 2014; 
Ohemeng, 2005). 
 
3.8.  Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter Three examined the economy of Ghana and the NGO environment. It 
explained the demographic, political, economic and the social environments of 
Ghana. It then looked at the history of NGOs in Ghana together with the case study 
NGO (KKP). The essence of the chapter was to help situate the research in the 
specific context of Ghana. 





4.1.  Introduction 
 
This research seeks to understand how NGO accountability systems function and to 
investigate the effect of institutional pressures on NGO accountability systems. It also 
seeks to examine the strategic responses of NGOs to these institutional/isomorphic 
pressures. The adopted premise is that since NGOs operate and function within 
environments, it is possible for existing institutional forces to affect their 
accountability systems. Similarly, it is essential to understand how NGOs respond to 
such pressures.  
 
The chapter presents the theoretical framework, which is used as a lens to interpret the 
results of the study. The study draws on institutional theory particularly New 
Institutional Sociology (NIS) to examine the effect of institutional forces on an 
NGO’s accountability mechanisms. In order to understand how the NGO would 
respond to these institutional pressures, the study also integrates ideas from Oliver’s 
(1991) analysis of strategic responses to institutional pressures.  
 
The chapter commences with the definition and discussions of institutions and argues 
that defining institutions remains contentious in the literature. It then proceeds to 
discuss institutional theory in general and why it has become one of the main 
theoretical frameworks for social science and other researchers in recent times. The 
chapter contends that NIS and its associated isomorphism of coercive, mimetic and 
normative could explain NGO accountability mechanisms but then NGOs could 
respond to these pressures strategically. The chapter concludes with a diagrammatical 
representation of the framework and a discussion of why NIS is selected as the 
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4.2.  Defining Institutions 
 
The starting point for reviewing the institutional theory is an attempt to define 
institutions. However, the definition of what constitutes institutions remains highly 
contested in the literature (Brammer et al., 2012; Jackson, 2010; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991, 2012; Scott, 1995, 2001). Perhaps this explains why Peters (2011) 
argues that institutionalism connotes different things to different scholars to the extent 
that sometimes the whole concept becomes contradictory (Hall and Taylor, 1996).  
 
Nevertheless, there seems to be consensus that institutions are structures/arrangement 
external to social actors (individuals and organisations) that operate together with 
other elements at different levels of social settings to establish and maintain stability 
and regulate social behaviour (Jackson, 2010; Peters, 2000, 2011; Scott, 2001). For 
example, Berger and Luckmann, (1966) argue that institutions exist where under 
certain conditions, a social actor is required to behave and operate in a particular 
manner such that any deviations results in the application of social sanctions and in 
some cases affect the legitimacy of the social actors concerned (Brammer et al., 2012; 
Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  
 
In can be argued that institutions are paramount to the successful functioning of 
societies because they establish uniform and conformable structures for adoption 
(Scott, 2001). Such structures might be broad or specific. Whilst broad structures 
permit actors to accept and operate within the structure with variations where 
necessary, specific structures are strict with no variations (Brammer et al., 2012).  
 
Once established, institutional structures are transmitted and internalised by social 
actors to enable them to operate harmoniously within their functional environment. 
The means through which institutional elements are transmitted to actors are many 
four of which are identified by Scott (2001) to include symbolic systems, relations 
systems, routines and artefacts. In effect, institutions tend to impose social structures 
on actors using elements such as laws, governance systems, operating procedures and 
standards.  
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Over time these structures become socially accepted, internalised and are enacted into 
social actors as the guiding principles upon which societies are governed such that 
any departures are quickly noticed and discouraged (Bjorck, 2004; Brammer et al., 
2012; Giddens, 2013; Scott, 2005). 
 
To a greater extent, institutions are shaped by contestation, conflict, compromises and 
the characteristics of a dominant force that determines acceptable conformance 
standards within a particular time horizon (Brammer et al., 2012; Jackson, 2010). The 
basis upon which actors adhere to established structures is dependent on the pillar of 
enforcement: regulative, normative, and/or cognitive in operation (Table 4.1) [(Scott, 
1995)].  
 
Table 4. 1 Three Pillars of Institutions 
  
Regulative Normative Cognitive 
    Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken for granted 
    Mechanism Coercive Normative Mimetic 
    Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
    Indicators Rules, laws, sanctions Certification, accreditation Prevalence, isomorphism 
    Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally supported, conceptually 
correct 
Source: Scott (1995, p. 33) 
 
Table 4.1 depicts the three pillars of institutions and the attributes of each in relation 
to their basis of compliance, mechanism, logic, indicators and basis of legitimacy. For 
example, when the regulative pillar is at play, the mechanism of enforcement is 
coercive and the indicators are rules and laws. It therefore rests on actors to internalise 
the pillars and operate within their remits for societal acceptability. 
 
4.3.  Institutional Theory 
 
The concept of institutional theory as a model to understand the effects of institutions 
on the operations of organisations has been in existence for decades firstly with the 
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introduction of old institutionalism and later institutional theory in the 1970s (Bjorck, 
2004; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer, 2007, 2010; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012; 
Scott, 2005).  
 
Old institutionalism (also called neoclassical theory) focused primarily on individual 
and societal rationality in value maximisation and the adherence of formal rules but 
rejects the importance of the effects of informal and environmental forces on the 
operations of organisations (Meyer, 2007). Old institutionalism stresses upon the 
irrelevance of social relationships towards societal behaviour and argues that society 
makes rational decisions with no reference to environmental and social influences 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996).   
 
However, the 1970s saw the birth of institutional theory otherwise called neo-
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism or new institutionalism in sociology 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer, 2010; Rowan, 2010). Institutional theory is 
hailed as a modern theoretical perspective in organisational studies amongst social 
scientist (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012). This is 
because it rejects the irrelevance of social relationship assumptions of the neoclassical 
theory but complements it with some sociological dimension (Wickramasinghe and 
Alawattage, 2007). Institutional theory is thus useful in explaining the evolving nature 
of societies and the importance of institutions in shaping social behaviour (Brammer 
et al., 2012; Giddens, 2013).  It seeks to theorise the effective integration of 
organisations into the social, cultural and environmental settings within which they 
operate (Bjorck, 2004; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer, 2007, 2010; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 2012; Scott, 2001).  
 
The primary view of the new institutionalism is that society encompasses empowered, 
purposive, bounded social actors comprising individuals, states and organisations that 
operate therein and that the social environment, to a greater extent, affects the 
behaviour of social actors (Meyer, 2007).  Broadly, new institutionalism looks at the 
relationship between organisations and their environment. It emphasises the creation, 
sustenance and diffusion of organisations and the effects of the wider external 
environmental forces on the behaviour and interest of social actors (Brammer et al., 
2012).  
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The theory seeks to understand how socially constructed norms are internalised by 
organisations to become the lens through which society perceives the world (Bjorck, 
2004; Dillard, 2004; Meyer, 2010). It relates to the effective interaction between 
organisations and their environments such that an organisation’s ability to have a 
cordial relationship with its environment determines its level of legitimacy and 
survival (Giddens, 2013; Glover et al., 2014; Peters, 2011). It is concerned with the 
development and effects of social structures, values, rules, beliefs, norms, and culture 
on individuals and organisational practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, 2012).  
 
The theory suggests that the existence of these predominant environmental factors 
(symbols, beliefs, values etc.) in a social setting over time become institutionalised 
and internalised in the minds of social actors. These factors become socially 
acceptable as legitimate to the extent that they eventually become taken for granted 
and the way of doing things within that society.  It argues that when strong norms 
develop in an organisation’s environment, organisations operating in such 
environment are compelled to adopt these norms to survive. The issue is: how do 
organisations operating in such an environment cope with these institutional norms 
and pressures, and what are the incentives for organisations to follow and adopt the 
rules of these institutions? 
 
Since its inception, institutional theory has gained popularity and vigour among social 
researchers because it has the ability to somehow involve social actors to determine 
the legitimacy of organisations operating within their environment (Meyer, 2010). 
The theory has the advantage of providing management with the tools to unify the gap 
between societal perceptions and the organisational actions and to incorporate societal 
norms, expectations, and requirements in their daily activities for legitimacy and 
survival (Meyer, 2007, 2010; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012).  
 
The popularity of institutional theory lies in its universal and interdisciplinary 
applicability. The theory has been used extensively for research in many disciplines 
especially in accounting, economics, sociology, political science, information 
technology and business studies (Bjorck, 2004; Chiravuri and Ambrose, 2002; Dillard 
et al., 2004; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Modell, 2009; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012; 
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Tsamenyi et al., 2006). This is in sharp contrast to the previously held view that 
institutional theory was applicable only to institutionalised organisations (Scott, 
1995). Chiravuri and Ambrose (2002) for example used the theory and the concept of 
isomorphism to conclude that organisations downsize because they are pressured by 
some external force; attempt to be similar to a best practiced; or have been told by 
experts that downsizing is good.  
 
Dillard et al. (2004) asserts that institutional theory has a wide range of applicability 
in all types of organisations both private and public and has been used considerably in 
various accounting research including budgetary control processes, management 
accounting changes, accounting regulations, financial institutions among others in the 
accounting literature. For example, NIS has been used extensively in both the public 
and private sectors in determining the effect of isomorphic pressures on the choice of 
accounting systems and the reaction of affected organisations in dealing with such 
pressures (Collier, 2001; Hussain and Hoque, 2002; Modell, 2002). Similarly, Moll et 
al. (2006a) argue that institutional theory has been used widely in five key accounting 
research areas including: the effect of macro environmental factors on accounting 
systems; the legitimacy of accounting systems; the efficiency of accounting systems; 
the composition of the institutional environment; and the effect of agency within 
organisations.  
 
The relevance of institutional theory in understanding accountability systems of 
NGOs is that there may be certain predominant environmental forces that may 
influence the accountability system of NGOs. It can be argued that NGOs operate in 
societies and are therefore affected ontologically by acceptable socially constructed 
views and norms (Scott, 1995).   
 
Three main strands of institutional theory exist, namely: New Institutional Economies 
(NIE), Old Institutional Economies (OIE) and New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
[(Burns, 2000; Mutiganda, 2014)]. However, for the purposes of this research, only 
NIS is used and is discussed below.  
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4.3.1.  New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
 
The NIS theory seeks to explain the effects of political, economic, social and other 
environmental factors on the operations of organisations. The theory argues that the 
structures, procedures and principles adopted by organisations are highly influenced 
by external pressures rather than rational optimisation of costs reduction and other 
rational motives. NIS suggests that the existence of macro factors can have a 
significant effect on the operational policies of organisations (Anheier, 2014; Powell 
and Bromley, 2013; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012; Scott, 2001). An organisation’s 
conformance to these factors warrants and promotes legitimacy and act as a catalyst 
for organisational survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 2012). The internalisation of these external rules, norms, values, customs 
and beliefs by organisations is described by Meyer and Rowan (1992) as 
institutionalisation. The model is useful in analysing organisations that are beset with 
uncertainty and are faced with institutional and political legitimacy (Tsamenyi et al., 
2006). 
 
Contrary to the ideology of economic rationality upon which NIE is based, NIS is 
different and argues that organisations could make ‘irrational’ decisions, mount 
minimal resistance and fully abide by societal norms as far as it legitimises their 
existence and does not bring them into conflict with the existing political, economic 
and social structures. The choices made by organisations to a greater extent may be 
shaped by the dictates of the institutional environment within which they operate 
(Carruthers, 1995). Thus, it can be argued that the accountability systems adopted by 
NGOs may not be entirely rational but could be influenced by the institutional 
environment within which NGOs operate as dictated by donors, governments, 
regulatory agencies, professional bodies and the like (Hussain and Hoque, 2002). As a 
result, NGOs could design their accountability mechanisms in response to the 
environmental pressures exercised by the aforementioned bodies in an irrational 
manner as far as it leads to survival and societal legitimisation. This is in line with the 
assertion by Moll et al. (2006a) that “the adoption of particular accounting systems 
can be understood in terms of a need to conform to external pressures as opposed to 
an overriding (rational-optimising) drive for increased internal efficiency” (p 187).  
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Paramount to a better understanding of the NIS theory is the concept of isomorphism, 
which is seen by DiMaggio and Powell (1991) as the process of forcing 
entities/individuals to behave perfectly like others given similar conditions. 
Isomorphism is the process by which organisations adopt and adapt institutional 
practices (Dillard et al., 2004) or the process of forcing member(s) of a population to 
behave and operate in an identical manner (homogenously) given similar 
environmental conditions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In fact, DiMaggio and 
Powell define isomorphism as “a constraining process that forces one unit in a 
population to resemble other units that facet the same set of environmental 
conditions” (1991, p. 66). 
 
Isomorphism is the modification of existing diverse organisational characteristics in 
line with acceptable environmental characteristics such that all entities within an 
organisational field become homogenous in nature towards a unified goal. Hannan 
and Freeman (1977) contend that isomorphism occurs because with time, all 
suboptimal behaviour of actors within an organisation field are eradicated as 
managers learn to agree on an acceptable behaviour. Isomorphism thus forces 
organisations to adopt certain characteristics that are deemed to be environmentally 
and socially acceptable but not purely on rational choices.  
 
The two types of isomorphism that have been identified in the literature are 
competitive isomorphism and institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 
1991; Fennell, 1980; Kanter, 1972). Competitive isomorphism mostly operates in a 
perfect competitive market where free and open competition thrives with an emphasis 
on market competition, rationality, fitness measure, and niche change (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Competitive isomorphism is linked with bureaucracy and has been 
criticised for not been entirely fit for purpose in today’s dynamic business 
environment hence it is supplemented by institutional isomorphism as a result of 
which it has been excluded from the efforts of explaining isomorphism. Institutional 
isomorphism argues that the characteristics of organisations are reflected in what is 
deemed to be socially acceptable. Institutional isomorphism thus explains the level of 
operational homogeneity in the activities of organisations operating in a particular 
environment/sector as all organisations within a sector strive to these acceptable 
characteristics such as NGOs and their accountability systems.    
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The theory argues that the environments within which organisations operate exert a 
much stronger influence in developing and shaping formal organisational structures 
than market pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1992; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991), 
the adoption of which leads to legitimacy whilst failure to adopt could signify 
organisational disaster (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 1992; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 
1991). Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that these environmental forces are myths and 
are accepted by organisations for the sake of legitimacy and survival as they seek to 
operate harmoniously within the institutional environment. For example, it is common 
for organisations to adopt particular structures, procedures, job titles, and roles etc. 
merely because they are applicable to the environment within which they operate 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1992; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012). The problem with the 
adoption of such institutional forces simply for legitimacy and survival is that it could 
lead to a reduction in organisational efficiency and competitiveness against other 
organisations in other environments the net effect of which is to promote 
homogeneity and standard operation procedures and practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012).  
 
4.3.2.  Institutional Isomorphism 
 
It is argued that isomorphism/homogeneity among organisations occurs when they 
attempt to adopt similar acceptable institutional norms and values for validity and 
survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1991) identify three 
institutional isomorphism (coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism); and 
argued that the homogeneity of organisations within an operational field could 
manifest severally via among others structural, behavioural and decision making 
changes (Ramanath, 2009, 2014). The identified institutional isomorphic pressures are 
discussed below.  
 
4.3.2.1.  Coercive 
 
Coercive isomorphism emanates when pressure is mounted on subordinate actors by 
superior autonomous bodies to behave in a particular manner. It is the direct 
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imposition of ‘an acceptable’ standard of procedures and rules to govern the 
operations of organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 
2012). The pressure could be either formal or informal and can be exercised in 
various forms of force, co-optation, persuasion, evolution or an invitation from an 
independent organisation to a dependent one. Coercive isomorphism can be legal or 
technical and can take many forms including mandates, annual reports, standards, 
financial reporting requirements, and regulations. This has been in existence since the 
1930s where United Charities applied coercive isomorphism to homogenise methods, 
standards and philosophies on organisations that depended on them (Sedlak, 1981). 
There is also evidence to suggest the imposition of performance evaluation, budgetary 
control mechanisms, and accounting practices and policies by parent organisations on 
subsidiaries (Chang et al., 2009; Yazdifar et al., 2008). For example, Yazdifar et al., 
(2008) report of the imposition of the management accounting and other systems and 
rules on subsidiaries by a parent UK chemical company.  
 
In general, there is a direct relationship between the level of dependence and the level 
of coercive isomorphism and homogeneity. It has been argued that, the higher the 
levels of dependence of an organisation on others for resources like funds and 
personnel, the higher the level of influence and imposition (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012; Thompson, 1967). 
NGOs receive the bulk of their funding and other resources from the international 
community, donors and government; and coercive isomorphism may well emanate 
from all these sources in the form of strings attached to their funds such as use of 
funds, level of operation and where to operate, and accountability mechanisms to the 
NGOs. Although some of these pressures may be ceremonial in nature, they are very 
important as non-compliance may have serious repercussions on the future of the 
NGO.  
 
One problem with coercive isomorphism, particularly the politically motivated 
pressure, is that it is inflexible, repressive, regressive and less adaptive (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003). This is because, in most cases, policy makers are not directly 
affected by the consequences of a coerced decision on the masses and tend to roll 
such decisions across to all and sundry operating in the politically constructed 
environment. In addition, the over dominance of dependent superior bodies and 
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governments to coercively impose conditions on all aspects of life including social 
life to create homogeneity, stifles creativity and innovation both in organisations and 
in societies (Meyer and Rowan, 1992).    
 
4.3.2.2.  Mimetic 
 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisations operating within a sector copies, 
mimics or benchmarks other organisations that are perceived to exercise best practice 
and are deemed to be legitimate or successful. Mimetic isomorphism is a way by 
which organisations tends to respond to lapses in their internal operational 
environment resulting from, among others, goals ambiguity, poor technological 
understanding, poor guidance and uncertainty in the environment (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; March and Oslen, 1976) by modelling themselves around a best 
practiced successful organisation. There is evidence to suggest that mimetic 
isomorphism is likely to be higher in uncertain and goal ambiguous environments 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Pfeffer, 2003; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012; Sarrina Li 
and Lee 2010). The modelling process can be done through recommendations from 
consultations, employee transfer or through trade associations. In most cases, 
organisations such as NGOs with large numbers of employees and 
customers/beneficiaries tend to largely mimic others with the view to provide broad-
based services to satisfy their broad-based customers/employees base. 
 
One benefit of mimetic isomorphism is that it allows organisations to handle difficult 
problems better at reduced costs and inconveniences especially through the 
identification of similar organisations that have encountered similar problems in the 
past (Anheier, 2000; Assavapisitkul and Bukkavesa, 2009; Cyert and March, 1963). 
In addition, mimetic isomorphism enhances organisations legitimacy especially if 
they can demonstrate to dependent parties their willingness to imitate others as a way 
of improving operational competencies and to survive. This invariably leads to 
organisational stability (Assavapisitkul and Bukkavesa, 2009; Wasserman, 2011). 
Also, the homogeneity and universality of certain structural and other arrangements 
within organisations can be credited to mimetic isomorphism. (Carpenter and Feroz 
2001; DeMichele, 2014; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012). 
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As organisations strive to mimic other best practiced ones they tend to operate and 
behave similarly.  
 
4.3.2.3.  Normative 
 
Normative isomorphism occurs when professional bodies that operate within an 
industry try to control and regulate operations with the introduction of rules and 
regulations that must be met by all parties within the industry. It emanates from 
professionalisation especially as members of an occupation agree on rules, conditions 
and working practices that govern and control occupational members for the sake of 
occupational autonomy (Andrews, 2009; Collins, 1979; Dillard et al., 2004). In as 
much as professional bodies can command power among members, some professional 
bodies may have political power backing. Irrespective of the source of the power, 
professional bodies generally have power and could impose it to their advantage. 
There has been an increase in the number of professionals in organisations 
particularly among specialised employees and management. Examples of professional 
bodies that have exercised normative isomorphism include: IASB, ISO, accounting, 
lawyers, medicine and human resource professionals (Andrews, 2009; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 2012). These bodies have been able to impose regulations normatively to 
control and regulate various sectors under their jurisdiction.   
 
In effect, NIS and its associated isomorphism offer an explanation as to why 
organisations may adopt irrational practices. The reason could either be a professional 
body who dictates their operations (normative) and they try to benchmark a best 
practiced organisation so as to improve and be successful (mimetic); or they are being 
forced to adopt practices for the sake of survival and legitimacy (coercive).  
 
These isomorphic pressures may apply to NGOs as the environment within which 
they operate are dominated by several environmental forces emanating from 
governments, donors, the international community, local communities, traditional 
rulers, opinion leaders, professional bodies and the like. The adoption of NIS to 
explain and understand the accountability systems of NGOs stems from its general 
applicability in different organisational settings and on its ability to integrate both 
internal (endogenous) and external (exogenous) forces (Hussain and Hoque, 2002; 
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Tsamenyi et al., 2006). The theory has been used extensively to discuss the effects of 
an organisation’s operational environment and accountability systems. Amongst these 
studies are the effect of societal and institutional environment on: 1) budgetary 
control systems (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988); 2) financial management reforms 
(Collier, 2001); 3) organisational structures and management accounting systems 
(Hussain and Hoque, 2002); 4) accounting and financial information systems 
(Tsamenyi et al., 2006); and 5) combating corruption (Okogbule, 2006). For example, 
Tsamenyi et al. (2006) used NIS in a study in an electricity distribution company in 
Spain and concluded that both internal and external forces affected the observed 
changes in the organisation’s accounting and financial system. Similarly, Carpenter 
and Ferox (2001) used NIS to examine the effects of institutional pressures towards 
the adoption of the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) within four US 
states. These researchers identify resource dependence as a potent coercive force 
towards the operations of organisaions (Carpenter and Ferox, 2001). 
 
For NGOs to respond positively to the institutional pressures within which they 
operate and legitimized themselves, they need to understand the effects of these 
pressures in order to develop mechanisms to cope and survive. However, several 
criticisms have been levied against the NIS theory in spite of its popularity and 
usefulness in accounting research. NIS is criticised for it’s over emphasis on the effect 
of macro environment on organisational systems to the neglect of micro 
environmental forces (Moll et al., 2006a; Yazdifar, et al., 2008). The neglect of micro 
environmental factors means that NIS as a theory does not consider the effects of inter 
and intra organisational efficiency and effectiveness in the success of organisations 
(Dillard et al., 2004; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 
2006). There is, therefore, the need for an effective integration of both micro and 
macro environmental forces as both can have a significant effect on organisational 
systems. One other criticism of NIS is that it cannot be used to explain changes that 
happen within organisations (Burns and Nielson, 2006; Hopper and Major, 2007). 
This is because the NIS theory is more suitable for explaining organisational stability 
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4.3.3.  Limitation of NIS 
 
One major criticism of NIS is its inability to predict the strategic responses available 
to organisations in dealing with institutional pressures. NIS argues that organisations 
passively and holistically adopt institutional pressures that are coercively, mimetically 
or normatively imposed on them by institutions operating within their institutional 
field by strictly following laid down procedures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hopper 
and Major, 2007; Modell, 2009; Yazdifar et al., 2008). However, it is argued that 
organisations are not merely passive conformers to institutional pressures but 
develops strategic responses towards those pressures (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013; 
Delmas and Toffel, 2004; Munir et al., 2011; Oliver, 1992). In effect, organisations 
do not simply accept imposed institutional pressures as the only remedy but 
strategically weigh the effects of such pressures on their operations and respond 
appropriately (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Greenwood et al., 2011; Meyer et al., 
2014). It is in line of this argument that Oliver (1991) developed the strategic 
response framework to assess the responses of organisations towards these pressures 
as discussed below. 
 
4.4.  Strategic Responses to Isomorphic Pressures 
 
Oliver (1991) developed a comprehensive theoretical framework of strategic options 
to explore organisational responses to institutional pressures (Clemens et al., 2008; 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Munir et al., 2011; Scott, 2013). She argues that 
organisations are not always passive in their response to institutional pressures and 
expectations but actively and consistently develop strategic responses to appropriately 
deal with such pressures with the view to minimising its effect on their operations 
(Boon et al., 2009; Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013). Oliver (1991) asserts that there is a 
relationship between institutional pressures and the strategic responses of 
organisations (Jamali, 2010; Miller et al., 2013).  
 
In order for there to be active conformance to resistance, Oliver (1991) identifies five 
possible strategies and sub-tactical responses (Table 4.2) as being of significance as 
far as organisational strategic responses to institutional pressures (Jamali, 2010; 
Munir et al., 2011; Thorgren et al., 2012; Whelan, 2013).  
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Table 4. 2 Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes 
Strategies Tactics Examples 
   
 
Habit  Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms  
Acquiesce  Imitate  Mimicking institutional models  
 
Comply Obeying rules and accepting norms 
   
 
Balance  Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents  
Compromise  Pacify  Placating and accommodating institutional elements  
 
Bargain Negotiating with institutional stakeholders 
   
 
Conceal  Disguising nonconformity  
Avoid  Buffer  Loosening institutional attachments  
 
Escape Changing goals, activities, or domains 
   
 
Dismiss  Ignoring explicit norms and values  
Defy Challenge Contesting rules and requirements  
 
Attack Assaulting the sources of institutional pressure 
   
 
Co-opt  Importing influential constituents  
Manipulate Influence  Shaping values and criteria 
  Control Dominating institutional constituents and processes 
Source: Oliver (1991, p. 152) 
 
Table 4.2 depicts possible strategies and tactics available to organisations in 
responding to institutional pressures. The table suggests that there are five strategic 
and fifteen tactical options open to organisations in dealing with institutional 
isomorphism (Munir et al., 2011). Arranged in order of active resistance to 
institutional pressures, these strategy options are: acquiescence; compromise; 
avoidance; defiance; and manipulation (Table 4.2). Whilst acquiescence is the least 
active in terms of organisational response to institutional pressures, manipulation is at 
the high side. These strategies and tactics are discussed in the subsequent sections. 
4.4.1.  Acquiesce  
 
Acquiescence is the first strategic option open to organisations in their conformance 
response to institutional pressures (Pache and Santos, 2010b). It is the strategic stance 
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taken by organisations to consent to institutional pressures silently without 
objection/active resistance (Bradley and Morrison, 2012; Scott and Carter, 2014). The 
acquiescence strategic option to institutional pressures is adopted when the 
organisation envisages some level of benefits including societal support and 
legitimacy (Thorgren et al., 2012). Oliver (1991) further identifies three sub-tactical 
options (habit; imitate; and compliance) that could be employed towards an 
organisation’s acquiescence strategy (Funnell and Wade, 2012; Jamali, 2010; Munir 
et al., 2011).  
 
Habit is the unconscious adoption of entrenched social rules and values willingly as a 
convention in direct response to institutional pressures towards the operations of 
organisations (Funnell and Wade, 2012; Oliver, 1992). Imitation as a tactical response 
is similar to mimetic isomorphism and is adopted when organisations tactically 
mimics the operations of an assumed best-practiced organisation for some perceived 
benefits (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Salomon and Wu, 2012). Imitation occurs 
when organisations are unsure/uncertain of the outcomes of their strategic response 
and thus seek counselling and advice from other trusted organisations (Doherty et al., 
2013). Compliance is the most active acquiescence tactic used by organisations as a 
response to institutional pressures in return for possible societal acceptability 
including, among others, issues of legitimacy, stability and reduced vulnerability 
(Thorgren et al., 2012). 
 
4.4.2.  Compromise 
 
Oliver (1991) identifies compromise as a strategic response option employed by 
organisations with multiple stakeholders who have conflicting demands and 
expectations vis-à-vis the organisation’s mission and objectives (Mason, 2012; Oliver, 
1991). It can be argued that it is virtually impossible for organisations with multiple 
constituents to equally satisfy all. As a result, compromising becomes a laudable 
strategic option (Clemens et al., 2008). Three tactical responses available to 
organisations in such dilemmas are balancing, pacifying or bargaining (Funnell and 
Wade, 2012; Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010b).  
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Balancing is employed as a tactic by organisations to amicably satisfy stakeholders 
with multiple institutional pressures and expectations without incurring the wrath of 
unsatisfied stakeholders (Burchell and Cook, 2013; Hoberg and Phillips, 2011). The 
use of balancing allows organisations to achieve parity and build consensus among 
the multiple stakeholders particularly in relation to the organisation’s own interests. 
Pacifying occurs when organisations partially resist institutional pressures but tries to 
appease resisted stakeholders/pressures for fear of negative consequences. It is an 
attempt by organisations to satisfy the minimum institutional requirement. Bargaining 
is the most active tactic of compromise and allows organisations to negotiate and 
possibly make concessions with the multiple and conflicting stakeholders (Hoberg 
and Phillips, 2011).  
 
4.4.3.  Avoidance 
 
Avoidance is the third strategic response to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). It is 
employed by organisations to limit their level of interactions with difficult to satisfy 
stakeholders. It is the apparent public deception about perceived compliance 
particularly employed if the organisation has low desire to adopt existing institutional 
requirements (Elbers and Arts, 2011; Oliver 1991). Avoidance is an attempt by 
organisations to completely ignore institutional pressures but disguise non-
compliance with tactics of concealment, buffering, and escaping (Hoberg and Phillips, 
2011; Jamali, 2010; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991).  
 
Concealment is the deliberate pretence to conforming to institutional pressures 
(Funnell and Wade, 2012; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012). 
The main difference between concealment and compliance lies within the motive of 
non-compliance of the institutional pressure. Compliance occurs when the intention 
for non-conformance is genuine; otherwise it is concealment (Pache and Santos, 
2010a, b; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012; Zucker, 1983). Organisations tactically adopt 
buffering to insulate their activities from public scrutiny, evaluation and inspection 
(Munir et al., 2011; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Thompson, 1967). It is argued that 
buffering is not suitable tactically when organisations require public approval of their 
activities to legitimise resource allocation, usage and sustainability (Jamali, 2010). 
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The most drastic avoidance tactic is escape which is employed when organisations 
overwhelmed by the extent of institutional pressures decide to either quit the 
institutional domain or change focus to avoid the institutional conformance (Funnell 
and Wade, 2012; Jamali, 2010; Munir et al., 2011).  
 
4.4.4.  Defiance 
 
Defiance is the outright rejection of institutional norms and expectations especially 
when organisations could do so with minimal repercussions (Oliver, 1991). 
Tactically, organisations could dismiss, challenge and/or attack institutional pressures 
depending on the situation (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013; Pache and Santos, 2010b). 
Dismissal is the most active defiance tactic generally employed where existing 
institutional enforcement mechanisms are either perceived as weak or where the 
organisation’s objectives conflict with the institutional requirements (Canning and 
O’Dwyer, 2013; Jamali, 2010). Challenge occurs when organisations opt to contest 
established institutional pressures and also attempt to offensively justify the reasons 
for their departure or non-compliance (Burchell and Cook, 2013; Whelan, 2013). 
Attack is an aggressive defiance tactic used by organisations to vehemently denounce 
distractive institutional values and expectations that seek to damage the organisation’s 
reputation (Funnell and Wade, 2012; Munir et al., 2011; Oliver, 1991). 
 
4.4.5.  Manipulation 
 
Oliver (1991) identifies manipulation as the most active strategic response to 
organisations towards institutional pressures because it seeks to actively change and 
neutralize the power and content of the pressure stream or the constituents that impose 
them (Hoberg and Phillips, 2011; Jamali, 2010).  
 
The main purpose of manipulation as a strategic option is to effect the content of the 
expectations of the pressure or lobby the enforcement agencies responsible for their 
implementation (Burchell and Cook, 2013; Hoberg and Phillips, 2011; Jamali, 2010). 
Again, the three tactical manipulative strategies are co-opting, influencing and 
controlling (Oliver, 1991).  
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Co-opting is the mean by which powerful institutional constituents are tactically 
influenced to limit their effects on the activities of an organisation. The co-opting 
tactic promotes the possible and effective integration of key institutional constituents 
into the decision making body or process of the organisation; or the tactic to join 
forces with other entities for a bigger say in resources allocation and approval 
(Burchell and Cook, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010a, b). It is 
argued that organisations attempt to co-opt institutional constitutes to neutralize any 
possible adverse opposition on the organisational legitimacy (Burchell and Cook, 
2013). Influence as a manipulative tactic is used by industry-wide bodies like 
coalitions to sway public perception or lobby governmental and other regulatory 
bodies towards ‘conformable’ pressures for mutual gains (Greenwood et al., 2011; 
Jamali, 2010). Controlling is an attempt to minimise the possible impact of emerging, 
localized, or weakly promoted institutional pressures (Hoberg and Phillips, 2011; 
Jamali, 2010). 
 
4.5.  Institutional Antecedents 
 
In her bid to explain the reasons for the adoption of the identified strategies/tactics 
discussed above, Oliver (1991) again recognizes five antecedents. The five 
antecedents responsible for the adoption of strategic options to institutional pressures 
are cause, constituents, content, control, and context (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013; 




One of the reasons for organisational adoption of strategic responses to institutional 
pressures is to achieve social or economic fitness (Oliver, 1991; Ji et al., 2014). 
Whilst social fitness promotes social acceptability, economic fitness ensures, among 
others, organisational efficient utilisation of resources (Covaleski et al., 2013; Ji et al., 
2014; Scott, 1995). The willingness of organisations to adopt a particular strategic 
response to a greater extent depends on the anticipated social or economic outcome 
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(Clemens et al., 2008; Corbett, 2012; Oliver, 1991). For example organisations will 
acquiesce for improved social or economic acceptability but avoid/defy otherwise. 
 
Table 4. 3 Institutional Antecedents and Predicted Strategic Responses 
    Strategic Responses 
Predictive Factor Predictive Dimensions Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate 
       Cause 
      Legitimacy Legitimacy or social fitness  High Low Low Low Low 
Efficiency  Efficiency or economic fitness High Low Low Low Low 
       Constituents  
      Multiplicity  Multiplicity of constituent demands  Low High High High High 
Dependence  Dependence on institutional constituents  High High Moderate Low Low 
       Content 
      Consistency Consistency with organizational goals  High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Constraint Discretionary constraints imposed on the 
organization  Low Moderate High High High 
       Control  
      Coercion Legal coercion or enforcement  High Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Diffusion Voluntary diffusion of norms High High Moderate Low Low 
       Context 
      Uncertainty Environmental uncertainty  High High High Low Low 
Interconnectedness Environmental interconnectedness High High Moderate Low Low 
Source: Oliver (1991, p. 160) 
 
Table 4.3 provides a summary of the various predictions of organisational strategic 
responses under different institutional antecedents. Table 4.3 suggests that 
organisations will strategically respond differently under different predictive factors.  
 
4.5.2.  Constituents 
 
Oliver (1991) again argues that the strategic response of an organisation is highly 
dependent on the multiplicity of institutional constituents/stakeholders and the level 
of organisational dependability on these constituents. The presence of multiple 
constituents each with different multiple, conflicting and sometimes incompatible 
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demands stifles unilateral conformance as any attempt to satisfy a particular 
constituent will invariably breed unsatisfied actors (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013; 
Jamali, 2010; Ji et al., 2014; Oliver, 1991, 1997; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). It is 
argued that strategic responses of compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation 
are appropriate under multiple constituents’ environments whilst acquiescence is 
suitable under low constituent multiplicity (Funnell and Wade, 2012; Munir et al., 
2011; Oliver, 1991). Again, acquiescence or compromise might be the most 
appropriate choice when the level of organisational dependability on others is high. 
However, at lower levels of organisational dependence, avoidance and defiance 
become viable strategic options (Jamali, 2010). 
 
4.5.3.  Content 
 
It is suggested that the content i.e. the rules and regulations within institutional 
pressures that organisations are required to conform has implications on the strategic 
responses to adopt (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013; Ji et al., 2014; Oliver, 1991). 
Content could either be consistent or at variance with or constrained by the 
organisational objectives.  On the one hand, institutional content is consistent if it 
aligns with the goals and processes of institutional actors (Jamali, 2010). However, 
constraint content indicates the loss of authority or discretion of the management of 
organisations in relation to decision-making (Fowler, 2013; Ji et al., 2014; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003). It is argued that the strategic response of organisations depends on 
their willingness to retain or relinquish decision-making autonomy, discretion and 
control (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013). For example, organisations will generally 
acquiesce when institutional pressures does not inhibit their control/power over major 
decisions but will vehemently avoid, manipulate, defy and/or attack if their level of 
autonomy is excessively threatened (Jamali, 2010; Ji et al., 2014; Meyer and Scott, 
1983; Pache and Santos, 2010b). 
 
4.5.4.  Control 
 
One other reason for the adoption of strategic responses is the level of control. 
Institutional control is the imposition of external pressures on an organisation to 
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operate in a particular manner. Control could be in the form of legal coercion or 
voluntary diffusion (Jamali, 2010; Oliver, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012).  
 
On the one hand, legal coercion is the imposition of regulatory and legal systems on 
the activities of organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
2003; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012). Again the level of legal coercion has implications 
for the adoption of a particular strategic response. Acquiescence is suitable under high 
legal coercion since the implications for noncompliance could be unbearable. 
However, when the level of legal coercion is low and lacks the requisite institutional 
muscles for enforcement; compromises, defiance, and/or manipulation become the 
preferred strategies. On the other hand, voluntary diffusion is the degree of 
willingness to accept, disseminate and inculcate institutional pressures and 
expectations into organisational activities. It is argued that the level of voluntary 
diffusion whether broad or narrow has implications on organisational strategic 
responses. When institutional expectations are broadly diffused, acquiescence and 
compromise are preferred. However, defiance and avoidance are high under narrow or 
low voluntary diffusion. 
 
4.5.5.  Context 
 
The last antecedent to strategic responses is environmental context, which can either 
be uncertain or interconnected (Oliver, 1991). The operational environment is 
uncertain if the degree of future predictability of environmental forces cannot be done 
accurately (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Oliver (1991) argues that under high levels of 
environmental uncertainty, acquiesce, compromise, and avoidance of institutional 
pressure will be high compared to an era of low levels of environmental uncertainty 
where defiance or manipulation will be low.  
 
Environmental interconnectedness is the number density of inter-organisational 
relations among actors within its organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
The level of interrelatedness of institutional pressures has implications for the 
strategic responses of organisations. For example, at high levels of inter-
organisational interconnectedness, acquiescence is predicted to be the preferred 
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institutional strategic response towards institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991, Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). However, in disjointed environments with low institutional 
interrelatedness, defiance and manipulation towards institutional pressures become 
prominent due to challenges in establishing institutional consensus. 
 
Several researchers have used Oliver’s (1991) model to understand the strategic 
response of both regulators and regulatees within the Irish professional accounting 
settings (Cannang and O’Dwyer, 2013; Funnell and Wade, 2012; Shapiro and 
Matson, 2008). For example, Shapiro and Matson (2008) argue that accounting 
regulators in Ireland generally adopt acquiescence or compromising strategies amidst 
intense regulatee’s resistance to neutralize any suggested regulation. However, in a 
later research, Cannang and O’Dwyer, (2013) rather identified the successful 
implementation of defiance strategies by regulators to counteract any possible 
regulatee resistance. Similarly, Funnell and Wade, (2012), applied Oliver’s (1991) 
model in the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) to understand the 
manoeuvring of strategic responses of both auditees and auditors towards 
performance audits.  
 
In addition, several other researchers have applied the strategic responses model to 
determine the reactions of NGOs to institutional pressures (Batley, 2011; Brinkerhoff 
and Brinkerhoff, 2004; Elbers and Arts, 2011; Rauh, 2010; Wallace et al., 2006). 
These researchers identified the regular use of the various strategic responses: 
acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation in NGO activities. 
For instance, Rauh (2010) recognised the use of acquiescence, defiance and active 
negotiations to respond to donors within the NGO arena. 
 
Again, Elbers and Arts (2011) used the model to empirically assess the responses of 
41 SNGOs from Ghana and India in dealing with issues of confliction donor 
conditions and found the widespread use of avoidance, influencing and buffering 
particularly among older and more experienced NGOs. It was observed that some 
NGOs in the two studied countries (i.e. India and Ghana) strategically select donors 
with favourable conditions but rejects those with uncompromising conditionalities. 
For example, a lobby and advocacy NGO in Ghana strategically selected donors with 
minimal coercive impact on their advocacy stance whilst an Indian NGO rejected 
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some donor funds to avoid compromising their principles. In another study 
undertaken in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, Batley (2011) argues that NGOs 
exercises strategic responses to handle constraining governmental institutional 
pressures. 
 
4.6. The Theoretical Framework for the Study 
 
It is argued that a variety of stakeholder and institutional pressures are major 
motivating forces that lead enterprises to pursue certain practices (Tate et al., 2010; 
Zhu et al., 2013). For the purpose of this research and to help us understand the 
institutional pressures that influence NGO accountability systems as well the strategic 
responses they adopt, NIS is adopted but extended with the integration of Oliver’s 
ideas of strategic responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). The theoretical 
framework for the research is presented in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 4. 1 Theoretical Framework: Institutional Explanation of NGO 
Accountability 
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Figure 4.1 is the schematic description of the theoretical framework for the research. 
The figure suggests that the nature of NGO accountability systems is shaped by the 
institutional pressures namely coercive, mimetic and normative forces. However, 
NGOs are not mere passive obedient to these pressures but rather they may be able to 
devise diverse strategies to respond to these pressures appropriately. These strategic 
responses are acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation either 
individually or collectively. 
 
This framework is applied in explaining the findings of this study based on the 
empirical evidence and the kind of relationships that exist between the NGOs, the 
donors and the beneficiaries.  It is emphasised that the state verses NGOs relationship 
has sometimes subsisted on conflict, which results from the basic lack of 
understanding of the dynamics of power and role relationships (Hasmath and Hsu, 
2013).  Hasmath and Hsu (2013) suggest that a lack of meaningful collaboration 
between the state and NGOs in China is not solely a result of the state seeking to 
restrict the development of the sector, or fear of a potential opposing actor to the state, 
but argue that there is a lack of meaningful engagement between the state and NGOs, 
which could be partially attributed to isomorphic pressures within state-NGO 
relations, and insufficient epistemic awareness of NGO activities on the part of the 
state (Hasmath and Hsu, 2013).   
 
This scenario could happen in the NGO-donor accountability relationships if the right 
mechanisms are not established to ensure cordiality.  That is to say that too much 
application of coercive isomorphic powers by donors could sometimes lead to 
conflict.  On the other hand, if the NGOs also mimic other accountability practices of 
similar institutions to the neglect of donor-proposed accountability systems, it could 
also engender conflict.   Similarly, if they adopt the normative posture and succumb 
to societal pressures that could also reignite conflict between them and their key 
benefactors: donors and government (Rauh, 2010).   
 
It is against this background that some researchers suggest that ‘once epistemic 
awareness was achieved by the state, they would have a stronger desire to interact 
with NGOs with the caveat that the state would seek to utilize the material power of 
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NGOs, rather than their symbolic, interpretive or geographical capital’ (Hasmath and 
Hsu, 2013:1).  However, the literature suggests that there is a lack of empirical 
evidence for establishing southern non-governmental organisations (SNGO) agency 
(Rauh, 2010).  Despite this shortage, Rauh (2010) argues that neoinstitutional and 
resource dependence perspectives together could provide a framework to understand 
how organizations in the developing world may adopt, negotiate, or contest donor 
pressure.  
 
Nonetheless, the literature also suggests that as a result of coercive forces, some 
governments and NGOs are unable to collaborate effectively (Fulda et al., 2012; 
Hasmath and Hsu, 2013).  For instance, Hasmath and Hsu (2013) report that the state 
and NGOs in China have difficulty collaborating to deliver social services to the 
marginalised groups in the communities.  Opinion on this could be divided into two 
schools of thoughts (Hasmath and Hsu, 2013). The first perspective attributes this to 
the domination and the strength of the central state, which effectively seeks to control 
the NGO sector through restrictive regulations rather than partner with it. This is so 
because the contention is that there should be a strong central state that should seek to 
continuously manage and control the NGO sector (Dickson, 2000; Hasmath and Hsu, 
2013; Heurlin, 2010; Kang and Heng, 2008; Ma, 2002; Ru and Ortolano, 2007; 
Simon, 2009; Wu and Chan, 2012).  The second perspective argues on the basis of 
organizational differences between the two sectors: the state and NGOs (Froissart, 
2006; Fulda et al., 2012; Hasmath and Hsu, 2013). The basis of this argument is that 
the organizational forms and goals of both sectors are divergent, and this dissuades 
the building of mutual trust or the potential for a credible catalyst to incentivize one or 
both parties to cooperate towards a common goal.  The paradox could be resolved as 
some analysts also postulate that rather than undermining state sovereignty, active 
NGO participation could enhance the ability of the state to regulate globally 
(Raustiala, 1997). 
 
Obviously, NGOs adopting a particular accountability system under the influence of 
donors may not necessarily yield the expected results.  For example, Rauh (2010) 
explains that southern non-governmental organisations (SNGOs) may not pursue the 
most relevant work because of pressure to adopt funder agendas.  Arguably, some of 
the accountability measures suggested by donors for adoption by NGOs may not be 
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profitable due to contextual differences.  It is in this vein that some researchers argue 
that although it is reasonable to expect recipient organizations to have appropriate 
accountability and transparency measures, current practices have been widely 
criticized for being extremely time-consuming, difficult to use, and for taking time 
away from important work on the ground (Mawdsley et al., 2002; Wallace et al. 
2006). 
   
It would be recalled that institutional theory suggests that a firm would consider the 
actions of other organizations when they determine their organizational practices (Zhu 
et al., 2013).  For instance, Zhu et al. (2013), explain that mimetic pressures occur 
when an organization imitates the actions of successful competitors in the industry: 
firms may follow or ‘mimic’ competitors merely because of their success (Zhu et al., 
2013).  Notwithstanding this, the outcome may not always be positive.  Supporting 
this view, Rauh (2010) argues that, although southern organizations increasingly 
adopt northern or corporate style practices and agendas, they have not necessarily 
resulted in improved efficiency.   
 
Furthermore, some researchers postulate that normative pressures could cause 
organizations to conform to social legitimacy concerns in organizational practices 
(Zhu et al., 2013). For instance, Zhu et al. (2013), argue that this pressure may be 
exerted by external stakeholders who have a direct or indirect interest in the 
organization.  Perhaps, this is the reason why Gray et al. (2006) found that the 
essence of accountability lies in the relationships between the organisation and the 
society and/or stakeholder groups of interest. They argue that the nature of this 
relationship allows individuals and organisations to infer much about the necessary 
formality and the channels of accountability (Gray et al., 2006). 
 
In spite of the fact that NGOs could be influenced by the dynamics prevailing in their 
environment to adopt a particular accountability system, there are times when the 
NGOs could subtly resist or negotiate so as to take a neutral posture in their 
relationship with donors and other stakeholders.  For this reason, Rauh (2010) 
suggests that integrating neoinstitutional and resource dependence perspectives could 
better reflect the various strategies used by SNGOs/NGOs.  For instance, this research 
suggests that southern organizations (SNGOs) could employ a range of responses: 
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from passive acquiescence to more active forms of resistance, which are contingent 
on relationships with donors and donor characteristics. 
 
This researcher believes that a neoinstitutional perspective would attribute this 
isomorphism to passive processes such as the diffusion of legitimating industry norms 
and power imbalances between donors and NGOs /SNGOs (Rauh, 2010).  Arguing 
further, this researcher notes that although empirical evidence suggests that in many 
instances these are indeed factors; it is also evident that to a certain extent, some 
SNGOs/NGOs are sometimes able to actively negotiate and resist donor agendas 
(Rauh, 2010).  It is important to emphasise that irrespective of wherever they are 
located, NGOs could exert some form of pressure to help change policy directions 
(Betsill and Corell, 2001; Jamali, 2014; Jordan and Huitema, 2014).  For instance, in 
the field of environmental studies, Betsill and Correll (2001) argue that NGOs could 
influence international environmental negotiations when they intentionally transmit 
information to negotiators that alters both the negotiating process and outcomes from 
what would have occurred otherwise. 
 
With the above framework in mind, the research data was analysed taking into 
account the different perspectives of the different forces that could influence NGO 
accountability systems in the studied organisation in Ghana. 
 
4.7. Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter Four discussed the theoretical framework for the research. It commenced 
with a discussion of the institutions, and proceeded to discuss institutional theory as a 
generic theory for institutional research. This was followed by a discussion of NIS 
and the three related isomorphism as well as the strategic responses available to 
organisations. The chapter argues that NIS is a theory with sociological dimension 
that allows researchers to incorporate the views of social actors in explaining the 
effects institutional pressures has on observed relations. However, the inability of NIS 
to explain the response options of organisations makes the addition of the strategic 
responses framework appropriate.   
 
 





The aim of this chapter is to discuss the methodological issues associated with this 
study, which focuses on NGO accountability systems and their strategic responses to 
isomorphic/institutional pressures. The study adopts an interpretive approach using 
qualitative research strategies on a single community based organisation (CBO) in 
Ghana to understand NGOs accountability systems and their strategic responses to 
institutional pressures. The chapter concentrates on two main aspects, namely: the 
philosophical underpinnings of the research; and the methods or techniques used in 
collecting data to help achieve the objectives of the research. 
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section One presents a discussion of the 
various philosophical perspectives of the research and a discussion of the researcher’s 
philosophical assumption. Section Two discusses the arguments relating to research 
methodologies and Section Three explains how data was gathered and analysed for 
this research. 
 
5.1.  Philosophical Assumptions of the Study 
 
This section discusses the researcher’s philosophical perspective as an interpretivist, 
which informs the choice of research methodology, methods and strategies adopted to 
collect empirical data. The adoption of the interpretive approach is based on the 
researcher’s philosophical stance that knowledge is socially constructed and must be 
interpreted and explained from the perspective of social actors (Cassell et al., 2006; 
Denzin, 2001; Flick, 2014; Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Smith, 2007). 
  
Some researchers have argued that the fundamental of every enquiry is to address 
questions that need answers and that the essence of research is to help discover 
intellectual findings capable of contributing to, and in some cases transform, 
knowledge (Ryan et al., 2002; Hoffman, 2014). Other researchers argue that the 
answers to research questions are influenced by factors such as the composition and 
process of creating an acceptable knowledge and the nature of reality (Bryman, 2012; 
Flick, 2014; Johnson and Duberley, 2000). It is against this backdrop that some 
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researchers encourage the choice of research strategies based on their philosophical 
commitment (Johnson et al., 2006; Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Smith, 2007). 
 
5.1.1.  Ontology and Epistemology 
 
The behaviour and nature of society and the constitution of warranted knowledge 
have been a source of worry for researchers and have resulted in different 
philosophical and methodological choices (Cassell et al., 2006; Gill and Johnson, 
2010; Punch, 2013). A scan through the evolution of academic research dispositions 
(paradigms) reveals that paradigms are differentiated by the answers they provide to 
questions and suggest that the two major ways of thinking about research 
philosophies are: ontology and epistemology (Creswell, 2012; Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
5.1.1.1.  Ontology 
 
The fundamental principle of ontology is based on the question of what constitutes 
reality and how it is captured (Johnson and Duberley, 2000; Dobson and Love, 2004). 
Many ontological positions have been adduced to in the literature, but the two 
extremes are positivism and interpretivism (Blaike, 2000; Grix, 2002; Punch, 2013).  
 
5.1.1.2.  Positivism 
 
Positivism emerged in the 19th century with the view to proposing certain values 
including: exact science; the use of numbers to quantify physical characteristics and 
relations; quantification; measurability; objectivity; and cause and effect (Potter, 
2013; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). The positivist paradigm generally, uses 
quantitative methods and it is deductive in nature (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
 
Positivist researchers, for example, argue that warranted knowledge should emanate 
only from reality (Duberley et al., 2012; Johnson and Duberley, 2000). The positivist 
ontology holds that reality exists independently of social actors or human cognition 
and that reality resides in the minds of people (Johnson et al., 2006). The positivist 
perceives the role of research as the provision of universal theories or laws about the 
world (Gray, 2013; Ryan et al., 2002).  
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Positivism emphasises the involuntary response of social actors to external stimuli 
and the application of nomothetic methodology to construct theory, predict the 
behaviour of social actors and neglects the subjective behaviour of social actors. The 
epistemological view of the positivist is that knowledge is warranted if it is directly 
observable (Cassell, 2005; Pather and Remenyi, 2004).  
 
5.1.1.3.  Interpretivism  
 
Ontologically, the interpretivists believe that reality is socially constructed and one 
cannot access the external world irrespective of its existence or otherwise (Blaike, 
2000; Holloway and Wheeler, 2013). However, the epistemological position of the 
interpretivist is that researchers could understand the world better by conducting 
research among people rather than objects in their roles as social actors; and to adopt 
an emphatic stance (Potter, 2013). Interpretivists use qualitative methods to 
understand social phenomenon directly from the perspectives of social actors 
(Cavaye, 1996; Holloway and Wheeler, 2013; Miles et al., 2013; Punch, 2013). 
 
5.1.1.4.  Epistemology  
 
The prime focus of epistemology is the nature and constitution of knowledge. It looks 
at the various ways of gaining knowledge and considers what constitutes acceptable 
knowledge in a field of study (Blaike, 2000; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Potter, 2013).  
 
Understanding a researcher’s epistemological stance is a crucial aspect in research. In 
fact the aim of most researchers is to add to existing knowledge so as to make a 
contribution towards knowledge. For researchers to achieve this objective it is 
important for them to identify what constitutes warranted knowledge and this is what 
epistemology seeks to handle.   
 
Dobson and Love (2004), explain that many epistemological positions, including 
positivism, realism and interpretivism, have been adduced to in the literature: each 
with different philosophical assumptions about what constitutes knowledge; how to 
obtain knowledge; and the appropriate method to adopt to capture knowledge. This 
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suggests that there is a direct relationship between the philosophical perspectives of 
researchers and the methods used in conducting research. As a result, distinct ways of 
conducting research exists among researchers based on their philosophical position 
(Gray, 2013).  
 
Bryman and Bell (2007), reveal that the epistemological philosophy of the positivism 
is akin to the position of the natural scientists who are obsessed with facts, and only 
sees acceptable knowledge (reality) as represented by objects that are considered to be 
real with separate existence to that of the researcher (Archer et al., 2013; Bhaskar, 
2013). Epistemologically, the positivist believes that truth exists and can be 
unravelled systematically and scientifically (Bhaskar, 2013; Cassell and Symon, 
1994). As such, the positivist tends to use quantitative methods similar to that of the 
natural scientist to capture data, ideally, in an uncompromising manner, neglecting the 
inputs of social actors (Creswell, 2012; Bryman and Bell, 2007). The positivist 
epistemologically believes that data collected must be less open to bias and must be 
more objective.  
 
Remenyi et al. (1989), also explain that positivists mostly use existing theory to 
develop hypothesis that can be tested to confirm, refute or develop new theories using 
statistical analysis. Positivist epistemologists use highly structured methodological 
processes in non-interactive environments to facilitate replication (Creswell, 2012; 
Gill and Johnson, 2002). The researcher believes that reality exists in the minds of 
social actors hence rejects the positivist epistemological stance. 
 
5.1.1.5.  Realism 
 
The philosophical position of realism is similar to that of the positivist in that it 
assumes a scientific approach to the development of knowledge and believes that 
there is reality quite independent of the mind (Modell, 2005; Smith, 2011; Yin, 2014). 
For instance, Bhaskar (2013), being a critical realist argues that researchers will only 
be able to understand what is going on in the social world if they understand the 
social structures that have given rise to the phenomena, stressing that what we see is 
only part of the bigger picture (Flick, 2014).  
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In a nutshell, the perceptions held about the role of humans and the nature of reality 
(ontology) and the constitution of knowledge (epistemology) are directly related to 
the type of research methodology adopted. In situations where human behaviour is 
perceived to be deterministic and reality is seen as objective, knowledge could be 
gained using positivists methods. However, where humans are perceived as bodies 
capable of making decision and judgements, and reality is seen as subjective, then 
knowledge could be gained in an interpretive manner (Creswell, 2012; Hopper and 
Powell, 1985; Ryan et al., 2002; Smith, 2011).  
5.1.2.  Justifying the Choice of Philosophical Stance 
 
The researcher adopted the interpretive philosophical stance for the study on the 
accountability systems of NGOs and their strategic responses to institutional pressures 
for the following reasons. First the researcher argues that the reality about NGO 
accountability exists in the minds of the active players within the sector i.e. donors, 
NGO employees, beneficiaries. As a result, knowledge about NGO accountability 
systems could be socially constructed from the experiences and expectations the 
actors have in an interpretive manner. Again the researcher is of the view that NGO 
accountability systems cannot be unravelled from the positivist perspective without 
understanding the importance of social opinions. In that regard, the researcher 
considered himself as part of the wider social world to build relationships with 
respondents to understand the accountability systems in practice (Punch, 2013). This 
stance allows the researcher to see the subjective viewpoints of respondents based on 
analysis of the empirical evidence obtained through the interview process.  
 
Further, the researcher believes that issues related to accounting research in general 
and NGO accountability mechanisms in particular, are socially constructed and could 
be influenced by factors such as the views and experiences of the affected social 
actors all of which were considered for the purposes of this study.  
 
The adoption of the interpretivist perspective allowed the researcher to analyse, 
interpret and report exactly the responses and experiences of actors from their own 
perspectives. Hence, the study sought to interpret the views of social actors in the 
NGO sector and the effect of the environment on NGO accountability mechanisms. 
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The interpretive perspective has been widely used and continues to be used in 
accounting research (Armstrong, 2008; Baxter and Chua, 2003; Baxter et al., 2008; 
Dillard, 2008; Hoque et al., 2013; Myers, 2013; Ryan et al., 2002; Scapens, 2008; 
Smith, 2011). 
 
5.2.  Research Methodology 
 
This section discusses the debates relating to research methodologies. There are two 
basic types of research strategies/methodologies namely: qualitative and quantitative 
(Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2012; Denscombe, 2003; Heaton, 2004; Punch, 2013; 
Silverman, 2013). The focus of each strategy/methodology varies on how to establish 
causal relationships (Flick, 2014; Maxwell, 2005). Invariably, quantitative research 
strategy has been the most dominant strategy among social science researchers, 
particularly in accounting research (Chua, 2011; Myers, 2013; Punch, 2013; 
Silverman, 2013). However, in recent years, there has been an increase in the use of 
the qualitative research strategy among social science researchers (Creswell, 2012). 
Although Bryman (2008) has compared these two research strategies from three 
angles: role of theory; epistemological perspective; and ontological perspective (Table 
5.1), Silverman (2006) examines it from four dimensions (Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5. 1 Differences between Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
Strategies 
Angle Quantitative Qualitative 
   Role of theory Deductively used in testing 
theory 
Inductively used in generating 
theory 
   Epistemological 
Orientation 
Natural sciences Interpretivism 
   Ontological Orientation Objectivism Constructionism 
Source: Bryman (2008, p. 22).  
 
From Table 5.1 it can be seen that there are some fundamental differences between 
the two research strategies in relation to their theoretical, epistemological and 
ontological perspectives (Bryman, 2008).   
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In terms of their orientation as to the role of theory, quantitative research strategy is 
deductive in nature and is useful in testing theory whilst qualitative research strategy 
is suitable in generating theory and as such inductive in nature (Bryman and Bell, 
2011; Creswell, 2012; Glaser and Strauss 2009). Epistemologically, quantitative 
research strategies follow that of the natural sciences whilst qualitative research 
strategies follow interpretivism (Bryman, 2012; Holloway and Wheeler, 2013).  
 
Ontologically, qualitative and quantitative research strategies are different. Whilst the 
ontological perspective of quantitative research strategy follows objectivism, the 
qualitative research strategy follows constructionism and seeks to build reality mostly 
from social interactions (Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
 
Silverman (2006) compares qualitative and quantitative research methodologies from 
four different perspectives: observation, textual analysis, interviews and audio and 
video recording as depicted in Table 5.2 below. 
 
Table 5. 2 Different Methods Used by Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Methodologies 
Method Quantitative Research Qualitative Research 
   Observation Preliminary work, e.g. prior to 
framing questionnaire 
Fundamental to understanding another 
culture 
   
Textual Analysis Content analysis, i.e. counting in 
terms of researchers' categories 
Understanding participants' categories 
   
Interviews Survey research: mainly fixed 
choice questions to random samples 
Open-ended questions to small samples 
   
Audio and video 
recording 
Used infrequently to check the 
accuracy of interview records 
Used to understand how participants 
organise their talk and body movements 
Source: Silverman (2006: p. 12) 
 
From Table 5.2 it can be seen that whilst quantitative research uses observation as an 
initial tool prior to the framing of questionnaires, the use of observation as a tool is 
fundamental to the effective understanding of societal issues in qualitative research. 
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In addition, although the two methodologies use interviews, quantitative 
methodologies use fixed-choice questions against open-ended question by the 
qualitative methodology. Besides, whilst quantitative research sparingly and 
infrequently uses audio and video to verify the accuracy and reliability of interview 
records, qualitative research uses video and audio to better understand interviewees 
and ensure accuracy.  
 
It is argued that the two research methodologies adopt different methods for different 
purposes (Bryman, 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2011; Flick, 2014; Johnson et al., 2007; 
Silverman, 2006). However, Denscombe (2003), states that although the distinctions 
between these two research strategies are oversimplified, they are not mutually 
exclusive as the two can safely be employed in good research in what is now termed 
mixed methods (Maxwell, 2012). The characteristics of the two research approaches 
overlap (mixed methods) and the main difference between them relates to how the 
data is gathered and analysed (Denscombe, 2008; Heaton, 2004; Johnson et al., 2007; 
Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  
 
The next two sections place emphasis on both research methodologies and discuss the 
option adopted for the research on the accountability systems in NGOs. 
 
5.2.1.  Quantitative Research Methodology 
As stated in the above section, quantitative research has been the predominant 
strategy amongst researchers over time especially in accounting research. Quantitative 
research is purely deductive and is used to test theory with an orientation towards the 
natural scientist and focuses on objectivism (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Creswell, 2012; 
Punch, 2013; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). The main assumption of this approach is 
the existence of objective truth in the world that can be unravelled scientifically. 
Quantitative research strategies seek to statistically and systematically measure the 
relationship between variables in order to support or reject some pre-defined 
hypotheses (Bryman, 2003; Silverman, 2013).  
 
Although quantitative research is widely used in research, it is criticised for being 
good for quantification, but very weak in dealing with social complexities of 
phenomenon (Bryman, 2003). As a result, it is recommended for the adoption of an 
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in-depth qualitative research approach in handling complex social issues (De Vaus, 
2002). It is argued that quantitative research is inflexible because the same questions 
must be asked in the same format and manner if it is to help establish any causal 
relationships. The inflexible nature of quantitative research implies that it is not 
capable in handling changes that may occur during the research process especially, 
during data collection (Maxwell, 2012).  Furthermore, since quantitative research is 
good in handling pre-defined conditions, it is not suitable to investigate the effects of 
environmental pressures and social interaction on phenomena (Holloway and 
Wheeler, 2013).  
 
NGO accountability systems requires the constant interaction with social actors in the 
NGO sector since the NGO environment is a flexible and constantly changing 
environment hence a qualitative approach is considered a more appropriate approach.  
5.2.2.  Qualitative Research Methodology 
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000), define qualitative research as: “an emphasis on the 
qualities of entities and of processes and meanings that are not experimentally 
examined or measured (if measured at all) in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or 
frequency” (p. 8).  Other researchers such as Creswell, (2012) argue that qualitative 
research is the interrelatedness of concepts and assumptions of an enquiry that is used 
to collect and analyse data in a descriptive manner (Gray, 2013). This field of enquiry 
suggests the unique nature of every phenomena and calls for the application of unique 
descriptive views to promote understanding (Holloway and Wheeler, 2013; Mason, 
2002; Silverman, 2013; Yin, 2014). It allows researchers to obtain first hand and in-
depth information of a phenomenon in a holistic and interpretive manner from the 
wider social environment contrary to the quantification of social characteristics 
(Bryman, 1989; Myers, 2013; Potter, 2013; Silverman, 2013).  
 
Qualitative research methods have three main purposes: to describe, understand and 
explain issues and are used to generate theories, hence, they are inductive in nature 
with an orientation of interpretivism and constructionism (Bryman and Bell, 2011; 
Creswell, 2012; Gray, 2013). It tends to be used in situations where reality is seen as 
socially constructed and requires the contribution of the affected social actors to 
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warrant understanding (Potter, 2013; Silverman, 2013). Qualitative research allows 
researchers to embed; observe social phenomena within the natural context; and 
comprehend social issues from the perspective of the social actors: this is useful for 
investigating the social dimension of any phenomena (Bryman, 2012; Creswell, 2012; 
Marshall and Rossman, 2010). 
 
Qualitative research is therefore appropriate where the researcher needs to embed 
themselves in the natural settings of the affected social actors to comprehend societal 
meanings to a phenomenon (Potter, 2013; Punch, 2013). Cassell and Symon (1994), 
contend that qualitative research is flexible as it allows the researcher to alter the 
research process where necessary and take into consideration the values, beliefs and 
culture of the social actors in establishing reality as socially constructed (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011; Holloway and Wheeler, 2013). The emphasis here is that reality is 
subjective in relation to how society perceives it and needs to be unravelled 
subjectively. Thus, qualitative research strategy is a theoretically informed study that 
seeks to provide better understanding of social realities and processes from the 
perspectives of the affected social actors. It argues that since social actors operate in a 
complex social environment and have different perspectives on any phenomena, it is 
appropriate and fair to consider and incorporate these different social actors’ views 
during interpretation (Giddens, 2013; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012). 
 
Qualitative research approach prohibits preconceptions but attempts to established 
social phenomena interpretively from the perspectives of the social actors (Packer, 
2010). It promotes a relationship between the researcher and the researched towards 
the establishment of the reality about phenomena (Punch, 2013; Silverman, 2011). 
The qualitative research technique ensures the collection of data directly from the 
affected social actors in their natural settings, and provides a deeper explanation and 
understanding of a phenomenon (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Holloway and Wheeler, 
2013; Marshall and Rossman, 2010).   
 
However, qualitative research is criticised for its reliance on the subjective 
interpretation of the researcher, which may be characterised by biasness, especially 
from novice researchers (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, Bryman and Bell, 2007; 
Pettigrew and Roberts, 2011). As a result, this research approach has been criticised 
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for being impressionistic in nature (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Merriam, 2014; Packer, 
2010). In addition, the quality and reliability of the evidence gathered and the 
researcher’s interpretation in a qualitative research may be difficult to evaluate posing 
generalisation challenges (Bryman, 2012; Myers, 2013; Silverman, 2011). Qualitative 
research strategy is time consuming and can be very expensive in relation to data 
collection and analysis (Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2011).  
 
5.2.3.  Justifying the Choice of Qualitative Research  
 
Qualitative research strategy is adopted for this research because it allows the 
researcher to investigate the phenomenon at stake and to be able to provide unique 
descriptive understanding and the effective resolution of intellectual puzzles within a 
phenomenon (Gray, 2013; Merriam, 2014; Mason, 2002).  
 
Moreover, qualitative research strategy/methodology ensures the provision of 
effective interpretations derived exclusively from social actors. This research adopted 
a qualitative research strategy to the neglect of a quantitative strategy because 
qualitative research accorded the researcher the opportunity to better understand and 
explain NGO accountability mechanisms and the effect of environmental forces on 
these accountability systems with the view to developing/suggesting a more holistic 
accountability system that would adequately integrate and reflect the views of the 
affected social actors operating in that field.  
 
The researcher is of the view that the reality of NGO accountability systems exists in 
the minds of social actors (practitioners and beneficiaries) within the sector and can 
best be understood when the views of these social actors are interpreted from their 
perspective. In addition, the flexible nature of the qualitative approach accords the 
researcher the option to modify the research process as and where necessary to cater 
for any useful new developments that may occur. The adoption of qualitative research 
for this study was grounded on the fact that it would allow the researcher to examine, 
describe and explain the accountability systems operating in NGOs sector. Because 
quantitative research predominantly emphasises the technical issues to the neglect of a 
wider social views, it was not suitable for this research as it could not have accorded 
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the researcher the opportunity to obtain some of the sensitive and rich information 
required for this research. 
 
5.2.4.  Qualitative Research Methods 
 
Research methods are the techniques for collecting and analysing data and may 
include interviews, questionnaires, textual analysis, observation and statistical and 
non-statistical approaches (Saunders et al., 2009; Silverman, 2006). There are three 
types of research methods suitable for conducting qualitative, namely: field study, 
field experiment and case studies (Bryman, 2012; Moll et al., 2006b; Myers, 2013; 
Silverman, 2013). For the purposes of this investigation, a case study approach was 
adopted. The reason was that, whilst field experiments like all experiments are used 
for observing behaviour using strict, pre-defined rules in controlled environments, 
they tend to provide less intensive investigation in organisations (Moll et al., 2006b).  
But the study on NGO accountability is neither an observation of actor behaviour in a 
strict, controlled, confined and pre-defined environment as in the case of field 
experiment nor can it be done in a less intensive manner (field studies); hence a case 
study was adopted for the research. The adoption of the case study method is an 
indication of the researcher’s philosophical underpinning that reality exists in the 
minds of social actors and must be unravelled in a flexible but intensive case study. 
 
5.2.4.1.  Case Studies 
 
Positivist empirical methodologies mostly based on neoclassical economics theory 
which are aimed at developing universal theories about the world have traditionally 
dominated, and still dominates, accounting research (Edwards, 2014; Modell, 2010; 
Parker, 2012; Ryan et al., 2002; Smith, 2011). However, recent years have witnessed 
an increase in the development of organisational behavioural and social theories that 
has led to a rise in the use of case study research methods in accounting (Chua, 2011; 
Ryan et al., 2002; Scapens, 2011; Smith, 2011). In fact the ability of case studies to 
provide a detailed understanding of accounting systems and practices cannot be 
overemphasised (Adams et al., 2006; Berry and Otley, 2004; Chua, 2011; Chenhall, 
2012; Coad and Glyptis, 2012; Cooper and Morgan, 2008; Guthrie et al., 2012).  
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A case is the object and focus of a study upon which an investigation is based 
(Bryman, 2012; Flick, 2014). A case may include communities, organisations, 
persons, events or any unit of analysis about which information is socially collected in 
their natural settings to provide a detailed understanding of a whole (Creswell, 2012; 
Punch, 2013; Yin, 2011).  
 
The issue of the ‘ideal’ number of cases to be undertaken for effective analysis 
remains contentious in the literature (Gray, 2013; Silverman, 2013). Whilst some 
researchers argue for a minimal number of case studies for in-depth analysis and 
understanding (Bryman, 2008; Fowler, 2014; Silverman, 2013; Punch, 2013; Yin, 
2011), other scholars suggest the strategic selection of cases based on resource 
constraints (Denscombe, 2010; Stake, 2013; Yin, 2014). Although the use of a single 
case study in research promotes higher in-depth investigation, however, depending on 
availability of resources, time and other factors, multiple case studies could be 
conducted to achieve identical results (Bryman, 2012; Creswell, 2012; Stake, 2013). It 
is argued that while multiple case studies are criticised for a reduction in the level and 
richness of detail, it allows researchers to examine each case independently and for 
effective case comparison (Gray, 2013; Silverman, 2013; Yin, 2014).  
 
Other researchers have digressed from the single/multiple dimension of cases studies 
to two other perspectives, namely: its ability to conduct research within the natural 
settings/context of actors; and the capacity to use multiple evidential sources (Crowe 
et al., 2011; Yin, 2010). Investigating in a real life context accords researchers the 
opportunity to dynamically undertake research within the confines of where the 
phenomena occur whilst the use of multiple evidence like interviews, questionnaires, 
observation and document reviews, among others, ensures data validity and 
verification (Crowe et al., 2011; Gray, 2013; Silverman, 2013; Yin, 2010).  
 
5.2.4.1.1.  Types of Case Studies 
 
Some researchers identify five different types of case study research to include 
descriptive, illustrative, experimental, exploratory and explanatory (Creswell, 2012; 
Gray, 2013; Punch, 2013; Ryan et al., 2002; Scapens, 2004). Case studies used to 
obtain information to explain situational occurrences are descriptive case studies 
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(Flick, 2014).  Those case studies are used to demonstrate the applicability of 
innovative systems and ideas that are illustrative in nature (Yin, 2011). Experimental 
case studies ensures the effective assessment of challenges associated with the 
development and implementation of new systems using existing theories (Stake, 
2013) whilst the exploratory ones are used to undertake preliminarily investigations to 
assess a possible scope for future research (Yin, 2011). In spite of the different 
classification of case study research, it is contended that the differences are blurred 
and that the selection of a particular type of case study is dependent on the nature of 
the research and methodology adopted (Creswell, 2012; Ryan et al., 2002; Yin, 2011).   
 
5.2.4.2.  Positivist / Interpretive Case Studies 
 
Case studies can also be distinguished as either positive or interpretive case studies 
(Ryan et al., 2002; Scapens, 2004; Smith, 2011) as specified in Table 5.3 below.  
 
Table 5. 3 Differences in Case Studies Research 
Type of Research Positivist Interpretive 
   View of the World External and Objective Social Construction 
   Types of Study Exploratory Explanatory 
   Nature of Explanation Deductive Pattern 
   Nature of Generalisation Statistical Theoretical 
   Role of Theory Hypotheses Generation Understanding 
   Nature of Accounting Economic Decision Making Object of Study 
Source: Ryan et al., (2002, p. 146) 
 
Table 5.3 depicts the distinguishing features of both positivist and interpretive case 
types of case studies. It can be argued from the table that the positivists see the world 
as external to the researcher and, therefore, use case studies as tools to build 
relationships between variables and to formulate exploratory testable theories and 
hypotheses (Gray, 2013; Ryan et al., 2002). Positivists argue that since case studies 
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use smaller sample sizes they are unsuitable for making statistical generalisations 
(Smith, 2011; Ryan et al., 2002). Alternatively, interpretive researchers recognise the 
socially constructed nature of the world and use case studies to build a 
complementary relationship between theory and observations to establish theoretical 
generalisation in a holistic manner (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Holloway and Wheeler, 
2013; Punch; 2013; Ryan, 2002).  
 
5.2.4.3.  Uses of Case Studies 
 
Some researchers argue that case studies provide superior contextual analysis and are 
used extensively in organisational, management, policy, accounting and NGO 
research to provide in-depth understanding and explanation of the occurrences 
(Bryman, 2012; Chua, 2011; Flick, 2014; Fowler, 2013; Guthrie et al., 2012; Randall 
and Palmer, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2002; Zadek et al., 2013). Others also debate that 
case studies are very useful in conducting research especially in situations where real 
life experiences are the focus of the investigation and where multiple evidence 
sources like interviews, questionnaires and observation are required to promote 
effective understanding (Crowe et al., 2011; Gray, 2013; Silverman, 2013; Yin, 
2010).  
 
Similarly, other scholars are of the view that case studies are useful because they 
ensure the efficient integration of the three tenets of qualitative research methods i.e. 
understanding, describing and explaining social phenomenon (Myers, 2013; 
Silverman, 2013). It is argued that the adoption of case studies for this study could 
provide an understanding of the complex nature of NGO accountability to help 
researchers describe and explain these phenomena.  
 
The adoption of a particular research design is influenced by the type of research 
questions and argues that case studies are appropriate when research questions are 
‘how’ and ‘why’ in nature (Bryman, 2012; Maxwell, 2012; Saunders et al., 2009; Yin 
2014). It is also claimed that case studies are suitable for investigations undertaken 
within a real life context and in situations where the researcher has little or no control 
over the issue under investigation (Denscombe, 2010; Gray, 2013; Holloway and 
Wheeler, 2013).  
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Case studies techniques are suitable because of its ability to accurately represent the 
view of respondents under investigation for effective reconstruction (May, 2011; 
Merriam, 2014; Yin, 2011). The technique is suitable in situations where the variables 
of interest are many and where the researcher is unsure of the relevant variables 
(Bryman, 2012; Creswell, 2012). It is also useful when multiple sources of evidence 
are required to complement each other for a better understanding of events (Crowe et 
al., 2011; Gray, 2013; Silverman, 2013; Stake, 2013; Yin, 2014).  
 
However, case studies are time consuming and the processes involved might be 
unbearable (Yin, 2011). In most cases, the time it takes to go through the case study 
process i.e. the amount of time taken to sample and select the case(s), gain access to 
case sites, collect and analyse data could be very long. In addition, instead of 
complementing each other, the collection of multiple evidence from different sources 
could give different and sometimes conflicting results making it difficult to analyse 
even with the help of information technology (Crowe et al., 2011; Gray, 2013; 
Silverman, 2013; Stake, 2013; Yin, 2014). 
 
5.2.4.4.  Justifying the Choice of Case Study Method 
 
In relation to the study of the accountability systems in NGOs, an interpretive case 
study approach is employed to understand the underlying structures and processes of 
the accountability system. This approach assumes that NGO accountability systems 
are socially constructed hence it is prudent for the researcher to describe the existing 
NGO accountability mechanisms and explain why such systems exist from the 
perspective of the affected social actors.  
 
A case study technique was adopted for the research on NGO accountability systems 
because of its superior contextual analysis (Fowler, 2013). This is on the premise that 
each case study is different with unique characteristics. Thus the accountability 
relations within KKP might be different from others hence worth investigating. Also 
case studies have been used extensively to explore various management and 
organisational issues in NGO studies (Fowler, 2013; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; 
Randal and Palmer, 2001; Tsamenyi, 2002).  
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The case study methodology was adopted because of its ability to allow researchers to 
investigate situations using several types of evidence including: interviews; 
discussions; document reviews; and observations (Crowe et al., 2011; Gray, 2013; 
Ryan et al., 2002; Silverman, 2013; Stake, 2013; Yin, 2014).  
 
Case studies are flexible and do not follow any strictly defined formula: allowing the 
research scope and focus to be altered as and when necessary with minimal 
disruptions (Bryman, 2012; Creswell, 2012; Holloway and Wheeler, 2013; Yin, 
2014). Also, because case study investigations normally occur within the natural and 
social settings of respondents, it allows researchers to gain a detailed understanding of 
phenomena and experience reality from the perspective of the researched (Creswell, 
2012; Gray, 2013; Holloway and Wheeler, 2013). This attribute of case studies is in 
line with the epistemological stance of the social constructivists who argue that reality 
is socially constructed and must be obtained from the perspectives of social actors, 
ideally within their natural settings (Blaike, 2000; Grix, 2002; Potter, 2013; Punch, 
2013).  
 
Another reason for the adoption of a case study was its ability to allow researchers to 
use multiple sources of evidence: in this case, interviews (both individuals and focus 
groups), document review, and observation (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Creswell, 2012).  
Case studies can be used in providing useful comprehensive insights into social issues 
in a dynamic fashion as it accords the researcher the right to provide in-depth and real 
descriptions of social events. The case study as a research method aids in the 
systematic acquisition of valuable information (Yin, 2011), and are useful in dealing 
with emerging and non-sequential events with no defined boundaries (Chua, 1986, 
2011). It provides researchers a better understanding of systems, practices, procedures 
and techniques as used within specific organisational contexts (Yin, 2003). In that 
sense it can be used to provide a detailed understanding of NGO accountability issues 
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5.3.  Research Design and Strategy 
 
This section presents a discussion of the research design and strategies applied to 
select and gather empirical data from KKP. Ryan et al. (2002) proposed some 
sequential and logical steps used to undertake case study research to include: case 
selection; arranging access; preparation; evidence collection and assessment; and 
pattern identification and explanation (Bryman, 2013; Saunders et al., 2009). 
However, the complexities of case study research may render the linearity of the 
sequences impracticable. Other researchers, on the other hand, have proposed an 
alternative processes to case study research to encompass research design, case 
selection and the interpretation of findings (Creswell, 2012; Merriam, 2014; Yin, 
2011).  
 
These researchers argue that it is important to go through some sort of processes  
when embarking on case study research. The sequential processes used for this 
research are described in the next few sections.    
 
5.3.1.  Sampling Strategies 
 
Because cases are selected from the population it is essential to ensure the selection of 
an appropriate case that reflects the population. Several sampling strategies exist for 
qualitative research in the literature but three of the most widely used techniques are 
purposive, snowball and quota sampling (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Denscombe, 2010; 
Guest et al., 2012; Mack et al., 2005; Robinson, 2014; Saunders et al., 2009). 
However, for the purpose of the research on NGO accountability systems the 
purposive and snowball sampling strategies were used to select both the case site and 
interviewees. Purposive sampling strategies were adopted because the researcher 
initially identified the participants to be interviewed using both formal and informal 
contacts.  
 
Participants were not randomly selected as in most quantitative research. However, 
during the course of the interview process, snowball sampling was also adopted 
whereby identified contacts who were hitherto interviewed were asked to recommend 
other suitable participants who met the set criteria/standard to be interviewed as well. 
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For example, the Programmes Director of KKP recommended some donors to the 
researcher for possible engagement. The adoption of these sampling techniques 
allowed the researcher to select an appropriate case site and relevant participants who 
could provide insight and also contribute to providing information towards an 
understanding of NGO accountability systems (Fowler, 2014; Miles and Huberman, 
1994). 
 
5.3.2.  Selection of the Case Study Organisation 
 
It is argued that the selection of suitable case(s) is an essential attribute to a successful 
case study research. Cases may be theoretically selected with emphasis on the 
research questions and the theoretical framework underpinning the study, selected to 
develop theory or to provide different perspective to existing theories (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011; Cooper and Morgan, 2008; Creswell, 2012; Townley et al., 2003; 
Scapens, 2004; Silverman, 2013).  
 
To select a suitable case for this study, an overall criterion was drawn to guide the 
selection process. The selection criterion was that the NGO must:  
 
• be registered; 
• have a relationship with different donors; 
• be involved in several projects with different donors; 
• collaborate with other NGOs; 
• have a wide geographical coverage in Ghana; and 
• have some level of beneficiary involvement. 
 
5.3.2.1.  Registration Status 
 
The first criterion used in the selection process was that the NGO have the capacity to 
operate legally in Ghana. In other words, the NGOs must be duly registered with the 
Department of Social Welfare (DSW) as an organisation limited by guarantee and 
must be of good standings with the department. Thus the NGO must submit its annual 
reports and other documents to the department as and when required.  
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5.3.2.2.  Relationship with Different Donors and Projects Involvement 
 
Another criteria used was for the potential NGO to have relationships with several 
donors and be involved in several projects for them. As already stated, NGOs 
generally obtain the bulk of their funding from donors so this would help the 
researcher to understand the accountability systems and the strategic responses to the 
various donors. In that regard, KKP was selected for the research because of the 
number of donors associated with their operations and the projects involved.  
 
As at the time of the field study, KKP had relations with some local and international 
donors such as SIMAVI, the French Embassy, USAID, WHO, ILO, USASHF, CHFI, 
Plan Ghana, FHI, ADRA, CARE International, BMSF, GAVI ALLIANCE, JHU and 
GHS among others. Also KKP was involved with many projects including the 
SHARPER, Child Survival, Behaviour Change Support Project (BCS), HIV and 
AIDS programmes among others (see list of acronyms and abbreviations)  
 
The number of donors KKP is associated and the projects involved makes a study on 
NGO accountability systems within KKP appropriate as it revealed the availability or 
otherwise of different accountability systems and the effects of environmental factors 
associated with its operations. 
 
5.3.2.3.  Collaboration with other NGOs 
 
This criterion was used to examine KKP’s collaborative relationship with other NGOs 
both locally and internationally to determine the extent of accountability between 
KKP and other NGOs. As at the time of data collection, KKP had a collaborative 
relationship with over 43 local NGOs and CBOs in their activities. Related to the 
above is KKP’s involvement with a host of NGO coalitions and networks including: 
the Ghana Coalition of NGOs in Health; Society for Women and AIDS in Africa 
(SWAA-Ghana); Network for Women’s Right in Ghana (NETRIGHT); Ghana HIV 
and AIDS Network (GHANET); Ghana Coalition of NGOs for the Rights of the 
Child; Millennium Development Goals’ Youth Network (MDGYN); Coalition of 
NGOs for the Prevention of Malaria, Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA-
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CSO); and Gender Violence Survivor Support Network (GVSSN) all of which could 
make the study of NGO accountability interesting. 
 
5.3.2.4.  Geographical Coverage 
 
The selected NGO should have a wider geographical spread across the length and 
breadth of the country. Ghana is divided into ten regions administratively and KKP 
was selected as the case study organisation for the research because of the level of its 
operational coverage within the country. KKP operates in all the ten (10) regions of 
Ghana: an indication of its enthusiasm towards the achievement of their goals.  
 
5.3.2.5.  Beneficiary Involvement 
 
KKP is also selected because of its ability to somehow involve the various 
stakeholder groups within beneficiary communities such as project coordinators, 
traditional leaders, community opinion leaders and field officers, through the 
formulation of local project advisory boards who generally make decisions locally on 
community project planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.  
 
5.3.3.  Research Participants and Selection 
 
This section describes the research participants and how they were selected. Thirty-
five people/interviewees including Directors, Donors, KKP employees, beneficiaries 




The Directors of KKP and the DSW were interviewed in their offices. With regards to 
the Director of DSW, the researcher wanted to find, among others, the number and 
categories of NGOs that are legally registered to operate in Ghana, NGO registration 
and renewal processes and the effects of the environmental factors that impact on 
NGOs operations. In addition, the researcher wanted to find out what it takes for an 
NGO to be in good standings with the department and whether there were any 
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sanctions for NGOs that refuses to remain active. The interview lasted 70 minutes and 
took place at the Director’s office at the Department of Social Welfare.  
 
The Executive Director of the KKP was also interviewed for about 110 minutes on 
issues relating to the motivation of the establishment of the NGOs, the accountability 
systems in place, and the organisation’s responses to the institutional pressures on 
their accountability relations. Issues relating to accountability to donors and 
beneficiaries were also discussed. The focus was to understand the background to the 
establishment of KKP and its operational remit and the socio-cultural environment 
within which NGOs operate (appendix C).  
 
5.3.3.2. Department of Registrar General 
 
An interview lasting 45 minutes was held with an official of the Registrar General’s 
Department to discuss issues relating to NGO registration. The focus of the interview 
was to ascertain and confirm NGO registration processes and whether they are the 




Donors generally provide the bulk of NGO finances and are capable of influencing 
the accountability systems of NGOs. It was therefore appropriate to interview some of 
these donors to obtain their views on how they perceive NGO accountability and to 
ascertain whether there have been any changes in the accountability systems over the 
last few years. As a result, representatives of two donors JHU, FHI360 were 
interviewed in their respective offices.  
 
5.3.3.4. Employees (Officers) of KKP 
 
Employees are the key people that work with NGOs and are primarily on the ground 
acting as the link between NGOs and beneficiaries. Employee/officers are those that 
mostly implement projects and are regularly in contact with project communities and 
beneficiaries. NGO field officers are therefore crucial to the successful 
implementation of NGO projects and have first-hand information on NGO 
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accountability systems. Several employees of KKP were interviewed including the 
Programmes Director, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Regional Programmes 
Coordinators, Programme Officers, Field Officers, the Financial Manager and the 
Regional Accounts Officer. 
 
On some occasions, the researcher travelled from KKP’s head office in Accra to other 
parts of the country including Cape Coast, Twifo Praso, and Mankesim to interview 
regional and district personnel. The researcher also accompanied a field officer to 
Wenniba Hospital to witness at first hand the relationship between field officers and 




Beneficiaries are generally the recipients of NGO intervention programmes and it is 
appropriate to know their views on a research that seeks to provide an understanding 
of NGO accountability systems. Since it was difficult to interview individual 
beneficiaries, the researcher used focus group interviews. Two focus groups were 
interviewed for about three and two hours each respectively to gather data.  
 
It is based on the above-discussed criteria that KKP was selected as the case NGO. 
Once selected, the next hurdle was to gain access. 
 
5.3.4.  Gaining Access 
 
The next stage in case organisation, according to Ryan et al. (2002), is gaining access 
to the case site (Creswell, 2012; Gray, 2013; Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2011). 
Gaining unrestricted access to case sites is one of the key ingredients to a successful 
adoption of case studies as a methodology. The use of social contacts to gain access 
and the courtesy to treat respondents with respect is essential (Creswell, 2012; 
Denscombe, 2010).  In reality, KKP was the researcher’s second option but became 
the main case when the first option opted out of the research process at the last minute 
amidst future publication concerns.  
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To gain access to KKP, an official / introductory letter was written by the researcher 
with an additional supporting letter from the thesis supervisor to the Executive 
Director of KKP to seek their permission to use their sites for the study. The 
researcher made personal/informal visits to KKP and capitalised on personal contacts 
(social network). This was followed up with emails and telephone calls to ensure that 
access was granted for the study. Once access was gained, the Executive Director 
nominated the Programmes Director as the focal point of contact for the researcher. 
Care was taken to negotiate and arrange appointments with case personnel 
(respondents) to minimise disruptions (Yin, 2011). The researcher collaborated with 
the Programmes Director to arrange interview schedules with identified respondents 
and communities and to handle all interview period conflicts. Interview dates and 
times were kept in a diary and reminders set to ensure that scheduled interviews were 
honoured appropriately.  
 
Prior to going to the field (case site), the researcher thoroughly reviewed the pertinent 
literature and identified key research questions to help in the investigation and the 
plan to adopt to achieve the desired results within set constraints (Creswell, 2012; 
Merriam, 2014; Ryan et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2011). Several data 
collection methods have been proposed in the literature to include: artefacts, 
questionnaires, interviews and observations (Creswll, 2012; Silverman, 2011, Yin, 
2014). However, the research on NGO accountability systems and strategic responses 
used interviews, observation and documentary evidence.  
 
To this end, data collection instruments; interview guide, consent forms, participant 
information sheets and other documentation were submitted to the Ethical Review 
Committee of the University of Birmingham for approval. Once the Ethics Committee 
approved the data collection instruments, they were piloted amongst colleagues for 
feedback to eliminate duplications and inconsistencies. The essence was to test for 
consistencies in the research process and the robustness of the methodology for 
possible fine-tuning and to gain the right balance and focus for the research. The 
designed instruments were then used to collect data from the identified participants. 
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5.3.5.  Data Collection Instruments 
 
One key element of research is the identification, design and usage of an appropriate 
data collection instrument to ensure the achievement of the research objectives 
(Bryman, 2012; Flick, 2014; Maxwell, 2012; Merriam, 2014). As already indicated 
three out of the six data collection instruments were adopted for the research on NGO 
accountability systems: interviews, direct observation, and documentary evidence. In 
effect, the study adopted the data triangulation approach to collect data, gain broader 
explanation and to validate data (Yin, 2011).  
 
5.3.6.  Field Study 
 
As the study adopted the interpretivist perspective, qualitative research methods were 
considered suitable for application during data gathering and subsequent analysis. The 
field study was undertaken in Ghana on a single case study between March and 
August 2012 to determine how NGOs operate and the challenges they face. The study 
also aimed at finding out how NGO accountability functions, the effect of 
environmental factors on NGO accountability systems and their strategic responses to 
those pressures.  
 
5.3.7.  Interviews  
 
This part of the study discusses why interviews rather than questionnaire 
administration were used to gather primary data for the research. Interviewing is one 
of the key data collection methods in qualitative research that can help researchers 
capture societal views on issues (Creswell, 2012; Marshall, 2010; Maxwell, 2012; 
Seidman, 2012). Several approaches to the use of interviews for data collection exist 
in the literature to include structured, unstructured, focused, non-directive, daily, life 
history, survey, ethnographic, open ended and counselling interviews (Bryman, 2012, 
Flick, 2014; Seidman, 2012; Silverman, 2006). The researcher adopted the general 
interview guide approach (Bryman, 2012; Holloway and Wheeler, 2013; Seidmam, 
2012) in which, general interview guides were developed (appendix D). The interview 
guides were prepared to guide the research in asking the right questions in his quest to 
answer the research questions and was implemented in face-to-face interviews with 
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participants. The use of in-depth interviews was in line with the researcher’s 
interpretive philosophical stance and also accords the researcher the opportunity to 
appreciate the issues discussed from the viewpoint of the interviewees (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011; Saunders et al., 2009; Seidman, 2012). 
 
The use of interviews as a data collection instrument for the research accorded the 
researcher the opportunity to have one-to-one verbal interactions with interviewees, 
clarify questions to interviewees where necessary and to seek explanation from 
respondents on ambiguous responses (King and Horrocks, 2010; Rubin and Rubin, 
2011; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). This approach ensured that the data collected 
reflected the views aired by respondents in an open and frank manner. The use of 
open-ended questions provides varied responses from respondents especially based on 
how they perceived the issue under discussion (Fink, 2012; Turner, 2010). It must be 
realised that interviews could be expensive and time consuming and its interpretation 
could be subjected to the biasness of the interviewer through interviewees’ postures 
and gestures. 
 
5.3.7.1.  Face-to-Face or In-depth Interviews 
 
On the whole, 35 people operating in the field of NGOs including Directors, 
employees/officers and beneficiaries were interviewed. In addition, some donors were 
interviewed to get their views on NGO accountability. The Director of the 
Department of Social Welfare and officials at the Registrar General’s Office in 
Ghana, were interviewed on the incorporation of NGOs in Ghana and the effect of 
environmental forces that operate within the sector. The average duration of the 
interviews was about 77 minutes and all the interviews took place at the natural 
settings/offices of the participants. 
 
5.3.7.1.1.  Semi-Structured Interview 
 
The interviews were semi-structured, initially guided by an interview guide (appendix 
D) with open-ended questions and in some cases influenced by interesting responses 
within the main themes that led to further revelations and investigation to capture data 
(Bryman, 2012; Seidman, 2012; Turner, 2010). The interview guide lists sets of 
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questions on themes and issues that the researcher wanted to unravel. The interview 
guide was suitable to the study because, although they ensure the possible uniformity 
of responses, they do not provide any predetermined responses (Creswell, 2012; 
Rubin and Rubin, 2011; Silverman, 2011; Turner, 2010). The guide promotes a 
focussed interaction in a systematic manner and ensures efficient time management 
between the interviewer and the interviewee. In addition, interview guides are flexible 
in that they could be amended as and when required to reflect any emerging and 
relevant issues (Holloway and Wheeler, 2013; Seidman, 2012; Silverman, 2011). To 
this end, the researcher on some occasions had to modify (add and remove) questions 
from the guide to direct and focus the research in the right direction. 
 
5.3.7.1.2.  Focus Group Interview / Discussions 
 
Focus group interviews as a data collection instrument has gained popularity amongst 
qualitative researchers in recent years (Bernard and Bernard, 2013; Bryman and Bell, 
2011; Gray, 2013; Maxwell, 2012; Silverman, 2013; Stewart and Shamdasani, 2014). 
A focus group is a group purposively and carefully selected to gather in-depth 
information from well-informed and focussed participants willing to partake in a 
discussion on a specific subject matter (Holloway and Wheeler, 2013; Rabiee, 2004; 
Rubin and Rubin, 2011; Stewart and Shamdasani, 2014).  
 
Whilst some researchers recommend the selection of homogenous and pre-existing 
groups with similar characteristics (Densconbe, 2010; Flick, 2014; Stewart and 
Shamdasani, 2014) others advocate for heterogeneous groups with diverse 
characteristics to prevent any existing relationships for purposes of an honest range of 
responses (Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Rabiee, 2004; Stewart and Shamdasani, 
2014). However, other academics argue that the effectiveness of a focus group 
discussion should not centre on the characteristics of the group (homogenous, 
heterogonous, new or pre-existing) but on the dynamism of the researcher (Creswell, 
2012; Krueger, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009; Silverman, 2013). The number of 
participants in a focus group interview remains contentious amongst researchers with 
some recommending between 6 and 12 participants for varied perspectives (Flick, 
2014; Morgan and Spanish, 1984; Rubin and Rubin, 2011) whilst others suggest 
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between 6 and 8 members for effectiveness (Krueger and Casey, 2000; Stewart and 
Shamdasani, 2014).  
 
The technique uses social interactions to promote collective group dynamics and is 
perceived to provide diverse, richer and deeper understanding compared to one-to-one 
interviews (Creswell, 2012; Green et al., 2003; Punch, 2013). One advantage of the 
focus group technique is its ability to generate large and rich sums of data quickly 
(Krueger and Casey, 2000; Stewart and Shamdasani, 2014; Thomas et al., 1995) and 
the observation of non-verbal cues (Kitzinger, 1995; Stewart and Shamdasani, 2014). 
It uses a flexible and informal format to obtain data and could lead to the unravelling 
of valuable information (Creswell, 2012; Fern, 1982; Krueger, 2009; Marshall and 
Rossman, 2010). It is generally suitable for people with relatively lower literacy 
levels (Carey, 1995; Denscombe, 2010; Smith, 2007) but its usage could lead to 
findings that do not entirely reflect the views of the general populates (Stewart and 
Shamdasani, 2014) and could have analysis that could be challenging (Rabiee, 2004). 
Focus group interview in the form of open-ended discussion, guided by focus group 
interview guide (appendix D) was used to affirm some claims and to solicit views, 
particularly on downward accountability issues.  
 
It is recommended that several focus group discussions should be undertaken until the 
point of theoretical saturation where clearer patterns emerge. However for logistical 
and other reasons, and to answer simple research questions, a number of focus group 
discussions are recommended (Burrows and Kendall, 1997; Krueger, 2009). For this 
reason, two focus groups were identified and organised.  
 
In practical terms and in order to help the researcher tell the story from the 
perspectives of beneficiaries, two focus group discussions were organized in the 
Greater Accra and Central regions. To gain access to these beneficiary communities, 
the researcher accompanied the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer of the case 
organisation to witness the operations of KKP’s instituted community structures. At 
these observation sessions, the researcher identified and established contact with some 
of the gatekeepers, who Saunders (2006), describe as the people who control research 
access.  These are community members with community influence.  They include: 
community volunteers and opinion leaders with knowledge of NGO operations. The 
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identified gatekeepers eventually assisted the researcher to organize the focus group 
participants and the venue for the meetings. Two focus groups composed of eight 
heterogeneous participants were organised. These two groups were given pseudo 
names as: ‘Agyanom’ and ‘Enanom’.   
 
The ‘Agyanom’ group was made up of four males and four females. The composition 
of this group ensured balanced opinions; gave confidence to the women and to get the 
perspectives from both sexes. Despite the Ghanaian culture where men always 
dominate females in discussions, there was no intimidation. However, in the case of 
the ‘Enanom’ focus group, the balance could not be attained since the researcher was 
only able to recruit three females against five males. The ‘Agyanom’ focus group 
discussion lasted three hours whilst the ‘Enanom’ one was over in two hours. The two 
groups answered similar questions with slight modifications in the line of questioning 
and probing by the researcher. 
 
Issues discussed at these meetings centred on how KKP or donors account to the 
community or beneficiaries.  The essence of the focus group discussion was to help 
investigate the nature of downward accountability relations that exist between donors 
/ KKP and the beneficiary communities. The question was always put across and 
discussants contributed their ideas towards it. The researcher was able to bring 
participants in line whenever they were going off the topic.  The discussions were 
very interesting and lively as participants were free to express their opinion on the 
issues raised. 
 
5.3.8.  Audio Recording 
 
Data recording is an essential component of data collection when using qualitative 
research methodology to understand how participants organise their talk and body 
movements (Creswell, 2012; Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Silverman, 2011). All 
interviews were recorded and in some cases hand written notes were taken to ensure 
that no information provided by participants was missed. Notes were taken as a 
backup and to guard against any recording equipment failures.  
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A digital voice recorder that could group voices into folders was used to record the 
voices while notebooks were used to take down non-verbal clues.  These helped a lot 
in the analysis. Also, the approach enabled the researcher to ask relevant questions 
and also to observe any non-verbal cues worth noting from participants. The 
recording was done with permission from interviewees before the commencement of 
the interviews. Some researchers explain that tape recorders as a tool for data 
collection allows researchers to focus on asking questions, capture responses 
accurately and serve as evidence (Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Patton 1990; Rubin 
and Rubin, 2011). Others argue that tape recorders should be used with care (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985; Myers and Newman, 2007). In order to minimise the effect of noise 
and other interferences, the researcher ensured that interview times were set at the 
interviewee’s convenience and at a time when there were less likely to be 
interferences. The researcher also ensured that the tape recorder used to record the 
interviews had external noise reduction and pause facilities to handle any unforeseen 
noise and other interactions. By so doing, the interview processes were not affected 
by such interferences. Participants were given refreshments: a bottle of water and 
sandwich as a form of appreciation for their contribution to the study.   
 
5.3.9.  Participant Observation  
 
Participant observation is one key method of data collection used for qualitative 
research methodology (Bryman, 2012; Creswell, 2012). It is argued that observation 
in qualitative research is fundamental to an effective understanding of another culture 
and issues and recommends researchers to be observant (Flick, 2014; Marshall and 
Rossman, 2010; May, 2011; Silverman, 2013). As part of the individual interviews 
(in-depth interviews) and the focus groups discussions and to fulfil the data 
triangulation approach adopted by the researcher, direct observation was applied to 
observe some of the accountability systems practiced by KKP. The presence of the 
researcher at some selected and approved meetings mostly within the premises of 
KKP accorded the researcher the opportunity to directly observe some of the 
accountability practices (Yin, 2011). At a meeting held between JHU (donor), KKP 
(NGO) and the Adwensan Community (a suburb of Accra), the researcher observed 
how communities are involved in the accountability systems of KKP. The researcher 
mainly observed the collaboration and discussions between the three main parties and 
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only asked a few questions for clarity of issues. The use of the participant observation 
methods affirmed some of the issues hitherto discussed with field officers from KKP. 
 
5.3.10.  Document Evidence 
 
In addition to interviews and direct (participant) observation, some documents, mostly 
in the form of reports, forms and templates, and contract extracts were reviewed 
(Silverman, 2011). Some of the documents reviewed were project proposals and 
reports; donor reports; annual reports; auditors’ reports; organisational structure; 
training reports and materials; policy documents; and project evaluation reports. In 
addition, KKP brochures, journals and their websites were reviewed and used for 
references and other purposes. Document analysis in this sense served as secondary 
sources of data to complement the primary sources (interviews and direct 
observation). This was done as part of the data triangulation process and to enrich and 
verify the data collected (Yin, 2014). 
 
5.3.11.  Data Analysis  
 
Suitable techniques were used to analyse the empirical data. It is argued that the 
choice of a particular mode of analysis is, driven, among others, by the research 
questions, the research strategies, the theoretical framework, the methods and data 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011; Creswell, 2012; Punch, 2013; Silverman, 2013). This study 
adopts qualitative data analysis (Creswell, 2012; Flick, 2014; Haberman, 2014; 
Silverman, 2011). 
 
In reference to this study, data were collected from: 
 
1. field interviews with among others, employees of KKP, officials of the 
department of social welfare, donor representatives, coalition of NGOs and 
beneficiary communities via focus group discussion; and  
2. documentary sources and other field notes.  
 
The voluminous nature of the data collected from the field interviews and focus group 
discussions necessitated the adoption and implementation of a data reduction strategy 
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by the researcher so as to enhance data analysis. The data reduction strategy promoted 
the identification and confirmation of emerging patterns and themes from the data. 
 
It is worth noting that the study adopted open or pattern coding and audit trail for the 
analysis of the data.  Accordingly, data collected through both the interviews and 
focus group discussions were analysed with these techniques in mind (Bryman, 2012; 
Bryman and Bell, 2011; Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Saunders et al., 2009; 
Silverman, 2013; Miles and Huberman, 1984). Specifically, data from the interviews 
were pre-coded and subsequently coded before an audit trail was conducted to ensure 
completeness (Marshall and Rossman, 2009; Silverman, 2011; Miles and Huberman, 




A pre-coding process was firstly initiated (Marshall and Rossman (2009). For 
instance, Marshall and Rossman (2009) see the organisation of data in this manner as 
an important phase of qualitative data analysis. It is argued that data at the pre-coding 
phase is generally raw, unrefined and highly descriptive in nature hence the need to 
organise such data into a suitable form for analysis.  Here, the data was organised into 
categories, concepts, themes, and patterns.  
 
In practical terms, the process of organising raw and unrefined collected data in an 
attempt to make sense of it commenced during the data collection period. Data 
collected during interviews and focus group discussions (both recorded and 
handwritten notes) were reviewed on a daily basis. Collected data (including those 
spoken in local dialects) were translated and transcribed verbatim into written text 
during this phase of the analysis in readiness for the identification and highlighting of 
the major points.  This was in line with the objectives of the study.  
  
Transcription was done within 24 hours of each interview and focus group discussion, 
particularly to ensure that the issues discussed and the responses were still fresh in the 
mind of the researcher. Again, in line with Miles and Huberman’s (1984) suggestion, 
all the documentary evidence was gathered into a document summary form to 
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determine their complementarity or otherwise. The next stage of the data analysis 




Actual data analysis commences after a successful pre-coding (Punch, 2013). This is 
because the pre-coding phase helps researchers to identify emerging themes from the 
unrefined data for further analysis. The transcribed field notes and other evidence 
were coded. Symbols or codes mostly derived from the research questions, the key 
concepts and themes were developed for each similar segment: paragraphs, sentences 
and phrases, among others, of the transcribed data. The various similar events were 
grouped into categories. These codes served as a data organisation tool because they 
allowed the researcher to quickly identify similar codes for possible clustering in line 
with the identified research questions, concepts and themes.  Crucially, pattern coding 
was adopted in this study in order to understand the patterns, the recurrences and the 
whys that described the phenomena and events. The transcribed data were all brought 
together and numbered chronologically. Fixed numbers were assigned to the relevant 
sections of the data to provide a link/trial between the data and respondents. 
Paragraphs, sentences, phrases, among others, were organised along the lines of the 
three research objectives. Consequently, three colour codes were assigned to each of 
the research objectives as follows: 
 
1. To investigate accountability relations both upward and downward in a 
particular NGO in Ghana - Blue. 
2. To examine how accountability relations are shaped by the institutional 
environment within which the studied NGO operates - Green 
3. To investigate the various strategies adopted by the studied NGO to 
respond to the institutional pressures it faces - Red 
 
The transcribed data was read over and over such that any relevant section or 
response that touched on any of the research objectives was coloured accordingly. All 
similar coloured sections were brought together and stored/saved differently. The 
coloured data were arranged into folders in line with themes developed during the 
coding process. In other words, data i.e. evidence under similar themes were stored in 
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defined folders. The combined data in each folder signifying the various themes were 
analysed in accordance with the level of quality and ability to contribute to the 
achievement of the research objectives. These summary phrases were read severally 
to reveal repeated words/terms that best described each of the research objectives.  A 
sample is depicted in table 5.4 below.   
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Table 5. 4 Recurring Words in Relation to Research Objective 
No. Research Objective Distinctive Colour Most Frequently Used Words/terms 
1 
To investigate accountability 
relations both upward and 




·       Reports 
o   types 
o   content 
·       Review meetings 
·       External monitoring and auditing 
·       Financial and annual report 
·       Relationship with other NGOs 
Downward Accountability 
·       Beneficiary Involvement 
·       Community Structures and Registers 
·       Review Meetings 
·       Reporting  
    
2 
To examine how accountability 
relations are shaped by the 
institutional environment within 
which the studied NGO operates. 
Green 
·       Donors 
·       Diplomatic missions 
·       Professional Firms 
·       Media 
·       Competition for Funding 
·       Government and Governmental Agencies 
·       Financial and Annual report 
·       The Regulatory Group of Forces  
·       Department of Social Welfare 
·       Coalitions of NGOs 
·      Other Groups 
Force, Impose, Influence, Dump, Sway, Authorize, Sanction, 
Imitate, Copy, Emulate, Mimic, Duplicate, Match 
    
3 
To investigate the various 
strategies adopted by the studied 
NGO to respond to the 
institutional pressures it faces.  
Red 
Agree, Comply, Accept, Consent, Submit, Concur, Conform, 
Obey, Fulfil, Follow, Arrange, Bargain, Corporate, 
Negotiate, Confer, Evade, Dodge, Circumvent, Prevent, 
Avert, Elude, Escape, Get-out, Sidestep, Bypass, Confront, 
Resist, Challenge, Flout, Disregard, Disobey, Oppose, 
Contest, Attack, Manoeuvre, Influence 
Source: Researcher's own construct 
Table 5.4 depicts the three research objectives and the most frequently used 
words/terms by respondents to describe them. The researcher used the identified 
frequently used words/terms as a basis to colour-highlight the paragraphs, sentences, 
and phrases that contain those words/terms and to examine the context within which 
they were used. Numbers were assigned to these highlighted phrases and they were 
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copied into separate files per research objective. In effect, the transcribed data were 
categorised according to the objective they sought to address.  
 
For example, a scan through the ‘blue colour’ coded data relating to the first research 
objective [(To investigate accountability relations both upward and downward in a 
particular NGO in Ghana.)], revealed the under listed issues.  
 
Accountability relations is predominantly upward as reflected in table 5.4 above and 
also via the decisions that are made regarding projects such as:  
1. Overall project decisions; 
2. Project conceptualisation and location; 
3. Project objectives and activities; 
4. Selection of project implementing partners; and 
5. Project closure. 
 
This approach was applied to analyse the other two remaining research objectives. 
The resultant themes were used for subsequent analysis in the findings and discussion 




The second phase of the data analysis is the audit trail (Marshall and Rossman, 2010; 
Miles and Huberman, 1984; Richards, 2014). Miles and Huberman (1984) explain 
that this is a process that promotes the identification and management of data chunks 
(Richards, 2014). The essence of an audit trail is to establish the relationship between 
the identified categories in the study. The audit trail also helps to confirm the 
availability of enough data to support the interpretation of the results.   
 
5.3.12.  Validity and Reliability  
 
To evaluate the reliability (evidence independence) and validity (true reflection) of 
the evidence collected, procedural reliability and contextual validity mechanisms 
were adopted (Creswell, 2012; Gray, 2013; Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Maxwell, 
2012; Scapens, 2004; Seidman, 2012; Silverman, 2013). Procedural reliability is the 
application of appropriate research method procedures including research design; 
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research plan; (see above) to ensure the possibility of an independent verification of 
the research processes in the form of an audit trail (Creswell, 2012; Flick, 2014; 
Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Punch, 2013; Ryan et al., 2002). Contextual validity 
relates to the level of credibility of the evidence and conclusions from the research 
findings (Bryman, 2012; Ryan et al., 2002; Scapens, 2004; Seidman, 2012). 
Contextual validity can be achieved through triangulation (Flick, 2014; Gray, 2013; 
Holloway and Wheeler, 2013; Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Ryan et al., 2002).  For 
the purpose of this research, data triangulation was applied where the validity of 
pieces of information were compared and crosschecked with other sources where 
possible. The qualitative research methods and the collection of data by the researcher 
himself ensured data verification and accuracy. 
 
5.4. Chapter Summary 
 
The aim of the research is to investigate NGO accountability systems and the impact 
of institutional factors on NGO accountability systems with the view to developing a 
more holistic NGO accountability system that incorporates most NGO stakeholders. 
The questions that the research sought to answer are: how upward and downward 
accountability functions in NGOs; the effect of upward accountability on downward 
accountability; and the influence of the institutional environment on NGO 
accountability systems. To help the researcher answer the research questions 
appropriately, an interpretive-explanatory case study approach was adopted. The 
adoption of the case study approach emanates from the researcher's philosophical 
stance that reality exists in the minds of social actors and knowledge can be gained by 
interacting with the affected social actors. As such, an in-depth case study was 
undertaken on a community-based organisation using research methods including 
interviews. The collected data were pre-coded and eventually coded in a data analysis 
process that was informed by the research questions and strategies as well as the 
theoretical framework.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 




This chapter presents the findings of the research on NGO accountability in Ghana in 
the specific context of KKP (the case study NGO). An analysis of the data was 
conducted based on themes and concepts drawn from the literature and themes that 
emerged from the fieldwork. Although the analysis of the data was influenced to 
some extent by the literature, care was taken to avoid force-fitting the data into prior 
sets of themes. This approach allowed the researcher to account for new themes and 
concepts and also discard those pre-defined themes that do not fit with the data. Such 
approach permits the recognition of the dynamic nature of empirical qualitative data, 
particularly in a case study setting. 
 
The chapter is structured into three main sections: the first presents the results in 
relation to the nature of decision-making at the case NGO; the second presents the 
results of the observed accountability system i.e. upward and downward within KKP; 
and the chapter concludes with a summary of the evidence gathered. 
 
6.1. Nature of Decision-making at KKP 
 
Effective decision-making is very important for the successful running of every 
organisation. In the decision-making process, management must be able to have 
access to relevant information upon which to select the best alternative amongst the 
available options. Also, in this process, management may be provided with the main 
aims or objectives to be achieved by fund providers in the form of general guidelines, 
particularly in the context of specific project funding, which is the case for KKP. 
However, it is observed in the studied NGO that the involvement of donors, which are 
its main fund providers, in the decision-making process, is beyond providing major 
project objectives or guidelines.  In most cases, donors seem to control some detailed 
decisions that are made within KKP including decisions on projects, projects 
conceptualisation and location, projects activities, selecting project implementing 
partner, and project closure. In effect, most decisions made within KKP are offshoots 
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and emanate from donors with little or no room for decision contribution by KKP. A 
Field Officer makes such an observation by stating that: 
  
In my view, we are only here to help them implement their 
already decided projects… they make all the decisions and we 
just follow [FO3]. 
 
Specific evidence of donor-led decision-making at KKP is provided in the subsections 
that follow. 
 
6.1.1. Overall Project Decisions 
 
The management of KKP has over the years undertaken a significant number of 
projects including: innovative HIV prevention (preventive strategies) among young 
people and the general population; wash up; tuberculosis advocacy and community 
involvement in early tuberculosis case detection; behaviour change support (BCS); 
nutrition and reproductive health centre; and child survival. At the time of data 
collection, KKP was implementing four major projects located in various parts of the 
country with several different donors as outlined by the Executive Director (ED). 
 
Currently, we are implementing four major projects running in 
the Greater Accra, Central, and the Brong Ahafo regions of 
Ghana. Normally as the year goes by other projects come by. We 
are hoping to start another one very soon on abortion care also in 
the Greater Accra region. Some of our donors are SIMAVI of the 
Netherlands, USAID, ADDR, The Global, Fund, FHI360, John 
Hopkins University (JHU), Ghana Aids Commission, Bristol-
Myers Squibb and GAVI [ED]. 
 
Detailed decisions related to the above-mentioned projects are suggested to be 
entirely made by donors with little, or in some cases no, inputs whatsoever from KKP. 
When asked about the level of KKP management involvement in project decision-
making, the Central Regional Programmes Coordinator (CRPC) noted: 
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You are there and a donor, or you see in the newspaper that there 
is a call for proposal; they want an NGO to do this or that in this 
and that region. We look at the requirements and if we realise 
that we qualify, we put in an application based on the project 
designed by whoever is calling for the proposal. In most cases we 
are not involved in project decisions at all.   
 
The Programmes Director (PD) added: 
 
All the crucial project decisions are under the sole jurisdiction of 
our donors who are classed and to a larger extent as the most 
important stakeholders in the NGO arena. Donors call all the 
shots on all major project decisions and other stakeholders are 
basically at their beck and call. 
 
In fact, according to interviewees, some of the other specific project decisions that 
donors make are in relation to: project conceptualisation and location; project 
objectives and activities; objectives, project planning; selection of project 
implementation partners; and project closure.  
 
6.1.2. Project Conceptualisation and Location 
 
The issue of project conceptualisation is concerned with the birth of projects. Before 
projects can be commenced, the idea about the project must be conceptualised. One 
could argue that since the NGO sector has several stakeholder groups, most, if not all, 
project conceptualisation should come out from consultation with the various 
stakeholder groups at least beneficiaries and implementing partners. However 
interviews at KKP revealed that project conceptualisation is mostly donor driven. 
Donors conceptualise projects, decide on the project location and total project costs 
and other conditions as far as projects are concerned. These conditions are packaged 
into calls for expression of interest or calls for proposals that are advertised in 
national newspapers, the Internet and other media inviting prospective NGOs like 
KKP to bid. In most cases, decisions on project conceptualisation do not involve 
KKP, beneficiaries, or any other stakeholder group with the exception of donors. 
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Even after the project has been awarded, the selected NGO still has no say in the 
decision to accommodate the conceptualised project to the grassroots realities. For 
example, when asked whether donors generally involve KKP in project 
conceptualisation, selection and location, Field Officer (FO1) answered that:  
 
...of course donors will not involve you in such things. I don’t 
think we matter that much. They only use us as a vessel to 
achieve their desired results  
 
Further, Field Officer (FO3) noted that: 
 
They [i.e. donors] just do it. They just do their things and put it 
out there and they want people to come and source it. They do 
not involve us in anything… what we have to do is in the 
contract so we just get on with it… All they need is the results. 
They give us targets…, our aim is to try to exceed donor 
expectations and to do more than what is expected of us for the 
sake of future referrals. 
 
Even when KKP has indicated in their response to an advertised proposal their 
implementation mechanism, donors can still tweak and make changes to submitted 
proposals and KKP will have nothing to say or do for the fear of not being considered 
or rejected.  
 
Before you get projects or contracts, you send a proposal. In the 
proposal you state one or two things that you want to do with the 
money. Then they will go through the proposal and see whether 
they are in tune or side with what they want to do. They can 
make their own adjustments and changes and say you want to do 
this but we want to do it this way… That is where their 
conditions come in. So we come back to readjust to suit exactly 
the way they want it because they are funding it… otherwise we 
lose it [PD]. 
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On the same issue, Programme Officer (PO4) explained: 
  
What I have realised is that, for some of the projects, the donors 
tell you exactly what you should use their monies for. Basically, 
they already have something in mind that you must do… Even if 
you want to do some creative activities, those ones you can do 
but you have to be careful about how you go about it. 
 
Field Officer (FO7) added: 
 
... for me, I sometimes think that for the donors, this is what they 
want to use their monies for, and this is what they are telling you, 
but when you go to the community you realize that sometimes 
it’s more than what they are asking for; and sometimes too there 
are so many things you have to do before the project even starts 
kicking, so sometimes it’s not comfortable but in most cases 
donors would not budge to any alternative ideas from us – 
something I find very unfortunate.  
 
It is not as if KKP or any other stakeholder group do not have the capacity to 
conceptualise projects but the truth is that most projects that do not emanate from 
donors do not get funding, and as such do not get implemented no matter how 
laudable the project concept might sound. It is further revealed that on occasions 
when KKP proposed or conceptualised projects for donors to sponsor, it had almost 
always not received favourable attention. Thus on occasions when KKP have 
conceptualised projects initiated by beneficiaries that KKP felt could immensely 
assist beneficiaries, obtaining funding from donors has always been a challenge. The 
ratio of obtaining funding for KKP/beneficiary-led projects compared to donor led 
projects is very small.  
 
This is what prompted the PD to comment that: 
 
Sometimes with suggestions from beneficiaries we try to obtain 
funding for such beneficiary led project initiatives by writing 
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proposals to prospective donors. But obtaining funding for such 
initiatives is always a challenge and it is quite difficult because 
donors mostly want to call the shots. In most cases, donors don’t 
want to know even when we have all the facts fully at hand and 
there is a compelling case for such an intervention. I must say 
that we are mostly not successful with funding when it comes to 
KKP/beneficiary intervention proposals as compared to donor led 
ones.   
 
KKP did have a few successes in obtaining funding for KKP led project interventions. 
However, in these experiences, the organisation has had to make fundamental changes 
to the initial proposal to suit prospective donors’ desired project objectives, activities, 
and outputs and so forth before approval for support could be obtained. 
 
We have been successful on a few of such initiatives and even 
then we had to make several changes for it to be accepted. If it 
does not meet their expectations, then forget about it. 
[Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (MEO)]. 
 
The focus group discussion also revealed that any project that beneficiaries have 
suggested to KKP that they, i.e. the beneficiaries, felt could be very beneficial to them 
had never received any positive response on the part of KKP. But since KKP relies on 
donors to fund project, the ultimate response to beneficiary-led projects rest with 
donors. This can be ascertained from the comment from a focus group participant:  
 
In the past we have tried to suggest projects that we [felt] might 
help us better through KKP, but the response has always been, 
we do not provide the funds, we will talk to our donors and see 
how it goes but they mostly never come back to us on such issues 




	   160	  
6.1.3. Project Objectives and Activities 
 
In addition to donors deciding on project conceptualisation and location, it unfolded 
during the interview that donors, to a greater extent, define project objectives as well 
as the activities to be undertaken in a project. The argument is, because donors 
generally conceptualise projects and they define their objectives, it is normal that they 
define the activities to be undertaken to achieve these objectives. These are then 
transmitted to KKP and other stakeholder groups who may be associated with the 
project. When asked to comment on how project activities are set, the MEO noted 
that:  
 
...donors normally provide a list of activities to be undertaken in 




To a very large extent, project objectives just like most other 
things, [are] an imposition and mostly come as part of the call for 
proposal documents. For instance as part of the call, they will tell 
you that the objectives of the project is ABC, so the only way 
KKP could apply is for KKP to assess itself as an organisation to 
determine which strategies will work best... So the strategies are 
sometimes flexible, but donors are firm on certain aspects that 
they don’t compromise at all including objectives and activities. 
You need to do it exactly the way they want it. 
 
In addition to donors defining project activities for KKP to only implement, they can 
alter (reduce) the number of activities at will. The PD particularly points out this 
issue:  
Recently, there have been changes even to the budget lines of 
project activities. The budget lines have been drastically cut 
down. This means that we are restricted in terms of the number 
of activities we can implement under projects. Previously, there 
were a lot of activities that could be implemented under projects. 
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Things like mobilisation, holding of seminars and durbars to 
sensitise beneficiaries and bring them together before and during 
the project implementation. But this time it is strictly on the 
implementation of the project, which does not help. Even if you 
want to do some creative activities, you need to seek approval 
from donors which is mostly not approved 
 
Furthermore, the donor in most cases has the right in comparison to KKP to alter the 
scope and objectives of projects at will if they deem it fit. Such practices were 
unearthed during a documentary scrutiny where it was stated that:  
 
Upon receipt of request from [the donor], [KKP] shall take any 
and all steps to comply with any and all requirements of the 
donor not already included in this Agreement and negotiate in 
good faith an amendment to effectuate such requirements in this 
Agreement (appendix E) 
 
The problem with donors solemnly defining project objectives and activities is that it 
stifles creativity and flexibility from KKP and beneficiaries. Besides, donor-led 
project activities might not work in all situations within certain communities and may 
not resolve the problem that the project is intended to solve due to the lack of 
community involvement and knowledge.  
 
At times donors will impress upon us to implement a project in a 
particular manner (as stated), but at times when we go to the 
field, beneficiaries and everybody else with local knowledge and 
expertise might suggest alternative implementation process. But 
we have to ignore these local beneficiaries and follow the donor 
because they are powerful and can easily terminate the project. 
When it happens like that, you realise that the impact of the 
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Moreover: 
 
At the end of the project you will realize that the beneficiaries 
were right but by then the harm and damage to the project have 
already been caused and money and other resources wasted 
[PO4]. 
 
There are instances where KKP who is on the ground have doubts about the success 
and viability of the donor proposed solution, but are unable to suggest alternative 
because the decision entirely lies with the donor. For example, one respondent 
observed that:  
 
Sometimes, you would think that you can do it this way to 
benefit the beneficiaries more, but the donor says otherwise. For 
instance, just last week I went with the project director to the 
field to monitor one of the projects in Twifo Praso. It is quite 
clear that just going out there to implement the project to 
sensitise the people on health issues is not enough. When you 
sensitise them, they need money to access the service. So I think 
we’ve got to the point where the donor has to add that aspect, 
that is, the economic empowerment aspect to the activities that 
we implement so that once we educate the person about what to 
do, the person would need money to go and access the service… 
and the donor(s) do not listen to us… In my view, they [donors] 
lack an appreciation of the problems that we are having here. We 
need to do more to advocate for such things to be done… 
Generally, we are on the ground and we know that when we do 
this, it would benefit beneficiaries more but [donors would not 
listen] [MEO]. 
 
6.1.4. Selection of Project Implementing Partners 
 
Selecting project-implementing partners is a key decision making process mostly 
made exclusively by donors. The role of an implementing partner is to carry out 
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donors’ wishes in a collaborative manner so as to maximise project impact and to 
ensure value for money in project implementation. As already indicated, donors 
generally package and advertise projects for prospective NGOs to bid on. Upon 
receipt of responses for applications for expression of interest or calls for proposals 
from prospective NGOs including KKP, donors solely decide the NGO(s) to partner 
with. Unsuccessful NGOs and other stakeholder groups could do nothing about the 
decision made by donors. Although the selection process considers institutions that 
operate in specific thematic areas (health, developmental etc.) and have experience in 
that area, it is mostly influenced by an NGO’s ability to demonstrate the existence of 
the needed credentials/criteria required by donors. Such requirements are enshrined in 
agreements and contracts specifically designed and advertised by donors.  
 
An extract of a sample of the eligibility criteria that must be met by prospective NGO 
seeking funding from a donor (appendix F) reads:  
 
Eligibility Criteria 
• Should be able to state clearly the results and outcomes that will be achieved 
from the project; 
• Demonstrate a track record in delivering results and timely reports; 
• Must be legally registered in Ghana; 
• Must demonstrate standards of good organisational governance; 
• Must practically demonstrate real and actual inclusion/diversity and gender 
sensitivity across the organisation; 
• Must have appropriate procedures for (financial/administrative) management, 
monitoring and reporting; 
• Must show at least two previous annual statements of accounts audited by a 
suitably certified person(s) or body; 
 
On the whole, our [KKP] response to donors request for proposal 
is entirely based on, and tailored to the eligible criteria specified 
by the particular donor. However, being selected for the funding 
remains the sole prerogative of the donor. They decide whom 
they want to work with.  [ED] 
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The PD added: 
 
Once we [KKP] have responded to calls for proposals, we only 
wait upon donors to select us. Donors control the selection 
process. It is entirely outside our domain. All we do is basically 
to “hope and pray” that we will be selected. Donors have the 
choice and they exercise it accordingly.  
 
6.1.5. Project Closure 
 
Projects could either be closed before the end of project period/duration (termination) 
or when the project has been allowed to run its course (completed). Project 
termination could occur where certain conditions in the contract are not met or where 
unresolved disagreement arises between the donor and the selected implementing 
partner. The way projects are terminated is highly dependent on the contract or 
agreement signed. In some cases, the partner is allowed to complete the attempted 
part (activity) of the project or where the total fund is provided for implementation, 
the rest of the fund is refunded to the donor. However, if the fund disbursement is 
based on project implementation stages of cash flow presented to the donor, where the 
funds are in arrears, the donor reimburses the outstanding fund to the implementing 
partner and the project implementation is brought to closure.  
 
In essence, donors have the option to terminate projects at will if KKP fails to abide 
by any of the conditions set out in the contract. Although respondents at KKP 
affirmed that the organisation has never experienced project termination from donors, 
an inspection of a donor service agreement (appendix E) revealed the possibility of 
project termination if KKP fails in any of the project conditions. A section of the 
service agreement document reads: 
 
Without regard to the set term, [the donor] in its sole discretion, 
can terminate this Agreement at any time if it determines that the 
performance of [KKP] is unsatisfactory, [KKP] develops a 
conflict of interest with [the donor], [KKP] is in breach of this 
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Agreement and does not cure that breach within ten (10) days’ 
notice thereof from [the donor], or [KKP] files a petition in 
bankruptcy or there is an entering of judgment of bankruptcy by 
or against [KKP].  In all events, if this Agreement expires or is 
terminated by [the donor], [the donor] shall have no further 
obligations to [KKP], including the payment of any further funds 
to [KKP]. 
 
An NGO that has ever experienced project termination faces an uphill battle to get 
any future funding from that donor and for that matter other donors especially as there 
seem to be an increase in the level of collaboration amongst donors. Project 
termination generally casts a permanent doubt on the image and credibility of the 
affected NGO to obtain funding from other donor sources. An interview with an 
official of a donor (D1) revealed a recent increase in the level of interaction and 
dialogue amongst donors. He comments: 
 
Donors these days communicate among themselves a lot and 
therefore are able to know who is funding what organisation. 
Through these interactions, we are able to identify credible 
NGOs to partner with. Besides, calls for proposals are designed 
to fish out blacklisted NGOs [D1].  
 
In most cases, NGOs are asked to respond with reasons why previous project was 
terminated as evident by an extract (clause) from a service agreement (appendix E) 
reads:  
 
Has [KKP] ever been denied the right to work on a project, to bid 
on a project, or had a project suspended or terminated by any 
funder, for any reason?  If yes, please attach an explanation. 
 
Donor’s quest to fish out NGOs that have experienced project termination in the past 
in itself could be good especially as it has the potential to help determine non-
performing NGOs. However, it could also damage the reputation of NGOs unfairly.   
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The preferred way of project closure occurs when the project runs its course and 
comes to an expected end. In such a situation, the closure process will follow the 
contractual process enshrined in the contract as specified by the donor. Project 
closures and processes vary depending on donor requirements.  
 
The initial project closure process starts with the submission of 
both financial and narrative reports including end of project 
evaluation report to the donor and any unexpended funds have to 
be refunded to the donor. There is also end of project audit and 
the choice of auditor is at the discretion of the donor [ED].  
 
An interview with a senior member on an NGO coalition (C1) revealed that donors 
expect NGOs to hand back all assets and unused resources. She is quoted at making 
the following statements: 
 
I remember a coalition member had to refund an amount of three 
hundred cedis (GHS300, which is about $1001) to a donor in 
2012 and another member had to refunded nine hundred US 
dollars ($900) to another donor in 2013.  
 
Where a donor fund is used to procure assets it is required that those assets are 
returned to the donor or instruction will be given as to what the donor wants it to be 
used for. The coalition official (C1) further states: 
 
A donor bought a mobile phone for use by an official of a 
coalition member and the phone and contact line was returned to 
the donor after the end of the project. Similarly, equipment 
including motorbikes were returned to a donor by a member of 
the coalition in the Upper West region at project closure - after a 
project implementation. Another option for donors is that, they 
will take stock of the assets or equipment after project closure 
                                                
1 Exchange rate: GHS3 is equivalent to $1  
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and officially releases them to the organisation - UNDP is known 
for this. 
 
6.2. Accountability System at KKP 
 
The analysis of the field data uncovered the two main types of accountability systems: 
upward and downward accountability systems and presented below: 
 
6.2.1. Upward Accountability 
 
Upward accountability concerns the relationship between NGOs and their donors, 
regulatory authorities / agencies and in some cases between partner NGOs and the 
selected NGO – KKP in the case of this study. Out of the two forms of accountability 
that exist within KKP, upward accountability is the most developed. This is because 
donors generally, provide the bulk of NGO funding and, thus, are seen to hold 
substantial power over the accountability arrangements at work at NGOs, especially 
those that rely heavily on donors to carry out their statutory mandates. In addition, 
regulatory authorities as well as the other compelling actors are also seen to have 
significant power over the organisations. To ensure that the selected NGO behaves as 
instructed, reports and other evidence are prepared on a regular basis. These reports 
and like evidence submitted to donors and other powerful actors form part of upward 
accountability arrangements at KKP. Observed upward accountability at KKP 
involves various arrangements including the type and content of reports, frequency of 
reporting, review meetings, and third party monitoring among others. 
 
6.2.1.1. Types, Content and Frequency of Reports 
 
There are basically two main types of reports (sometimes three) produced by KKP 
and submitted to donors. KKP produces at regular intervals narrative reports as well 
as financial reports and sometimes monitoring and evaluation reports for donors. The 
narrative report seeks to recount whatever has happened with regard to the project 
between reporting periods (the last reporting date and the current reporting date) or 
from the commencement of the project up to the date of reporting. The narrative 
report also explains the activities that were carried out within the reporting periods, 
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the challenges faced and how these have affected the project’s progress. In addition to 
providing narrative reports, KKP also produces regular financial reports. The 
financial reports capture the financial transactions that have been incurred over the 
reporting period as well as the financial position at the year-end.  
 
The basic types of report are outlined by PO6 who remarked that: 
 
The report is in two forms: project implementation reports [or 
narrative or activity reports] and financial reports... The 
[narrative] reports contain activities implemented within a 
specific period. For example, the narrative or activity report for 
June will have to be submitted at the end of June. In addition 
KKP is expected to submit financial reports with receipts for 
audit purposes. 
 
PO2 confirmed these types of reports prepared by KKP, which are submitted to the 
main providers of funds by noting that: 
 
Since donors provide funding and ... depending on the type of 
donor, we submit narrative reports basically writing what is 
happening on the field. We also submit monitoring and 
evaluation (MandE) reports – more like figures … and also 
financial reports on how we are spending the money. These are 
what we give to donors on a regular basis.  
 
An investigation into some of the documentary evidence also confirmed donors’ 
insistence on KKP to provide these periodic reports as evidence for work done. An 
extract from such a document (appendix E) attests to the fact that donors indeed 
impress upon KKP to provide these reports 
 
[KKP] shall furnish narrative, programmatic and financial reports 
to [the donor] on its findings and progress during the term of this 
Agreement quarterly and timely. [KKP] shall also notify [the 
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donor] of all events pertinent to the Services or the use of the 
Services monies. 
 
A section of the same document also reads: 
 
A comprehensive activity, narrative and financial reports 
including pictures and video recordings of activities undertaken 
by… shall be submitted by [KKP] to [donors]. 
 
Regarding the content of the reports that KKP submits to donors, they are mostly 
predefined. In most cases, templates and formats are provided for KKP to follow in 
producing these reports. Examples of the templates are provided in appendix G.  
 
The MEO explained that: 
 
The templates come with data collection tools designed to collect 
data on the field, which we summarise and send to the donors as 
part of our reporting. 
 
The organisation’s main Finance Manager (FM), who is also the project accountant 
for most of KKP’s projects, provided more details on the templates relating to the 
financial reports: 
...for the financial reports, KKP is given templates to use. We 
prepare the journals; we prepare the financial status report, we 
prepare the cashbook, we prepare the bank reconciliation 
statements, and then we prepare requests for funds for the next 
month. That is how the report looks like and at the end of the 
month, you have to prepare this report with its supporting 
documents.   
 
KKP is required to provide periodic financial reports to donors and these are basically 
based on donor specific templates (appendix G)  
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Concerning the frequency of reporting, KKP prepares its reports for donors at regular 
intervals. However, the frequency of reporting varies depending on donors or donor 
groups, but, generally, the reporting takes place monthly or quarterly. FO3 noted: 
 
We... submit reports based on... donor’s specification[s]. Some 
donors want it monthly; some want it quarterly and some bi-
annually. Effectively we are always writing reports. 
 
A scan through some of the documentary evidences from KKP established the views 
of respondents on how donors could fix report due dates as seen from the extract 
below: 
 
The comprehensive financial and narrative reports shall be 
submitted bi-annually to us [donors]. However, activity reports 





At the end of every month you report on the activities that you 
have implemented both narrative and financial. Then some of 
them mid-stream, they will bring auditors to come and audit the 
project and to see your accounting systems as well.  
 
It must be realised that reporting to donors about the performance, status and 
challenges of projects is not bad in itself. What makes it unacceptable is the way and 
manner it is done and the way it is used more as a punitive mechanism than a learning 
one. This can only be achieved through constant dialog with all stakeholders. 
  
One of the major challenges facing NGOs in their upward accountability relations is 
the lack of donor appreciation of the cultural and environmental context differences 
within which the two operate. The lack of donor understanding of KKP operational 
settings has led to queries being raised about submitted reports from KKP to a donor. 
The FM of KKP indicates: 
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A financial report sent by KKP to a donor was initially rejected 
on the ground that some of the documentations of expenditure 
(rent payment) in the budget line was not legitimate. The donor 
comes from a country where rent is payable monthly and so they 
did not understand why rent could be paid in advance for as long 
as two to three years as in the case of Ghana. It took the 
intervention of an employee of the donor who had lived in Ghana 
with that experience to clarify issues on our behalf before the 
report was finally accepted.  
 
6.2.1.2. Review Meetings 
 
Another upward accountability mechanism used by donors in their relationship with 
NGOs is the holding of regular meetings between the two parties. Donors constantly 
hold review meetings with NGOs as a fact-finding mission, sometimes designed to 
obtain and verify information and to catch out those NGOs that are not operating 
according to set conditions.  
 
We hold periodic mostly quarterly review meetings that are 
organised by donors as enshrined in the contract. At these review 
meetings every NGO that obtains sponsorship from a particular 
donor conducts a presentation of the activities carried out, the 
targets achieved and to answer questions [FO12] 
 
Evidence suggests that, although these review meetings are supposed to be attended 
by all stakeholders, the main parties to the meetings are donors and NGOs with little 
emphasis on beneficiary groups. For instance, when asked whether beneficiaries 
partake in these review meetings and the role they play, PO7 answered that: 
 
A representative of beneficiaries is always present at these 
meetings. Of course we cannot bring everybody in that 
community to the review meeting so a representative is 
nominated by the opinion leaders to participate in the review 
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meeting. It is our view that the nominated person will carry 
whatever we discuss to the rest of the community. On a few 
occasions the nominated persons contribute to the discussion but 
in most cases they just sit and listen.  
 
6.2.1.3. External Monitoring and Auditing 
 
Various forms of external monitoring mechanisms are identified in KKP-donors 
accountability relationship. In addition to the donor unannounced visits to KKP 
project sites and offices for monitoring purposes, donor also mandates other external 
bodies to monitor KKP. These external monitoring bodies including embassies 
(Diplomatic Missions), the district and other local assemblies also monitor KKP 
periodically to ensure that the organisation adheres to agreed conditions. These 
mechanisms keep KKP on its toes to ensure that the organisation does what is 
expected from it. Donor (D2) who sponsored a health intervention project explained:  
 
As part of the monitoring process, we involve the community 
health committee and the district health directorate to assist. 
Once KKP gives us their work plans and schedules, we forward 
them to these agencies and mandates them to occasionally and 
periodically visit project sites and report back to us. 
 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, KKP is also required to report to other external 
bodies such as the district assemblies and local authorities within KKP’s operational 
jurisdiction and other governmental agencies.  
 
In most cases, we are asked to send portions of our reports to the 
district assemblies and the Ghana Health Services and other 
professional bodies… On other occasions, donors could ask their 
own auditors to audit us [MEO].  
 
KKP is subjected to external auditing in various ways. KKP is supposed to submit its 
work plans to donors who would occasionally do external auditing either at KKP 
offices or on project sites at unannounced intervals. This is to ensure that KKP is 
	   173	  
complying with all agreed terms and conditions. The external auditing is in various 
forms and can take different dimensions. For example, it is revealed that one donor 
has contracted EY as their external auditors to constantly monitor KKP’s work. 
 
JHU for instance have contracted EY accountancy as their 
auditing firm. They audit the accounts and disburse funds to us. 
What they do is that at the end of every month; we prepare 
financial reports and send it to them for audit. Any queries or 
outstanding issues must be resolved with Ernst and Young before 
they release funds for subsequent phases of the project to us 
[FM]. 
 
6.2.1.4. Financial and Annual Report 
 
One other accountability system observed at KKP is the collation, preparation, and 
submission of financial, and annual reports to relevant stakeholders. To demonstrate 
its financial accountability, the GoG via regulation and donors mandates KKP to 
prepare and circulate audited financial and annual report to interested parties 
annually. The financial report contains the income and expenditure of KKP within the 
year under consideration together with accompanying notes explanation the various 
items in the statement. All monies received from donor(s) as well as expenditure 
incurred on projects as per the agreement must be clearly specified in the financial 
report. When KKP obtains funding from a single donor, the financial statement is 
prepared for that donor alone. However, where KKP obtains funding from multiple 
donors, it is required to prepare separate financial statements for the different donors 
as well as a consolidated financial statement that integrates the various individual 
donors. As per requirement, these financial statements must be audited and certified. 
NGOs including KKP is required to disclosure other donor sources of funding during 
the project proposal stage as a way of demonstrating its financial transparency and 
accountability. 
 
Some recent budget templates have sections that mandate KKP to 
declare and disclose other funding sources in their funding 
portfolio especially for similar projects, and the percentage of 
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cost allocation to various activities if other donors are funding 
the same project. The purpose of this initiative is to prevent KKP 
from ‘double dipping’ (i.e. obtain multiple funding for a project, 
use only a single donor fund to implement the project, report on 
the project to the multiple donors and squanders the other funds) 
[PD].  
 
An official of a donor (D2) attests to donor awareness of possible double dipping 
practices amongst some NGOs and argues that such practices have led to the 
modification of templates and increasing collaboration amongst donors. He states:  
 
Donors communicate a lot more amongst themselves these days 
compared to the immediate past. The donor community in Ghana 
currently is moving towards the practice of pool-funding. With 
pool-funding every donor is aware of the funding activities of 
each other. We are also able to quickly track misuse of fund by 
NGOs and to black list them. This emerging trend has raise NGO 
accountability to a higher level.   
 
In addition, KKP also prepares annual reports that show the various 
projects/interventions undertaken by the organisation within a given period. The 
annual reports also highlights the achievements of the project undertaken, the 
implementation challenges faced in the course of the project, and a section of the 
financial report.     
 
6.2.1.5. KKP Relationship with other NGOs 
 
On a number of occasions and as per the contract, KKP has had the opportunity to 
partner with other local and sometimes smaller NGOs, to implement projects as 
implementing partners on their behalf. The PD explained: 
 
KKP is a member of different NGO coalitions and depending on 
the type of project and the nature of the contract with donors, we 
sometimes use other smaller local NGOs as implementing 
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partners. KKP have had the experience of sub-contracting to 
other NGOs. In a recent project, KKP partnered with thirty-nine 
[39] other local NGOs to implement the project.  
 
It became apparent during interviews that the accountability relation between KKP 
and these other smaller NGOs is also upward because it mirrors KKP-donors 
accountability relationship. Conditions and standards are set for KKP to abide by, 
which are also abided by other implementing partners so that KKP is able to achieve 
its objectives and look good in the eyes of donors.  
Just as the donor demands certain periodic reports from KKP, 
KKP also demand certain periodic reports from smaller partner 
NGOs. At the end of the day it is for accountability purposes. We 
demand narrative reports, we demand M and E reports and we 
also demand financial reports. It is just to help us to be able to 
report to the donor(s). KKP demands monthly reports from these 
partners because the donors demand quarterly reports from KKP 
[FO7]. 
 
6.2.3.  Downward Accountability 
 
Downward accountability concerns the relationship between NGOs and their 
beneficiaries. The main objective of NGOs is to complement the role of governments 
in the provision of unmet public goods, services and support at mostly neglected 
places for the benefit of society. NGOs therefore stand between these two major 
stakeholder groups: fund providers / regulatory authorities / monitoring organisations 
/ other compelling environmental forces and beneficiaries. As a result, one would 
expect that since NGOs basically serve these two categories of stakeholder groups, 
they would equally accountable to these two groups.  
 
This section reports on how KKP accounts to their beneficiaries. The evidence 
provided indicates that although KKP somehow accounts to beneficiaries, the level of 
accountability it accords to their beneficiaries is minimal compared to that accorded 
to their donors. When asked about the level of accountability of KKP to their 
beneficiaries, the PD remarked that: 
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As an organisation, we try as much as possible to account to 
beneficiaries but on different levels... not in the same category as 
donors. I hope you understand. It is obvious. Beneficiaries are at 
the receiving end just like KKP and on that basis, of course the 
level of accountability cannot be the same. In any case we try to 
be very open to them so they know some of our budget lines. 
 
This comment suggests that beneficiaries are marginalised in the accountability 
process. The observed downward accountability relations within KKP include 
beneficiary involvement, community structures and registers, application of review 
meetings, and reporting. 
 
6.2.3.1. Beneficiary Involvement 
 
According to evidence at the case site, beneficiary involvement in KKP projects is 
very minimal overall. In most cases beneficiaries are seen as a “keep informed” 
stakeholder group. When asked about the level of beneficiary involvement in project 
decisions, PO8 observed that: 
 
What we do mostly is that we only inform them [beneficiaries] 
about the projects that we are about to begin, the benefits that the 
project will bring to them, and then we inform them of their level 
of participation. We also inform them about the various 
interventions under the project and if they have a role to play in 
terms of the various interventions 
 
The minimal level of beneficiary involvement on project issues was explained by the 
GARPC who confirmed that, in most cases, beneficiaries are only informed of the 
project at a start-up meeting exercise: 
 
At the start of every project we hold a stakeholder start up 
meeting with every stakeholder. We invite every stakeholder on 
board, we tell them what the project is about, and we spell out the 
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benefits of the project… So this is one of the ways that we get to 





Although we do not involve beneficiaries in our projects in any 
great deal, what we do in terms of accountability is that we 
always make sure that we do whatever we state we are going to 
do in the community, we do it and during review meetings, we 
offer them the opportunity to tell us how they feel about what we 
are doing. 
 
This suggests that although the main recipients of the project are the beneficiaries, 
they are mostly not involved in the project decisions. They are only at the receiving 
end and as to whether donor-led interventions suit them or not is not an issue for 
either KKP or donors. Such a situation has led to duplication of projects, which 
eventually leads to misallocation of resources. A focus group interview confirmed 
that there have been at least two similar projects by two different NGOs in the 
community over the last year. They lamented that the resources for the second similar 
project could have been channelled in other important projects had their views been 
sought.  
 
From KKP’s perspective, CRPC commented on the level of involvement of 
beneficiaries in project selection for example at the organisation: 
 
Of course the beneficiary does not select projects for us, I don’t 
think they have the capacity. The only time we involve 
beneficiaries to some extent is when we need their input in 
securing funding for a project that we [i.e. KKP] feel is necessary 
for the community 
 
It is difficult to conceive such a situation where donors, and to some extent KKP, tend 
to conceptualise projects to deal with beneficiaries’ problems without involving them. 
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The basic question that one might thoughtfully ask is: how is it possible to pretend to 
solve someone’s problems without seeking from the person the issues they are 
experiencing, and how these might rank in terms of priority? The focus group 
discussion on the matter revealed that donors and KKP lack an appreciation of the 
real problems faced by beneficiaries. As much as the beneficiaries were grateful to 
donors and KKP for helping them, they were quick to affirm that such interventions 
could be prioritised appropriately if only they were consulted. A participant from the 
focus group noted: 
 
Although this NGO [i.e. KKP] or whoever is responsible is 
trying to help us, they clearly do not understand the real 
challenges that we face here and even if they do, the way they 
show it is different. We feel that they should consult us every 
step on the way right from project conceptualisation to 
completion. In that sense we all will benefit immensely. They 
have the resources, but we know the terrain better and also have 
the local knowledge. 
 
Another focus group member, although appreciating the contribution of donors and 
KKP in her life and that of her community, was quick to advise that:   
 
The era where traditional authorities and other beneficiaries are 
only invited to sod cutting and commissioning of projects in their 
communities should be over. It is about time that we are included 
in some of the important decisions. We want to know the project 
content, funds involved and how they are utilised. 
 
Within the beneficiary involvement process lays the selection of volunteers. The 
majority of KKP projects are implemented with the assistance of volunteers selected 
from project implementing communities. Volunteers are an integral part of most 
interventions and could play a key role in the successful completion of most projects. 
These volunteers are community members who decide to play lead roles to make 
NGOs’ work successful. In most cases, it is only during volunteer selection that 
beneficiary communities are involved in KKP projects. When KKP is in need of 
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volunteers, then they will contact the opinion leaders of the community to nominate 
volunteers to assist the organisation. Even those nominated to play some participation 
roles are not given full access to information to effectively play their role. For, 
example PO1 observed:  
 
We select community volunteers in collaboration with opinion 
leaders to help us implement projects. These volunteers are 
somehow involved in project implementation, they know the 
amount to be spent on each activity, and they know how much is 
due them and so on. But at their level we are just short of given 
them a financial level report or any other report. 
 
The problem with not involving beneficiaries to any great deal as observed by 
interviewees is that it could lead to project apathy and antagonism, misplaced 
resources and, in some cases, eventual project failure. More importantly, this is likely 
to affect the overall accountability framework including upward accountability.  
 
6.2.3.2. Community Structures and Registers 
 
To ensure that KKP is, to some extent, accountable to its beneficiaries, they have 
instituted community structures and registers within the various communities. These 
community structures comprise members of the community mostly opinion leaders 
whose mandate is to aid in the successful completion of projects and to monitor 
progress.  
 
We [KKP] have community structures and a community based 
project management committee to see to how the project is being 
implemented in the community. We set them up right from the 
beginning as part of our accountability. So they are also 
monitoring the project that is being implemented. So when we 
hold review meetings, all the people come and talk and speak 
about the project [MEO]. 
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These community structures and registers are initiatives of KKP and are instituted in 
communities to monitor the movements and activities of project implementers and 
managers. Project managers are supposed to visit project communities as detailed in 
their work plans/schedules. As a way of monitoring these officers, KKP instituted the 
community structures. Project officers are required to sign the community placed 
registers anytime they visit these communities. An interviewee explains the operation 
of these community structures as follows: 
 
The way it [i.e. community structure] works is this: there is a 
monitoring form designed and kept in the community. Anytime a 
project officer visits the community, he/she signs the form and 
whoever is in charge of the community also signs to 
acknowledge that the project manager has been there. We also 
have in the various communities a register so when you go you 
will sign it, which is kept at the community so that in your 
absence, anybody that goes there can verify from the register to 
know that you have been there and to confirm the activities that 
you carried out. [PD] 
 
These community structures help to some extent keep KKP officers on their toes as 
far as project implementation is concerned. It serves greatly as a monitoring and 
evaluation tool. However, one could argue that such community structures exist to 
ensure that projects are implemented effectively in the sight of donors rather than to 
serve as an accountability mechanism.  
 
In spite of the benefits that accrue from the adoption of these community structures to 
the operations of KKP, especially to ensure effective project delivery, donors do not 
seem to be interested in them either because they did not initiate them or they lack an 
appreciation of the benefits thereof. This is what prompted the MEO to state that:  
 
In reality, donors are not interested in these structures that we 
have at the community/beneficiary level. They are only interested 
in you reporting to them. I wish that they would show interest in 
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some of these beneficiary level structures and commit resources 
for their enhancement and entrenchment 
 
The above suggests the involvement of all stakeholders spearheaded by donors to 
have a rethink about the development and adoption of a holistic accountability system 
with facets that basically addresses the needs of concerned interested parties.  
 
6.2.3.3. Review Meetings 
 
As part of downward accountability, KKP organises periodic review meetings within 
the implementation communities. These review meetings are supposed to provide a 
platform for the project stakeholders to air their concerns about the project. But it 
normally turns out to be platform for donors and KKP to inform beneficiaries of 
project status. A focus group participant, nominated to attend such meetings, argues 
that beneficiaries are generally passive observers as these meetings.  
 
The meetings are a complete waste of time. As far as I am 
concerned, the motivation is only the food and the allowance 
given at the end of the day. To me the meeting is more 
informative than a discussion. Any suggestions that I have tried 
to make in the past, the response has been either that such an 
activity is not in the budget or beyond the funding requirements 
of the project. At such meetings we are only informed on what 
has been done and what is to be done. The review meeting idea is 
excellent if only they [i.e. KKP] will accept contributions from 
us and incorporate them into their operations.  
 
A KKP manager explained the above situation as follows.  
 
There is a budget line for each activity so you cannot spend on 
any activity that is not within the budget line even if it is very 
relevant and in our view could help the project to be very 
successful [PO12].   
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One of the donor officials (D1) interviewed commented on the matter recognising 
how activity levels have been cut in recent years (partly due to the global economic 
trends) and how KKP or any other NGO will be dealt with negatively if they either do 
not implement agreed activities or swap agreed activities for ones not agreed even if 
they are justifiable.  
 
There are reasons why activities are itemised, agreed and budget 
lines allocated. Any deviation from such outlined activities will 
severely affect the motives and objectives, something we do not 
encourage at all otherwise we will keep shifting the posts. At best 
maintain the status. 
     
6.2.3.4. Reporting  
 
The way and manner in which KKP report to donors is significantly different from the 
way they report to beneficiaries. Basically KKP do not report to beneficiaries in any 
great detail. Unlike donors who get monthly, quarterly, by-annual and annual and 
other periodic reports on a whole range of elements (financial, narrative, etc.) 
regarding the project, beneficiaries of KKP do not enjoy similar reporting attention. 
One of the best reporting forum for beneficiaries is at review meetings organised by 
KKP as acknowledged by the ED who remarked that: 
 
One other thing we do as an organization in order to account to 
the beneficiary is, we have review meeting with them. After we 
have compiled our quarterly reports to the donors we have 
meetings with them to give them updates on what we have done 
so far. 
 
At the review meetings, beneficiaries are told/informed of project status and other 
issues. Occasionally, beneficiaries get the chance to comment or ask questions about 
projects and to challenge KKP but such encounters are rare.  
 
Donor (D2) confirmed the importance of these review meetings but confirmed the 
rarity of such an encounter by stating that: 
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During these review meetings, KKP will have to tell all present 
what they have done in the past quarter. It is a platform to give 
the community representatives the opportunity to challenge any 
unfounded claims. These are some of the things that we use to 
check or ensure accountability from KKP to the beneficiaries but 




I must admit that the direct beneficiaries - communities and 
volunteers do not get any final formal report from us – financial 
or narrative – we are not obliged 
 
Another respondent from KKP (FO3) further stresses the lack or minimal reporting to 
beneficiary in these terms. 
 
We do not report to beneficiaries by presenting financial reports 
to them or to the local communities 
 
The closest beneficiaries, like any other interested party, could get to see formal 
project reports when they visit the district assemblies or the district offices. This is 
because on some occasions, KKP is required to submit copies or portions of project 
reports to the district assembly where the project is being implemented as stated by 
PO8: 
At the end of every reporting period we send a copy of our report 
to donors, and in some cases to the district assemblies so that any 
other interested party could access it.  
 
6.3. Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter presented the main themes unravelled during the interview process at 
KKP as far as their accountability system is concerned.  It was observed that the most 
compelling group of stakeholders, particularly donors, are virtually involved in the 
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day-to-day decision making of KKP on issues regarding projects. It was also revealed 
that in comparison to downward accountability, upward accountability is the most 
entrenched form of accountability in KKP.  
 
The next chapter discusses the findings of the empirical results.  
  
  





This chapter discusses the results of the study drawing on the theoretical framework 
and the literature. The analysis is essential so as to make sense of the results of the 
study. The chapter is divided into four main sections.  Section One discusses the 
implications of the accountability relations within KKP. Section Two provides the 
theoretical explanation to the observed accountability relations in terms of the effects 
of the institutional pressures on those accountability systems. The third section 
examines the strategic responses adopted by KKP in dealing with the identified 
institutional pressures. Section Four summarises the key issues of the chapter.  
 
7.1.  Understanding KKP accountability relations 
 
This section provides an understanding of the accountability relations within KKP as 
they relate to existing literature.  The analysis of the field data uncovered two main 
types of accountability systems: upward and downward. Figure 7.1 depicts the central 













Figure 7. 1 Relationship Between the Compelling and Regulatory Groups, 
NGOs and Beneficiaries 
Source: Researcher’s own construct 
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The figure shows that in general, KKP (case study NGO) plays an intermediary role 
by obtaining funds and other resources from the compelling group (donors) to provide 
public goods for the benefit of the beneficiary group.  On the one hand, the providers 
of resources for KKP’s activities such as donors and other philanthropists are the 
compelling group of stakeholders with the passion to assist beneficiaries overcome an 
identified social need mostly away from the location of donors many miles away.   
 
On the other hand are a different group of stakeholders, including communities and 
individuals generally referred to as beneficiaries who tend to profit from any 
implemented interventions. Since the providers of funds are mostly remote from 
project implementation sites but yet provide the needed resources, there is the need 
for some form of mechanism to ensure the efficient utilisation of their resources to 
achieve the intended objective. In effect, donors provide funding and other resources 
for NGOs like KKP to render services to beneficiary communities to address 
identified need(s).  
 
The existence of such a relationship automatically calls for accountability, a system 
that seeks to ensure the efficient allocation of donor resources for the intended 
purpose. This therefore, brings into mind two forms of accountability mechanisms, 
which were identified as existing between KKP and its donors and beneficiary 
communities: one from the KKP to donors; and the other from KKP to beneficiaries.  
These mechanisms have been explained on the basis of the empirical findings and 
their relationship to extant literature. 
 
7.1.1.  KKP’s Upward Accountability 
 
The accountability relationship existing between KKP and its donors could be 
described as upward accountability.  Generally, upward accountability is the most 
entrenched form of accountability within the NGO sector for a number of reasons and 
perhaps rightly so (Chenhall et al., 2010; Ebrahim, 2003; Edwards and Fowler, 2002; 
Kilby, 2006; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). 
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One of these reasons is that in the NGOs’ environment, the most compelling group of 
stakeholders or donors are essentially the main providers of most of the resources 
required by NGOs like KKP to function. In fact, without the support of these major 
stakeholders, most NGOs worldwide would lack the necessary resources and would 
cease to operate at the level that they do now. This supports the argument that the 
providers of these resources are aware of the important role they play in the 
operational chain of NGOs and are therefore, able to demand greater accountability 
from their subordinates (Chenhall et al., 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  
 
KKP equally depends heavily on donors and other compelling group of actors for 
resource support for survival and is, accordingly, required to exhibit good upward 
accountability practices to such authorities. The organisation is required to 
demonstrate their upward accountability credentials, particularly to donors and other 
compelling stakeholders in the form of disclosures and reports, review meetings, 
external monitoring and auditing, among others.  In line with Ebrahim’s (2003b) 
assertion that reports and disclosures are used as a major accountability tool by the 
most compelling group of stakeholders within the NGO sector, donors demand 
periodic narrative, financial and other ad-hoc reports and disclosures from KKP to 
indicate the efficient utilisation or otherwise of project resources. This suggests that 
even if KKP is not performing effectively but could demonstrate its efficiency 
through the submission of reports it could be seen as accountable in the eyes of 
donors and could attract funding resources to survive.  
 
Thus, donors are seen to be more interested in efficiency than effectiveness and are 
happy to support NGOs that upwardly account to demonstrate their efficiency (Burger 
and Owen, 2010). The nature of reporting that KKP has to comply with is highly 
dependent on two main things: the type of donor(s) as well as the project type. As a 
result of these two factors, KKP is always asked to prepare and submit different 
reports at different intervals (weekly, monthly, quarterly, half-yearly, and annual) to 
donors as an indication of the existence of its upward accountability. As per the terms 
and conditions of project contracts, KKP is asked to submit reports at regular intervals 
to the providers of funds.  
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It would be recalled that neoclassical theory focuses on adherence to rigid and formal 
rules and the rationality in value maximisation and rejects the importance of the 
effects of informal and environmental forces on the operations of organisations (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996).  As indicated in the literature, the definition of NGO 
accountability is highly contested but the common thread among these various 
definitions is the realisation of the existence of a superior body overseeing the 
activities of subordinates (Clark, 1991; Korten, 1992; Kendall and Knapp, 1995; 
Kaldor et al., 2003; Teegen et al., 2004; Gray et al., 2006).  However, it could be 
argued that NGOs, including KKP are generally seen as intermediary organisations 
that solicit resources from one group of stakeholders to resolve an identified need for 
other stakeholders.  Thus, accountability is the right that emerges from the 
relationship between the accountable organisations: the accountor and the accountee 
(Edward and Hulme, 1996b; Fox and Brown, 1998).  
 
The study also observed that the existence of resources scarcity in relation to the 
number of NGOs available making demands on their resources has increased the 
powers of resource providers over the resource users like KKP. As a result, the 
observation was that the providers of resources were seen to be the most powerful 
stakeholders in their dealings with KKP and their wishes must be carried out to the 
letter for fear of reprimands culminating in the former’s ability to demand ‘anything’ 
from KKP. Evidence gathered suggests that such demands could vary and could be 
contractual or otherwise, mostly in the form of accounting for resource usage via the 
provision of reports and other activities.  A similar observation has been reported by 
other researchers (Ahmed et al., 2011; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2008; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  
 
For example, Ahmed et al. (2011) in their study observed that upward accountability 
promotes the submission of formal, technical and economic reports for the 
satisfaction of donors; a stand shared by Roberts (2001) who sees this form of 
accountability as scrutinising the conduct of dependents. It was noted that in most 
cases, donors from the onset enshrine the reporting format and the frequency of 
reporting in the contract with little or no flexibility for KKP to manoeuvre. This 
means that the reporting requirements must be strictly adhered to and must be 
submitted on time without delay if KKP was to be taken seriously as a 
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recommendable organisation.  This situation creates anxiety within KKP to 
demonstrate results, real or perceived. This finding is supported by Agyemang et al. 
(2009) who examined NGO accountability and aid delivery and confirmed the 
inflexibility of reporting formats:   
 
Reporting formats often appear inflexible and provide little scope 
for reporting to donors the views and experiences of officers and 
beneficiaries in the field (p.5) 
 
An NGO’s (in this case KKP’s) ability to comply with such reporting requirements 
could earn greater respect from donors. Often times, KKP is able to meet donor-
reporting demands and tends to get referrals from other donors. The upward 
accountability mechanism between KKP and its donors is further demonstrated in 
relation to how reports are even accepted by the latter. Donors or for that matter the 
compelling group of stakeholders do not accept reports from KKP as the final report 
first time: 
 
…Generally, reports are submitted as drafts and in word format 
for easy editing. In fact, donors have the right to modify (edit) 
‘submitted reports’ from KKP at will (using tracking facility) if 
they so wish. Reports modification could be anything as minor as 
altering the English language expressions from say ‘finished’ to 
‘completed’ or the changes could be significant and 
material…(PD)  
 
Irrespective of the changes (minor or significant), KKP is required to fully incorporate 
donor comments into the report before it could be accepted as a final report. Failure to 
integrate donor changes into the final report could connote ‘noncompliance’ and 
could have possible repercussions.  Perhaps, this supports the assertion that NGO’s 
accountability is difficult because the variables involved are multiple, complex and 
diffused: it lacks a formal clearly defined constituent membership to whom they are 
required to be accountable to (Burger and Owens, 2010; Ferejohn, 1999; Jordan and 
van Tuijl, 2006; Kilby, 2006; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2010).  
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In addition to the submission of narrative reports, donors also demand separate 
periodic and in some cases ad-hoc financial reports from KKP. The essence of the 
financial report is to provide surety to donors about the efficient utilisation of the 
financial resources entrusted to the care of KKP. Depending on the type of donor, 
KKP’s financial reports must be reviewed and certified by an auditing firm 
(preferably, the international ones) normally selected by the specific donor. This 
suggests that even if KKP previously had its own contracted auditing firm, the 
introduction of a particular donor to KKP’s donor portfolio could necessitate the 
introduction of that donors’ preferred auditing firm or a complete shift in the financial 
auditing processes on the part of KKP.  This relationship amounts to a kind of 
imposition. In effect, the constant preparation of audited accounts by KKP for donors’ 
consideration highlights the adoption of upward accountability by KKP. This 
responds to the view shared by several researchers who see the preparation and 
submission of audited accounts to a superior (as in the case between KKP and its 
donors) as identical to the demonstration of upward accountability (Edwards and 
Hulme 2002; Ebrahim 2003a, 2003b; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  
 
The study argues that KKP had about five (5) different donors who sponsor different 
projects at different times and locations.  This means that the preparation of five 
different audited accounts for different donor agencies overseen by different auditing 
firms can be very challenging.  A similar challenge is reported by the Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting of the United State of America (2005). It was clear that KKP, on 
average, get at least one visit from each of these auditing firms every two months with 
each (auditing firm) spending on average about a week to audit KKP’s accounts. 
During these visits, some of KKP’s key operational personnel may have to stay 
around to answer queries that may be raised by the auditors causing delays to work 
flows and project implementation: 
 
…Such practices to a greater extent could be seen as a waste of 
time by some personnel who are interested in the provision of the 
most needed intervention to beneficiaries. The challenge is that 
any unresolved queries generally, lead to delays in the release of 
subsequent funds and other needed resources that eventually lead 
to delays in projects... (MEO)  
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The literate reveals that the growth of NGOs, especially in the South, has been fuelled 
by a belief among donors that NGOs are more cost-effective than governments in 
providing basic social services, are better able to reach the poor, and are key players 
in democratization processes (Bagci, 2007; Edwards and Hulme, 1996b; Mackintosh, 
1992; Smillie et al., 2013). Perhaps, one way of ensuring this is through the 
submission of regular reports by NGOs to donors.  The study discloses that in 
addition to the provision of regular/periodic reports (narrative or financial), KKP is 
obliged to submit any other ‘as and when’ or ‘on demand’ reports to donors when 
asked: 
 
…Such ad-hoc reports must be provided and submitted 
irrespective of its effects on scheduled project implementation… 
(MEO)  
 
The requests for an ad-hoc report by a donor could necessitate the suspension of an 
activity in relation to project implementation just to satisfy a donor requirement.  
Perhaps, this indicates why some analysts argue that ‘NGOs and funders have focused 
primarily on short-term ‘functional’ accountability responses at the expense of longer-
term ‘strategic’ processes necessary for lasting social and political change’ (Ebrahim, 
2003b: 813). In fact, Ebrahim (2003b) presents that disclosure statements and reports 
are among the most widely used tools of accountability and are frequently required by 
federal or state laws in many countries.   
 
The study shows that in addition to the provision of reports to donors, donors also had 
the right to physically visit any of the offices of KKP nationwide at will and 
unannounced: to verify any claims (primary or secondary) made by KKP:  
 
…This kind of unannounced visit could be undertaken either 
directly by the personnel of the donor or their representatives… 
(GARPC) 
 
Moreover, as a way of emphasising upward accountability, donors sometimes 
authorise some external bodies like their diplomatic missions, international auditing 
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firms, coalition of NGOs and the like to monitor the activities of KKP. Kreidler 
(2011) confirms that most donor agencies are part of their government’s foreign 
ministries, so they can only put pressure on recipient governments if this is in line 
with their own government’s foreign policy priorities.  KKP was mandated to share 
its work plans with donors. With such information, donors could easily monitor the 
activities of KKP or pass on KKP’s work plans to any monitoring contractor they feel 
fit to engage. Irrespective of who does the external monitoring (donors or a 
contractor), KKP is required to comply fully if they are to be seen as upwardly 
accountable.  This supports the view of some researchers that accountability has both 
an ‘external’ dimension in terms of an obligation to meet prescribed standards of 
behaviour; and an ‘internal’ one motivated by responsibilities expressed through 
individual actions and organizational missions (Fry, 1995; Chisolm, 1995; Ebrahim, 
2003b). 
 
Again, such external visits (spontaneous or announced) have the potential to disrupt 
planned activities for the period under consideration to the detriment of, especially, 
the ‘not so compelling’ group of stakeholders.  
 
On top of the unannounced visits, KKP is mandated to attend periodic and again 
sometimes unannounced face-to-face fact-finding exercises in the form of review 
meetings: 
 
…Though such meetings are supposed to serve as a platform that 
unite all stakeholders as to the way forward as far as project 
implementation is concerned, it is generally used by donors as a 
forum to interrogate the operations of KKP and possibly to ‘catch 
out’ KKP… (GARPC) 
 
This goes to explain and affirm the power of the most compelling group of 
stakeholders to demand uncompromised accountability relations upwardly from KKP 
even if such an action could directly or indirectly affect the other stakeholder groups. 
 
Although upward accountability tends to promote and give assurances to providers of 
funds on the efficient utilisation of their resources, it does not hold in all situations 
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(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). If that was the case, the numerous worldwide 
scandals and mismanagement of donors’ resources could have been curtailed 
(Ebrahim, 2010, Carr, 2000; Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Safire, 2004; Gray et al., 
2006). This goes to suggest that the overemphasis on upward accountability alone is 
not enough and cannot serve as a panacea to resource misallocation and ensure the 
security and efficient utilisation of donor resources. Thus, donors’ perception of 
relying on upward accountability within KKP just to satisfy themselves, might not 
necessarily ensure the effective allocation of resources in the operations of KKP. The 
general trend is that upward accountability is one-dimensional, narrow in nature, 
dominated by donors and usually inflexible; exactly as in the case of KKP 
(Agyemang et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2003a, b, 2004; Fowler, 2008; Islam et al., 2013; 
O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010; Schmitz et al., 2012; Wenar, 2006).  
 
The literature suggests that the introduction of new public management (NPM) by the 
Australian government in the 1990s increased the pressure on NGOs in Australia to 
adopt improved accountability and formal reporting mechanisms and to apply more 
quantitative accounting performance indicators at the expense of the more traditional 
qualitative accountability approach (Aucoin, 1990; Guthrie et al., 2004; English et al., 
2005; Chenhall et al., 2010).   
 
Thus, the study also contends that the Government of Ghana (GoG) was another 
compelling stakeholder group capable of demanding upward accountability from 
KKP in its capacity as either a donor or as a regulator. This is because the GoG via its 
ministries, including the Ministry of Health and Education provide funding to KKP to 
undertake projects on her behalf. Evidence gathered from KKP suggests that the GoG 
was the second provider of funding for KKP: next to donors. In its capacity as a 
donor, the GoG like all other donors demand disclosure statements and periodic/ad-
hoc reports from KKP. Failure to oblige could have serious repercussions for KKP. 
This confirms the political dimension argument regarding NGOs’ accountability 
(Gray et al., 2006; Naidoo, 2004; SustainAbility, 2004).  
 
On the other hand, the government also demands accountability from KKP through 
regulations (Andrews, 2014; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Edwards and Gaventa, 2014).  
The study argues that the GoG via the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) acts as 
	   194	  
the main regulator of KKP’s operations in Ghana. Thus, the dual role of the GoG 
either as a donor or as a regulator makes the GoG one of the most compelling 
stakeholder group in the operations of KKP.  The DSW and other bodies ensure that 
KKP complies with all the regulatory standards instituted by the GoG to guarantee its 
continual operations in Ghana (Anku-Tsede, 2014; Alhassan, 2013). One of the ways 
this is done is to require that KKP is registered with the DSW as an organisation 
‘limited by guarantee’ in Ghana and has a certificate of recognition renewable 
annually to that effect. As a result, KKP is obliged to operate within the rules and 
standards thereof. It is mandated on KKP to supply the DSW with the relevant 
information and documents, including annual reports (narrative and audited financial 
accounts) to merit their continual operations in the country. In fact, the GoG has the 
right to withdraw the certificate of recognition from KKP if it breaches any of the 
requirements enshrined in the regulations: this will make it illegal to operate in 
Ghana.  This supports one of the reasons for NGO accountability, which is to assure 
donors of the efficient utilisation of their donations; and governments for the 
provision of needed public goods to warrant tax exemptions (Hedlund and Hamm, 
1978; Ebrahim, 2010).  
  
The revoking of the certificate of recognition carries several sanctions, including: the 
inability of KKP to apply for exemption and reduction in taxes and duties to be paid 
by NGOs on donated items from abroad; enjoy tax reliefs to donors for donations 
made to NGOs for charitable activities; deny support to facilitate NGO activities; and 
any other benefits that could accrue to other NGOs operating legally in Ghana. What 
happens in KKP and Ghana is similar to that of other parts of the world, especially the 
United States of America where NGOs are required to fulfil certain regulatory 
requirements to warrant their continual operations (Ebrahim, 2003a). 
 
As a matter of fact, such mandatory disclosures on NGOs ensure the implementation 
of an upward accountability mechanism to a superior body like the GoG.  A research 
conducted by O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) revealed that in spite of the rhetoric to 
improve accountability, nothing much had been achieved to that effect and that 
upward accountability still dominates accountability relations within NGOs.  
However, such accountability relations could have negative consequences (Agyemang 
et al., 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Ebrahim, 2003b; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2010).  
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Consequently, the dominance of a one-sided accountability relation that focuses 
mainly on the compelling group of stakeholders in an upward fashion is described as 
‘inappropriate’ with the potential to damage intended social benefits envisaged in any 
intervention (Ebrahim, 2005; Dixon et al., 2006; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). 
 
The idea of accounting to the main providers of funds explaining the manner in which 
resources are utilised and the activities undertaken using reporting is not in itself a 
bad concept. The problem occurs where the emphasis shifts from the implementation 
of actual activities to ensuring that reporting is right. The use of the timely submission 
of reports (weekly, monthly) and the like as the yardstick to measure the credibility of 
an entity is somewhat flawed. Besides, the use of reports as a panacea to signify the 
accomplishments of an intervention without reference to any verification mechanism 
about what actually happens on the ground, especially from beneficiaries, could 
encourage the submission of reports not based on substance.  In all these, perhaps, the 
revelations by Curristine et al. (2007) seem to be the reason as they observe that 
citizens are demanding that governments be made more accountable for what they do 
with taxpayers’ money.  Perhaps, the observation is that governments profess to be 
doing a lot for the citizenry but there may be nothing concrete on the ground to 
demonstrate such claims.   
 
7.1.2.  KKP’s Downward Accountability 
 
Downward accountability is basically the relationship between NGOs and their 
beneficiaries in terms of how beneficiaries are involved or consulted in NGO 
activities and interventions within beneficiary communities (Bendell, 2006).  
Evidence gathered demonstrate that contrary to the dominance of upward 
accountability within the spheres of NGOs like KKP’s operations, downward 
accountability was underdeveloped and did not attract much attention. It was revealed 
that several reasons accounted for the imbalance and weak state of downward 
accountability in the operations of KKP.  
 
The major reason is the realisation that stakeholders at the other side of the equation, 
particularly beneficiaries have little to offer in terms of resources provision.  This 
explains why Najam (1996a) attributes the precarious nature of downward 
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accountability to the lack of commitment and support from the compelling group of 
stakeholders, mostly donors and government and the weak position of beneficiaries.  
This researcher notes that ‘[un]like donors, [communities] cannot withdraw their 
funding; unlike governments, they cannot impose conditionalities’ (Najam, 1996a: 
346-347). 
 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2010) argue that downward accountability focuses solely on 
the relationship between NGOs and beneficiaries and compares NGO downward 
accountability relationship to what happens between private businesses and their 
customers. They argue that as private businesses could not survive without the direct 
involvement and consideration of their customers, it presupposes that NGOs cannot 
function effectively without the active involvement of their beneficiaries. However, 
the stark truth is that NGOs in general, and the likes of KKP in particular, do not 
actively involve their beneficiaries to any great extent. This revelation is in line with 
the findings of a research undertaken by Assad and Goddard (2010) in a Tanzanian 
NGO in which they tried to determine the salient stakeholders in accounting practices.  
These researchers observe that, contrary to the objectives of NGOs to improve the 
plight of beneficiaries, such claims are not entirely reflected in their accountability 
dealings with beneficiaries (Assad and Goddard, 2010). 
 
However, a different view is documented where beneficiary communities were 
actively involved in successful implementation of governance and reconstruction 
processes (Andrew and Gugerty, 2011).  Although, there are sporadic attempts and 
initiatives by KKP to improve their downward accountability relations with their 
beneficiaries, these attempts are very minimal and do not exist in any great detail in 
comparison with how KKP accounts to their compelling group of stakeholders, 
particularly donors. This happens because for KKP to legitimise its survival, it is 
obliged to account to donors and the other compelling group of stakeholders via 
mechanisms such as reporting, review meetings and external monitoring, among 
others.  
 
However, the same accountability enthusiasm cannot be said about KKP’s 
accountability relations with its beneficiaries downwards.  There is no indication that 
downward accountability to beneficiaries will improve significantly any time soon 
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unless the compelling group of stakeholders, particularly donors encourage and 
enforce such relationships.  This is why Kreidler (2011) believes that donors are a key 
link in the accountability chain, and stakeholders expect donor representatives to 
ensure that action is taken when the humanitarian system does not perform well. That 
is, it is important to take a closer look at what donors can and cannot influence – and 
what tools they have at their disposal to enhance the accountability and quality of 
humanitarian aid (Kreidler, 2011). 
 
This could be explained by the reality reported by some researchers that in 2008, 
governments of OECD countries spent approximately US$135 billion on development 
aid, showing commitment to spending over twice this amount (as a proportion of 
national income) each year by 2015 (Agyemang et al., 2009).  Agyemang et al. 
(2009:5) continue that this is in addition to ‘amounts donated by private individuals, 
charitable foundations and corporations’ and invariably ‘much of this aid is 
channelled through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to front-line aid 
projects’. 
 
Another reason could be that there is no clear and defined format, guidance or any 
indication from donors as to how KKP should account to their beneficiaries and there 
are no enforceable mechanisms to that effect. In comparison to upward accountability 
where donors proactively impose reporting deadlines, content and formats, and 
sanctions, among others, there is limited or no such conditionalities and commitment 
from donors to ensure that KKP account to beneficiaries downward: 
 
…Even on occasions where donors or for that matter any of the 
compelling stakeholder groups attempt to show interest in KKPs 
downward accountability to beneficiaries, the approach is 
somehow seen as superficial and patchy… (PD) 
 
The study argues that all KKP interventions are undertaken with the support of donors 
for the benefit of beneficiaries/communities. In most cases, KKP obtain resources, 
particularly from donors to provide services needed by beneficiaries. This relationship 
depicts a two-part system of accountability where on the one part, KKP is mandated 
and perhaps rightly so to account to the providers of resources using reports and the 
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like; and for donors to compel KKP or for KKP itself to ensure that beneficiaries are 
well accounted to. However, there seems to be a relaxed attitude, particularly from 
donors towards ensuring that beneficiaries are equally in the picture on issues of 
accountability. The efforts and intensity exerted by donors on KKP to adhere to 
upward accountability is not seen when it comes to downward accountability to 
beneficiaries.  However, efforts are been made to ensure that NGOs provide some 
level of accountability to their beneficiaries/communities.  This is exemplified by a 
report by the European Commission’s Department for Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection (ECHO), the largest global humanitarian donor contributing about 40% of 
total humanitarian spending in 2010. ECHO requires all potential partners to sign a 
Framework Partnership Agreement, which commits them to meeting minimum 
standards in their internal procedures and programming before applying for funding 
(Kreidler, 2011). 
 
In fact, there are limited donor initiatives towards ensuring that KKP accounts to their 
beneficiaries contrary to donor claims to that effect. Donor commitment to downward 
accountability within KKP is very minimal. The truth though is that donors can 
influence partners’ adherence to standards and accountability mechanisms at the 
various stages of the funding cycle: proposal appraisal, monitoring, financial and 
narrative reporting and evaluation (Kreidler, 2011).   
 
This is why Agyemang et al. (2009:5) observe that donors’ need for periodic 
performance reporting that regularly demonstrates progress and goal achievement on 
a project sometimes conflicts with the longer-term nature of certain projects and the 
slower pace of work in some communities.  However, they suggest that it may also be 
necessary for the mandated upward-accounting and accountability mechanisms to 
provide flexibility in reporting formats so that a range of possibly unforeseen issues 
revealed through downward accountability can be reported upwards to donors 
(Agyemang et al., 2009:5). 
 
In spite of the lackadaisical attitude of donors to commit themselves towards 
downward accountability: 
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…KKP on their own as an organisation and in accordance with 
their mission, attempts to account to beneficiaries, but the level 
of enthusiasm and urgency is not commensurate to that accorded 
donors…(ED) 
 
In spite of the sporadic attempt by KKP to improve its relationship with their 
beneficiaries, downward accountability to beneficiaries basically does not exist in any 
great detail within the organisation. In implementing its programmes, KKP on their 
own, with no massive support and commitment from donors tend to account to 
beneficiaries in any small way they could via durbars, community entry strategies, 
review meetings, and the provision of report extracts for beneficiary communities. In 
addition, the institutionalisation of community structures, the use of community 
project teams to oversee the implementation of projects within communities and the 
like are laudable downward accountability initiatives instituted by KKP to somewhat 
account to beneficiaries and ensure that at least the voice of the poor is heard.  This is 
somewhat different from the suggestion that donor monitoring of funded projects is 
another way of enhancing quality and accountability (Kreidler, 2011).  Kreidler 
(2011) reveals that ECHO has a larger field presence than any other humanitarian 
donor, enabling it to systematically monitor all the projects it funds. What happens is 
that ECHO staff are held accountable if a project had not been monitored, or if the 
monitoring visit had not been documented.   These monitoring visits ensure that the 
standards set at the proposal stage are met, and offer technical assistance to support 
other elements of good quality management.  
 
It emerged that KKP tries to involve its beneficiary communities in its processes since 
beneficiaries are the eventual recipients of any donor intervention.  Efforts are made 
to at least, involve them from the onset of the project with the view to soliciting 
beneficiary views about the project. As indicated earlier, obtaining funding for KKP-
beneficiary-led interventions within communities is always a daunting task with a 
very low success rate. This presupposes that most beneficiary interventions are donor-
initiated with relatively minimal KKP-beneficiary involvement.  However, it is within 
the operational management of KKP to always involve beneficiaries via durbars, 
review meetings and community entry strategies etc. 
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…Upon receipt of the go ahead to undertake a particular project, 
KKP endeavours to implement a community entry strategy 
whereby we visit the chiefs, elders, and opinion leaders of the 
intended beneficiary community to brief them about the 
impending project… (PD) 
 
In collaboration with the chiefs and elders of the community, KKP then organises 
durbars to sensitise the general public about the project as well. KKP does all these 
because they believe that effective downward accountability has the potential to 
enhance the effectiveness of the organisation’s interventions because of the 
incorporation of the views and experiences of beneficiaries that are closer to the 
interventions. This supports O'Dwyer and Unerman’s (2010: 467) view that 
‘downward accountability to beneficiaries has the potential to be an important tool in 
the quest to improve the effectiveness with which finite development aid is deployed’.  
 
This affirms the importance of downward accountability to the effective deployment 
of aid delivery as these researchers further argue that the integration of ideas from all 
stakeholders most especially beneficiaries has the potential to enrich project planning 
and implementation: 
 
appropriate downward accountability mechanisms should help 
NGOs become learning organisations, interacting and mutually 
learning with their beneficiaries (in addition to other 
stakeholders) and thereby developing deeper understandings of 
the aid delivery solutions that are likely to be most effective in 
practice in each aid situation (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010: 467) 
 
Similarly, Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi (2004) stress that downward accountability 
recognises the rights of beneficiaries not only as a recipient of an intervention but as 
an essential party capable of positively shaping projects effectiveness; and that the 
adoption of downward accountability mechanisms within NGOs has the potential to 
provide 
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a frame within which to signal a move towards a more genuinely 
inclusive and democratic process of popular involvement in 
decision making over the resources and institutions that affect 
people’s lives’ (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004:1424). 
 
One other means by which beneficiary communities are involved in KKP projects is 
via the selection of volunteers. It emerged that volunteering is an integral aspect of 
KKP’s activities.  Generally, these volunteers are selected from beneficiary 
communities in collaboration with the Chiefs, assemblymen and other opinion 
leaders. Once selected, the volunteers normally partner KKP in their project delivery 
endeavours. In principle, selected volunteers become an integral part of the KKP 
project implementation team because they work closely with KKP personnel on the 
project. But even then, the level of volunteers’ involvement in KKP projects is very 
minimal and KKP is not obliged to account to these volunteers (supposed partners) in 
any great detail. One would assume that because volunteers are effectively part of 
KKP’s project, they could have full access to information to operate effectively within 
the group, but that is not always the case in KKP: 
 
…Volunteers of KKP could have access to information regarding 
the token they are to receive for their efforts but have no access 
to any project information, strategies and reports (financial or 
otherwise) in comparison with personnel of KKP…(MEO) 
 
Although KKP strives to involve beneficiaries in their projects, for example, as in the 
case of the Adwensan Community Health Community, the extent and intensity of 
beneficiary involvement is inadequate in comparison with that accorded the most 
compelling stakeholder groups.  This explains why Ulleberg (2009) argues that there 
is considerable dissatisfaction within the international community regarding the 
impact of many capacity building interventions. The fact is that these activities have 
usually strengthened the skills of individuals, but have not always succeeded in 
improving the effectiveness of the ministries and other organizations where those 
individuals are working. 
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Marilee (2000) argues that development agencies have only recently recognized the 
need for monitoring and evaluation (M and E) of participation in development 
projects and programmes.  The study reveals that in general terms, beneficiaries are 
seen as the less important element in the whole NGO sector due to their inability to 
exert any influence on either the provider of resources or the implementer of projects. 
On a lot of occasions, beneficiaries are only informed of projects a few days before 
the actual commencement of the project. Beneficiaries are mostly made aware of 
projects at durbars or at project stakeholder start up meeting. However, in the case of 
KKP, it tries to organise such durbars prior to the commencement of any project in 
the beneficiary communities. The majority of the beneficiaries of the projects 
normally get wind of the projects at the durbar grounds/meeting.  This means that 
they might have little to contribute in terms of any suggestions or an alternative 
approach to the project.  This is one of the reasons why Marilee (2000) suggests that 
three aspects of participation need to be evaluated: the extent and quality of 
participation; the costs and benefits of participation to the different stakeholders; and 
the impact of participation on outcomes, performance and sustainability.  
 
In reality, by merely informing beneficiaries about an impending project does not 
constitute beneficiary/community involvement. The issue is to answer a question like: 
how could KKP account to beneficiaries when they (beneficiaries) have no details 
about the project and are not involved? It is unbelievable that intended beneficiaries 
of what is seen as a collective intervention are neither involved nor accounted to. This 
state of affair exists because there is no enforcement provision in donor contracts with 
KKP that compels KKP to involve beneficiaries in any great detail. If donors were to 
be serious about downward accountability and mandates KKP to do so, then KKP will 
have no option but to comply as in the case of upward accountability. In fact, it is in 
the interest of donors and other compelling stakeholders to encourage downward 
accountability, especially between KKP and beneficiaries as an efficient monitoring 
tool for measuring the performance of KKP.  This could help avoid project apathy and 
antagonism, project duplication and resources misallocation.  
 
After all, beneficiaries have pressing and neglected challenges that need immediate 
attention; donors have the resources to help resolve such challenges; and KKP have 
the ability to utilise the resources to resolve issues. Therefore, it is a step in the right 
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direction for all these parties: donors, KKP, and beneficiaries, to work together 
holistically to achieve the objectives collectively. It is only when beneficiaries are 
involved in greater detail and have much information about the project in terms of 
project content and resource allocation that they will be able to play a key role in 
ensuring effective project accountability.  By ensuring that this was done would 
conform to the suggestion that some of the common objectives and expected benefits 
of participation in development are: improving the efficiency, effectiveness, 
sustainability and coverage of projects and programmes; and promoting stakeholder 
capacity, self-reliance and empowerment (Marilee, 2000). 
 
In their bid to somehow account to beneficiaries, KKP as part of their operational 
processes normally institute community structures / institutional arrangements within 
project implementation communities. Examples of such community structures are 
‘community based project management committees’ and ‘registers’. The community 
based project management committees act as the project steering committee to ensure 
the successful completion of projects. In most cases, opinion leaders and other 
community members constitute these structures and are tasked with ensuring that 
KKP operates within agreed timelines and to monitor progress. An example of such a 
structure is the Adwensan Community Health Community whose mandate is to 
encourage community members to be health conscious and to monitor projects. As an 
operational principle, KKP is committed in ensuring the timely and successful 
completion of projects.  Participation also entails costs to the different stakeholders. 
There are time costs for both the beneficiaries and the donors, including increased 
time for training, preparation and consultation. Even as this arrangement is good, it 
also has cost implications both in terms of time and hidden costs.  Thus, Marilee’s 
(2000) opinion is that participation also entails costs to the different stakeholders.  
 
The literature contains an argument to the effect that downward accountability 
mechanism encourages NGOs to be accountable: upwards to donors; and downwards 
to beneficiaries (Edwards and Hulme 2002a; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  
Therefore, as part of their downward accountability initiatives, KKP always set up 
structures, including monitoring teams within the project communities right from the 
beginning of the project. Another structure that KKP sets up within the communities 
to monitor its effectiveness is the institution / institutionalisation of community 
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registers.  These are record keeping documents used to monitor the frequency of visits 
of KKP employees to project sites.  This ensures that any project implementer / 
officer from KKP signs the community register kept with either a community based 
project management committee member or any reputable person within the project 
community. Although these structures are laudable, one could argue that they are 
tools set up by KKP more to indirectly demonstrate their effectiveness to donors, 
rather than to downwardly account to beneficiaries.  
 
There is always the likelihood of system abuse emanating from the possible collusion 
of the parties involved; however, no matter how one looks at it, such structures at 
least, consider the inputs of beneficiaries in projects, and confirms the assertion that 
assessing the extent and quality of participation requires both quantitative and 
qualitative indicators (Marilee, 2000). Marilee (2000) notes this means that 
quantifiable indicators can be used to measure the economic aspects of participation, 
the extent of participation in organizations and project activities and the development 
momentum. Again, qualitative indicators measure processes such as organizational 
growth, group behaviour and self-reliance (Marilee, 2000). 
 
Some researchers argue that downward accountability considers socio-cultural, 
political and ethical issues as well as ensures that accountability becomes a process of 
negotiation among stakeholders rather than imposing one’s definition of effectiveness 
over another, as often happens with upward accountability (Messner, 2009; O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2006; Roberts, 1991). The UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) suggests that well-planned and managed evaluation exercises 
can improve the quality of future development activities (DFID, 2005).  Thus, the 
study argues that another partial demonstration of downward accountability of KKP 
to beneficiaries occurs during review meeting(s).  This is a platform for constructive 
stakeholder deliberations about a project: to identify challenges faced and the benefits 
thereof. It is argued in the literature that institutions exist where, under certain 
conditions, a social actor is required to behave and operate in a particular manner such 
that any deviation results in the application of social sanctions and in some cases 
affect the legitimacy of the social actors concerned (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; 
Brammer et al., 2012; Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  
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Kilby (2006) observes that the accountability of NGOs, particularly their ‘downward’ 
accountability to their beneficiaries, affects NGO effectiveness in the process of 
empowerment for the poor and marginalized in developing countries.  Moreover, the 
study suggests that these review meetings are organised for all stakeholders to assess 
the project under consideration and help KKP seek solutions to identified problems. 
Since beneficiaries are the recipients of such project interventions, and KKP are the 
main project implementers, it stands to reason that beneficiaries would be given the 
opportunity to lead the discussion and challenge unfounded claims by KKP or suggest 
project modification/enhancement. However, the purpose of such review meetings are 
always misplaced as the intention of donors is to use the review meeting to 
substantiate reports submitted rather that to encourage an effective dialogue about the 
project to the benefit of all. Therefore, this is contrary to the idea suggested by DFID 
that evaluations can also challenge accepted thinking to improve the overall 
development effectiveness (DFID, 2005).  
 
Dalal-Clayton and Bass (2006) explain that periodic reports are to be prepared which 
will review the state of progress towards sustainability, rather than the process and / 
or delivery of strategies (Bass and Dalal-Clayton, 2012). The study argues that the use 
of reporting as a demonstration of downward accountability relations between KKP 
and the beneficiaries was non-existing. Arguably, KKP does not provide any form of 
report (narrative or financial) to beneficiaries except at review meetings where report 
extracts / overviews are mentioned. Depending on the type of project or donor, KKP 
might have to submit copies of their reports to the district, municipal and metropolitan 
assemblies (offices) within which the projects are sited to enable interested parties to 
access them. However, due to logistical and other constraints, some assemblies are 
unable to keep the reports and beneficiaries are generally unable to access such 
reports:  
…It is unfortunate to note that even the head office of the 
Department of Social Welfare do not have the logistics to store 
documents and reports from the various NGOs operating in 
Ghana…(DDSW)    
Overall, the evidences from the study supports Wallace and Chapman’s (2003) 
argument that while the stated commitment of UK NGOs and donors is to downward 
accountability and promoting local ownership and control of development, the 
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policies and procedures that surround the disbursement and accounting for aid money 
ensures that upward accountability dominates. They continue that this domination is 
part of a wider problem of domination by donors of their recipients, which skews the 
relationship and undermines the potential for these relationships to work well as 
partnerships: Yet it is partnership that most agencies involved in development believe 
in and want to achieve (Wallace and Chapman, 2003).   
 
Indeed, it could be said that the kind of control that the donors have over KKP is 
massive such that if the donors really cared so much about downward accountability 
to beneficiaries as they professed, they would greatly influence KKP to do so in a bid 
to improve their relationship and empowerment of beneficiaries. However, the 
evidence on the ground suggests that despite claims to ensuring the adoption and 
application of downward accountability, the system of accountability does not exist so 
much in practice.  A similar sentiment is expressed by Najam (1996a) who critically 
overviewed accountability of NGOs in Bangladesh and concluded that downward 
accountability to beneficiaries did not exist despite rhetoric from donors to that effect. 
In fact, Najam describes the process of downward accountability as a ‘sham ritual’ 
performed to somewhat appease beneficiaries and to let them feel that they are 
equally important and their views are considered in the process (Najam, 1996a, 
1996b).  
 
However, the lack of donor commitment and support towards these noble downward 
accountability initiatives by KKP, or any other NGO for that matter, tends to frustrate 
such initiatives in spite of the notion that downward accountability to beneficiaries 
could help improve the effectiveness of the sector’s interventions (Ebrahim, 2005; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). Obviously, downward accountability initiatives such 
as the community structures instituted by KKP have the potential to enhance the 
effective delivery of projects for the benefit of all stakeholders. Therefore, there is the 
need for effective leadership and commitment from donors and other compelling 
stakeholders to ensure that resources are allocated to ensure the development, 
implementation and sustainability of downward accountability.   
 
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that similar behaviour by donors has been 
reported in the housing sector; and that, in spite of considerable rhetoric about 
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participation and inclusive reconstruction accompanying the post-tsunami 
reconstruction by various donors, a number of systemic barriers created considerable 
distance between beneficiaries and NGOs in Aceh, Indonesia, in the housing sector 
(Daly and Brassard, 2011). According to these authors, the drive for efficiency and 
the need to produce tangible results quickly, mixed with the sheer number of 
stakeholders and resources involved, created a largely top-down environment in 
which decisions were centralized and arbitrary standards imposed. They argue that 
this was exacerbated by an extensive chain of sub-contractors, and a large supply of 
lower-cost imported labour. This highlighted the importance of local political 
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7.2. Institutional Explanation of the Observed Accountability Relations at 
KKP 
 
This section provides the theoretical explanation of the observed accountability 
relations in terms of the effects of the institutional pressures on those accountability 
systems.  The NGO sector is highly influenced by the institutional environment within 
which they operate. In other words, the observed accountability relations: upward and 
downward discussed above (section 7.1), are shaped by the institutional forces 
























Figure 7. 2 Theoretical Explanation of KKP accountability Systems 
Source: Researcher’s own construct 
 
Figure 7.2 depicts that coercive, mimetic and normative forces affects KKP in their 
accountability relations and to minimise the effects of such forces on their operations, 
KKP in turn adopts strategic responses in that regard.  
 
Broadly, the theoretical framework adopted to explain the findings of this research 
using KKP’s accountability systems is the NIS as discussed by DiMaggio and Powell 
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(1983). The theory argues that the institutional forces operating within an 
organisation’s environment is likely to shape its accountability relations: in this study, 
KKP. DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who propounded NIS, argue that three main 
institutional forces: coercive, mimetic and normative, exist and affect accountability 
relations. According to these authors, coercive forces are formal or informal pressures 
on organisations in certain directions or more directly, the imposition of acceptable 
standards of procedures and rules to govern organisations in a particular aspect: in this 
case, accountability relations at KKP. The mimetic forces are defined as 
benchmarking or mimicking best practices from other organisations in the same or 
other sectors / industries. The mimetic forces identified at KKP are in the area of 
accountability relations in the global NGO sector in Ghanaian settings. According to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), normative isomorphism occurs when organisations 
operating in particular industries adopt certain practices as a result of social pressures.   
 
Interviews with the various actors within the NGO sector in Ghana (and reported in 
chapter 6) unveiled that all the three institutional factors: coercive, normative and 
mimetic as suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) were being observed to some 
extent in KKP’s accountability relations with its stakeholders as part of the 
organisation’s legitimacy seeking behaviour. Although all the three institutional 
isomorphism affect the behaviour of KKP in varying degrees, coercive isomorphism 
emerged as the dominant force that explains why certain decisions are made and also 
why such accountability relations are observed.  As argued by Powell and DiMaggio, 
(2012), the potency of the different types of isomorphism will vary from organisation 
to organisation (Scott, 2013). In effect, these institutional forces affect and could be 
used to explain why KKP behave and operate the way they do in terms of among 
others, decision making as well as the observed accountability relations.  The sub-
sections below provide theoretical explanations as to why KKP makes certain 
decisions and account the way it does.  
7.2.1. Coercive Forces and KKP’s Decision Making and Accountability Systems 
 
As already indicated, coercive forces are the imposition of some ‘acceptable’ 
standards of procedures, rules, and behaviours, formal or informal on organisations 
such as KKP to adopt practices that otherwise would not have been observed or 
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undertaken (Powell and DiMaggio, 2012). It was observed that most of the decisions 
made within KKP are coercively influenced as is discussed below.  
  
7.2.1.1.  Decision-Making at KKP  
 
Like all other organisations, the existence of limited resources (financial and others) 
needed for the effective operations of the organisation, coupled with increasing 
competition for these scarce resources calls for efficient decision-making.  The 
findings of the study show that the situation is slightly different in the case of NGOs 
in general and KKP in particular. Although donors generally provide the majority of 
the funds needed for the day-to-day running of the organisation, they are also 
effectively involved in the daily running of KKP and in most cases, either make key 
decisions or significantly influence KKP’s decision making.  This is why some 
researchers argue that organisations’ decisions to change and adopt new measures 
could emanate from pressures from similar organisations (Powell and DiMaggio, 
2012). 
 
One would have expected that in the case of organisations such as the KKP, its donors 
would leave the management (of KKP) to take all the relevant decisions as far as 
these decisions satisfy the funding requirements, and which would eventually lead to 
the achievement of the project objectives.  On the contrary, the major decisions in 
relation to projects undertaken by KKP are highly influenced and controlled by its 
funders as echoed by:   
 
…Precisely, since we are providing the funding, it is imperative 
that we also take part in the decision making and monitoring to 
ensure effective accountability of resource utilisation…(D2)   
 
Perhaps this funder’s attitude may be right, as they do not want their funds to go 
waste, especially in an era where scandals, embezzlements, mismanagement, and high 
levels of corruption have tainted the credibility of many NGOs and their management 
(Ebrahim, 2010, Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Gray et al., 2006; Safire, 2004; 
Trivunovic, 2011). 
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It could be argued that some limited number of donors may wish to provide the funds 
and implement projects concurrently, without soliciting for the services of a project 
implementer like KKP whilst a great majority of others prefer to implore the services 
of intermediaries like KKP. In most cases, donors who beseech the services of 
implementing partners like KKP tend to interfere unnecessarily in the activities of 
KKP. This means that donors could give responsibility to KKP without the much-
needed authority to function effectively (Ahmed et al., 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; 
Mercer and Green, 2013).  In addition to the provision of project guidelines, donors 
tend to control major project decisions including project conceptualisation, objectives, 
location, activities to undertake, and the selection of implementing partners (in this 
case KKP) among others (Edwards and Gaventa, 2014; Smillie et al., 2013).  
 
It should be remembered that the concept of institutional isomorphism argues that the 
environments within which organisations operate exert a much stronger influence on 
developing and shaping formal organisational structures (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1992). The study argues that the decision process in 
respect of donor-funded projects commences as soon as the project is advertised.  
However, it appears that the beneficiary or implementing organisations have a limited 
role in these processes. For instance, on a number of occasions, future projects are 
advertised in the daily newspapers, on the Internet predominantly, via donor websites 
or by way of donor/coalition referral. These advertised projects come with guidelines 
and requirements, including project duration and even in some cases, how the project 
is to be implemented. All these are basic and relevant decisions that should at best be 
made with inputs from implementing partners and the intended beneficiaries.  
 
The question is how could a project be implemented successfully, when donors are 
the same people who fix the duration and provide funding for it to be implemented in 
an unfamiliar environment (foreign) by an implementing organisation that played no 
or little part in the decision making process? It could be perceived that the project 
could be implemented successfully if there was effective involvement of, at least, the 
implementing partner and/or intended beneficiaries in such decisions.  This could be 
vital to the successful completion of the project. Therefore, some researchers suggest 
that the adoption of institutional isomorphism will lead to legitimacy whilst failure to 
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adopt this approach could signify organisational disaster (Meyer and Rowan, 1992; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012).  
 
It is even possible that if the local organisations were involved, they could have 
suggested an alternative location for the said intervention to be sited and 
implemented. For example, KKP’s projects could have been better suited in a 
different community in other parts of Ghana, rather than its current location.  
However, since the donors solely selected the project location in their advertised 
‘calls for proposals’ document, KKP or other implementing partners had little say in 
the already decided project location. They accept and implement accordingly.  This is 
a deviation from the literature where any identified project/activity that the 
community felt would improve their livelihood was brought to the attention of the 
chief and his elders for deliberation, consideration and possible implementation 
(Korboe, 1998). Researcher Korboe (1998), explains that under normal 
circumstances, a meeting should be convened openly to discuss the issue(s) at stake, 
deliberate, iron out differences, dispel suspicion and reach consensus and to mobilise 
human resources in the form of community support (Tsey, 2011). Similar the 
community and stakeholder participatory approach in dealing within societal 
problems, including issues of poverty alleviation, is recorded elsewhere including the 
Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kyamusugulwa, 2014). 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explain that coercive 
isomorphism emanates when pressure is mounted on subordinate actors by superior 
autonomous bodies to behave in a particular manner. The study observed that the 
decision about project conceptualisation is mostly done by whoever is funding the 
said project, with little regard to the other stakeholders who might be associated with 
the project in question. The call for proposals and other expressions of interest 
documents are prepared and put out for interested parties like KKP to bid on. In 
bidding for such projects, KKP or any other implementing partner would have to 
respond exactly as it is expressed in the document. Implementing partners that present 
alternative views to what is advertised are mostly rejected as unsuccessful bidders 
even if their suggestion was laudable.  This is why DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
explain that pressure from coercive isomorphism could be either formal or informal 
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and could be exercised in various forms of force, co-optation, persuasion, evolution or 
an invitation from an independent organisation to a dependent one.  
 
The study notes that in effect, donors conceptualise projects on their own, decide 
where the project should be implemented, state the amount of money involved, set 
objectives and performance indicators, and simply invite interested NGOs, including 
KKP to ‘take it or leave it’ (PD). In other words, the selected NGO effectively inherits 
and implements a predetermined and predesigned project from the said donor who 
eventually monitors progress keenly to ensure absolute compliance with no 
room/opportunity to even slightly vary the inherited project to reflect any relevant 
grass root realities. On few occasions, where KKP has had the opportunity to suggest 
implementing solutions, donors have always had the last say by altering KKP’s 
proposals or in some cases, completely rejecting it. This means that decisions of the 
donors are legitimised through this process.  This agrees with the idea that coercive 
isomorphism can be legal or technical and can take many forms, including mandates, 
annual reports, standards, financial reporting requirements, and regulations 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
 
The literature shows that NGOs have played and continue to play a significant role in 
Africa, particularly in deprived communities neglected by either the state or the 
private sector, spending over US46 billion in developing countries in 1989 alone 
(Clark, 1991). However, the study reveals that in actual fact, projects not initiated / 
conceptualised by donors hardly ever get funded and implemented. It emerged from 
the study that the operations of KKP take them to various communities in Ghana. As 
part of their activities, KKP are able to interact with members of the community to 
obtain at first hand, information about the challenges they face. Based on these real 
inputs from the community members, in the past, KKP was able to package these 
community needs into proposals for funding purposes. However, it was adduced that 
such beneficiary/KKP-led project initiatives hardly got funding. This buttresses the 
fact that the main compelling group of forces do not want to relinquish their power as 
the sole decision maker: to initiate projects. Perhaps, because donors have limited 
control in such projects they tend to shun away from them (Hossain et al., 2003). This 
is why DiMaggio and Powell (1983), note that this is the direct imposition of ‘an 
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acceptable’ standard of procedures and rules to govern the operations of 
organisations. 
 
It was observed that the capacity and capabilities exist within KKP to work closely 
together with the relevant communities (beneficiaries) to unravel or unearth laudable 
project initiatives worth considering.  However, since such initiatives do not emanate 
from donors, they are generally killed before they are even born due to lack of interest 
to fund and low confidence in KKP to deliver on their own (Michael, 2004). The 
possibility of a beneficiary/KKP-led project initiative to obtain donor funding is very 
slim.  Nevertheless, on a few occasions, such initiatives are only accepted with 
fundamental changes that meet the prospective donors’ expectation and interest and in 
line with their mission. This supports the evidence in the literature that the 
characteristics of NGOs provide them with numerous advantages, including the 
ability to attract altruistic resources, provide for unmet and heterogeneous demand for 
public goods, protection against contract failure and free rider issues (Brown and 
Moore, 2001; Doh and Teegan, 2002; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2005; Goetz and Jenkins, 
2002; Jammulamadaka, 2009; Kamat, 2003).  
 
It would be recalled that new institutional sociologists argue that there is a direct 
relationship between the level of dependence and the level of coercive isomorphism 
and homogeneity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Thompson, 1967). Thus, the higher 
the level of dependence of an organisation on others for resources, the higher the level 
of influence and imposition (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; 
Thompson, 1967).  The study argues that apart from being solely responsible for 
project conceptualisation decisions, donors to a greater extent also controlled 
decisions on the objectives of projects; and, in some cases, the activities to be 
undertaken to achieve the set objectives. In addition to setting the objectives, donors 
have an exclusive right to change the scope and objectives of projects as and when 
they deem fit. The only aspect at this stage that KKP might be involved to any extent 
was the decision on the strategies to be adopted to achieve the donor set objectives 
and even then donors can sometimes tweak KKP’s strategies at will. 
 
The unwillingness of donors to involve KKP and beneficiaries meaningfully in setting 
project objectives has an innate problem of suppressing the creative ability of KKP 
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(Burger and Owens, 2010; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012).  
This will not enhance KKP’s ability to build capacity for itself and within the 
community.  Thus, this is contrary to the view that NGOs provide capacity-building 
(Brown and Moore, 2001; Fowler, 2013). Perhaps, this is because the donors 
supporting KKP are not interested in helping KKP to build capacity.  This is also due 
to the fact that KKP is a relatively small NGO that is non-comparable to the capacity-
building NGOs that are generally large international NGOs that seek to build and 
improve the capabilities of other smaller and local NGOs to ensure effective 
operations (Brown and Moore, 2001; Fowler, 2013).   
 
It would be remembered that new institutional sociologists argue that the structures, 
procedures and principles adopted by organisations are highly influenced by external 
pressures rather than rational optimisation of costs reduction and other rational 
motives (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991; Scott, 2001).  The study discloses that 
since donors are generally away from project implementation locations, they mostly 
rely on and partner with selected implementing partners like KKP to accomplish their 
intended tasks. The role of the implementing partner (KKP) is to effectively and 
collaboratively translate the conceptual views and objectives of donors into reality on 
the ground. Indeed, the implementing partner plays a pivotal role as an intermediary 
between the donor on one hand and the intended beneficiary on the other. As a result, 
one would have expected that such a selection process should consider inputs from 
other stakeholder groups, or at least, the beneficiary/KKP. But again, just like any 
other important project decision, the decision to select an NGO as a project-
implementing partner (KKP) was solely under the control and prerogative of donors.  
However, if the implementing partners like KKP were involved, they could have used 
their social connections (social capital) to ensure an integrated approach to selecting 
projects that would be beneficial to society (Chenhall et al., 2010). 
 
As evidenced in the literature, accountability is mainly about responding to the views 
and queries of others (Edward and Hulme, 1996b; Fox and Brown, 1998).  The study 
findings show that donors strategically select project-implementing partners via 
several means to ensure the achievement of their set project objectives. Two of these 
are: the donors’ own selection; or via a referral. In practice, what happens in the case 
of a donor’s own selection is that if an NGO has had a ‘good’ working relationship in 
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the past with the donor in question, then the donor might decide to continue the good 
relationship and select the same NGO as a partner.  
 
However, if the donor has not had any previous working relationship with the 
prospective implementing partner, then the prospective implementing partner will 
have to demonstrate its credibility and accountability credentials to the prospective 
donor via the submission of documents, annual and financial reports, organisational 
structure, and strategic plans, among others.  An NGO’s inability to submit these 
documents as evidence (even if it is a new NGO) could severely affect their chances 
of being selected as an implementing partner. This means that if an NGO wanted to 
be selected, it had to operate in a similar environment after a first unsuccessful 
attempt. This attitude of the donors could create homogeneity in the NGOs 
environment.  Perhaps, this is why Meyer and Rowan (1977) indicated that the 
environmental forces that influence organisational behaviour are myths, which are 
accepted by organisations for the sake of legitimacy and survival as they seek to 
operate harmoniously within the institutional environment. 
 
Another way through which a donor could select an NGO as an implementing partner 
is via referrals.  An NGO could be referred if a highly trusted stakeholder(s) 
recommended it: other donors, professional firms, or the coalition of NGOs.  This 
could be done via a letter of recommendation. Again for an NGO to be referred, it 
might have demonstrated its accountability credentials to the referee, mostly during a 
previous working relationship.  However, once a donor says no to an NGO, no other 
stakeholder group could reverse the donor’s decision. Thus, evidence gathered 
demonstrates that this selection process further enhances the power of donors as the 
most compelling group of stakeholders who are generally revered by NGOs and other 
stakeholders. This could create conflicts between donors and implementing partners 
such as KKP and even beneficiary communities.  A similar scenario is reported by 
Busiinge (2010) who argues that, because of power imbalance caused by the financial 
muscle of a donor, a local NGO in Uganda was unable to implement an agenda of its 
target beneficiaries. This financial imbalance was also responsible for re-awakening 
some of the conflicts in the region of operation in Uganda. 
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The study reveals that generally the basis of referral depends on the ability of an NGO 
to submit reports and other needed documents on time. This suggests that the chances 
of a blacklisted NGO being selected as an implementing partner is very slim 
irrespective of the circumstances and conditions (prejudice or reality) under which it 
was blacklisted. In practice, KKP mostly gets referrals via either the various 
coalitions or other donors that it has previously had interactions with. Clearly, the 
decision to select an NGO like KKP to partner a donor to implement a perceived 
intervention still remains the sole responsibility of the donor with little or no input 
whatsoever from KKP.  
 
In addition, it emerged that the selection has no bearing on how well or badly an 
expression of interest, or calls for proposals from prospective NGOs, including KKP 
had been responded to. Once a donor makes its decision and selects a particular NGO 
as a partner, unsuccessful NGOs and other stakeholders can do nothing about it even 
if they have reservations about the selection process. This situation puts the selected 
NGOs: 
 
…at the receiving end and to behave as if the donor has done 
them a favour by selecting them as implementing partners...(PD)  
 
This situation further entrenches the power of donors within the NGO arena.  This is 
why some researchers argue that institutions exist where, under certain conditions, a 
social actor is required to behave and operate in a particular manner such that any 
deviation results in the application of social sanctions and in some cases affect the 
legitimacy of the social actors concerned (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Brammer et 
al., 2012; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
 
The literature shows that institutions tend to impose social structures on social actors 
using various elements, including symbols, laws, norms, and values. In the long run, 
these structures eventually become socially accepted, internalised and are enacted into 
social actors as the guiding principles upon which societies are governed such that 
any departures from such established societal norms are discouraged (Scott, 2001).  In 
theory two main forms of project closure exist:  the first is where the project is 
allowed to run its course (natural closure); and the second is where the project is 
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ended earlier than normal (premature closure).  Again, donors are invariably involved 
in decisions regarding both forms of project closure.  
 
Embedded in every project contract are the terms and conditions as well as the 
processes involved in its closure. These closure conditions are set exclusively by the 
donor and vary from donor to donor. In fact, it is in the interest of all stakeholders, 
especially donors, partner NGOs, and the beneficiary for a project to end at its 
stipulated time as anticipated in the contract. In the case of KKP, most projects run 
their natural course. Although these projects end naturally, donors determine what 
needs to be done during project closure.  
 
It has been argued that institutions are often shaped by contestation, conflict and 
compromises and exhibit the characteristics of a dominant power relation that 
generally defines acceptable conditions for social actors within the environment 
(Brammer et al., 2012; Jackson, 2010). The natural completion of a project has the 
potential to achieve the expected objective set by the donor: to resolve an identified 
challenge in a value for money manner.  
 
Premature project closure occurs where a project is not allowed to run its full original 
implementation duration.  This could happen if there was a breach (mostly from the 
implementing partner: KKP) in any of the agreed terms and conditions set out in the 
contract. Although project termination depends on breaches in the contract, the 
decision to terminate projects lies entirely with the donor.  This could be exercised at 
will as far as a breach (minor/major) was detected on the part of KKP or the 
subcontracted NGO concerned. The irony of the situation is that if donors were rather 
to breach the terms of the contract, KKP or the subcontracted NGO concerned could 
not under any circumstance terminate the project for fear of possible blacklisting: 
 
…It is a situation like the donor is always right and the NGO is 
wrong all the time. The repercussions of being blacklisted by 
donors could be unbearable on an NGO because it could lead to a 
drain on any future funding sources and referrals…could create a 
permanent reputational, credibility, and accountability damage in 
the minds of donors…(CRPC)  
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These one-sided relationships happen notwithstanding the benefits of a joint 
partnership between KKP and its funding donors.  A practical example was a joint 
pilot initiative between KKP and a donor to determine the impact of community 
involvement on the success of projects that were set up in some communities within 
the country. One such initiative is the formation, and establishment of the Adwensan 
Community Health Committee (ACHC) within the Adwensan Community, a suburb 
of Achimota in Accra. The membership of the ACHC comprised, among others, 
teachers, nurses, and opinion leaders within the Adwensan Community. As part of the 
project, a system called Community Decision System (CDS) was introduced that 
empowers the community members to make decisions themselves. The essence of the 
CDS was to help the community members identify their own health issues and 
challenges by capturing and analysing data to help them make informed decisions 
together about their health. The zeal and enthusiasm within which members embraced 
the idea and contributed to discussions allow the community to prioritise the 
communities’ health concerns to the benefit of all.  
 
This affirms the fact that if only donors could show support towards involving KKP 
and beneficiaries in decision-making, they could identify the needs of the community 
for appropriate intervention(s) to be instituted.  However, this practice of the donor 
having the upper hand in decision-making over closures attests to the reasons for the 
concentration of upward NGO accountability. This is because; donors have the ability 
to impose punitive measures on NGOs that are deemed to be unaccountable (Edwards 
and Hulme 2002; Ebrahim 2003a, 2003b; Unerman and O’Dwyer 2010).    
 
7.2.1.2.  Accountability Systems at KKP 
 
In assessing the influence of coercive forces on KKP’s accountability system, the 
study notes indicate that providers of resources are assumed to have significant 
influence / power to demand certain practices from organisations they sponsor 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Thompson, 1967). This suggests that in the sphere of 
accountability, for example, organisations depending on others for resources may be 
‘forced’ to use certain standards for financial reporting, disclose certain information 
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publicly or to identified recipients, adopt certain transparency mechanisms and so 
forth. In the case of NGOs, particularly those operating in developing countries 
settings such as KKP in Ghana, a key resource necessary for their functioning is 
financial and the providers of such resources are usually referred to as ‘donors’ 
(Anderson, 1998).  
 
The study observes that KKP is resource (financial) dependent on donors (Froelich, 
1999). This situation has continuously maintained the entity (KKP) in a position that 
makes it do anything that the latter (donors) demand in order to be seen as a ‘good 
student’ in donors’ eyes, which is essential for future funding, survival and growth. 
Specifically, donors are seen to ‘push’ through KKP’s accountability system certain 
types of reporting (both financial and non-financial), review meetings, disclosures of 
certain information and involvement (though limited) of some community 
representatives in the organisation’s activities.  A similar observation has been 
recorded  by Knacka and Rahman (2007).  
 
It is observed that in the Kunsusuman HIV Projects, for example, donors required 
KKP to organise review meetings with partners and peer educators to assess progress 
on those projects. As a requirement, KKP is further required by the donors to make 
available information on the amount of funding available on the projects to the 
partners and peer educators involved.  This provides some level of transparency on 
the part of KKP regarding its activities (Ebrahim, 2003b). Arguably, patterns of 
accounting and reporting on these projects are also ‘pushed through’ by the donors 
with almost no consideration from the organisation’s (KKP) side. In other words, 
KKP has no option other than adopting or complying with these standards or practices 
for fear of donors withholding or even withdrawing funding. Similar findings have 
also been reported in other developing country settings in the literature: for example, 
Assad and Goddard’s (2010) study of stakeholders’ involvement in two Tanzanian 
NGOs’ accounting practices concluded that the ability of donors to withhold 
resources from NGOs makes them the most relevant among other stakeholders. As a 
result, these researchers call for a reduction in the power of donors over NGOs on the 
grounds that, after all, donors need NGOs to achieve their objectives. 
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While this argument is true for the NGO sector as a whole, it does not seem to hold 
when it comes to the individual NGO taken in isolation. For example, in the retail 
industry, it is commonly argued that the customer is very powerful for the success of 
the industry but it is the ‘collective body of customers’ that such argument refers to, 
and not a single customer whose marginal spending is so insignificant that it does not 
warrant any important attention (Rossi, 1998; Assad and Goddard, 2010).  
 
In the context of Ghana where KKP operates amid thousands of NGOs, the 
organisation is perceived to be like a drop of water in the ocean. As such, it is 
observed to be at the ‘mercy’ of donors. Thus, KKP’s failure to listen and obey them 
would simply result in it being put aside and replaced by other competing NGOs. In 
fact, if considered through the lens of Etzioni’s (1964) categorisation of power, 
donors clearly hold a utilitarian power since the source of such power is the financial 
resources they provide to KKP to fund its operations through various projects. It is 
also tempting to argue in KKP’s context that donors are definitive stakeholders in 
terms of Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder framework because they appear to have 
power, legitimacy and urgent claims (through the provision of key resources that 
donors can withhold at will) over the entity. Even though they (donors) seem to have 
these three attributes, the study did not provide sufficient evidence to form a 
definitive conclusion on the extent of each of the attributes distinctively, especially on 
donors’ coercive influence on KKP’s accounting systems and more broadly its 
accountability relations.  
 
Some researchers posit that upward accountability does not create room for learning 
and sharing in a partnership and open environment and can have a damaging effect on 
the ability of NGOs to act as effective catalysts for social change as it concentrates 
too much on control functions at the expense of knowledge sharing (Dixon et al., 
2006; Ebrahim, 2003b, 2005; Edwards and Hulme, 2002a). The research also argues 
that as a result of donors’ influence, KKP’s accounting practices in terms of reporting 
formats, auditing, level of disclosures, number of words and so on had changed over 
time from its inception up to the time of the fieldwork just to meet donor 
requirements. Most of these changes in disclosures have been explained by KKP to be 
done in response to donor demands.  
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This satisfies Ebrahim’s (2003) explanation that coercive isomorphism can be legal or 
technical and can take many forms, including mandates, annual reports, standards, 
financial reporting requirements, and regulations (Powell and DiMaggio, 2012).  The 
influence of donors, whether local or international, on NGOs accounting practices 
change is evidenced in a few studies. For example, Assad and Goddard (2010) 
indicate that in Tanzania, donors are reported to have introduced several changes in 
accounting for the adoption of NGOs. The findings of this study, therefore, add to 
existing studies, although these studies were not primarily undertaken to provide an 
institutional understanding of the observed changes (Assad and Goddard, 2010).  
 
Within the realm of accounting, it emerged that Pannell Kerr Forster (PKF) has 
audited KKP’s accounts since 2001. However, it appears that the auditors only have 
to consolidate the accounts since each of the donors in KKP’s portfolio have their 
own preferred auditors as a condition for KKP to secure funding from donors. 
According to KKP, the use of several auditors to audit segments of their accounts is to 
ensure resource provision for sustainability.  
 
Some researchers argue that one of the risks of upward accountability is that it creates 
fear and anxiety amongst NGO’s management with the challenge to demonstrate 
‘performance’ (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b; Najam, 1996; Roberts, 1991).  Evidence 
gathered demonstrates that KKP’s interaction with several donors had led to the 
adoption of different auditing schedules and conditions, which hitherto was not the 
case. Since its incorporation in 2001, KKP used Ghanaian based auditing firms to 
audit their accounts annually. However, as a result of their dealings with different 
donors, the situation had changed completely over time. This is because each of the 
donors had managed to push through their preferred auditing firm (mostly 
international) to audit their portion of KKP’s total funds separately. At the time of the 
study, KKP had five (different) donors and virtually each donor used a different 
auditing firm to audit KKP.  This supports the evidence that there is imposition of 
performance evaluation, budgetary control mechanisms and accounting practices and 
policies by parent organisations on subsidiaries (Sedlak, 1981; Yazdifar et al., 2008; 
Yazdifar and Askarany, 2011). 
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In effect, before the main auditors could consolidate KKP’s annual accounts, five 
other auditors would have already audited portions of the same accounts. Although 
such an arrangement is a waste of time and effort on the part of KKP, the organisation 
(KKP) had to comply if they were to continue to enjoy a good working relationship 
with their donors. In contrast, even private sector organisation, irrespective of their 
operational coverage and financial strength, could engage the services of a single 
auditing firm to oversee the true and fair view of their operations. The question that 
needs to be answered is: what is the justification for KKP to solicit the services of 
several auditing firms just to audit a relatively small operation? This is possible 
because donors command much power within the NGO sector and are able to impose 
the implementation of policies even if such situations could bring untold pressures on 
others.  
 
An acceptable mechanism would have been the adoption of holistic accountability, 
which promotes a learning environment and gives NGOs the opportunity to report 
operational mistakes, learn from their mistakes and gain transferrable experience for 
future project improvements (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). Unerman and O’Dwyer 
(2010) argue that the challenge posed by lack of holistic accountability is that, in most 
cases, the rigidity of donor-led upward accountability scares NGOs from reporting 
any operational mistakes in projects for fear of future funds suspension or reputational 
damage. 
 
One other reason that has led to the coercive form of accountability between donors 
and NGOs (KKP) is the loss of trust and management credibility as a result of an 
increase in the level of corruption, mismanagement and fraud amongst NGOs 
(Ebrahim, 2010, Carr, 2000; Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Gray et al., 2006; Safire, 
2004; Trivunovic, 2011). In most cases, donors are remote from the activities of 
NGOs, including KKP, as in the case of Adabraka of the Netherlands. As a result, one 
option available to Adabraka, for example, to monitor and have tight control over the 
activities of KKP and to ensure the efficient utilisation of their resources to KKP, is 
the imposition of reports and disclosures. This happens against the backdrop of the 
break in trust between the most compelling group of stakeholders (donor agencies) 
and NGOs (Ebrahim, 2010; Gibelman, 2004; Gray et al., 2006). 
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It is also important to note that even where donors are somehow close to the activities 
of KKP, they (donors) still felt the need to coercively impose upward accountability 
mechanisms. Perhaps, donors continually impose these accountability mechanisms to 
have full control over the activities of NGOs and also because of the willingness of 
NGOs to accept imposed conditions unchallenged. The status of donors in the NGO 
accountability relation necessitates the constant demonstration of an NGO’s 
accountability credentials to donors as an assurance for the efficient allocation of 
resources. In fact it emerged that KKP always feels obliged to fully comply with 
donor demands.  A balance could be created if both downward and holistic 
accountability were adopted to encourage accountability dialogue amongst the various 
NGO stakeholder groups, promote beneficiaries’ empowerment and improve the 
effectiveness, transparency and sustainability of NGOs’ operations (Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2010). 
 
The research argues that the coercive influence of government on the activities of 
KKP was minimal contrary to what pertains in other countries. The Government of 
Ghana (GoG) on its own provide limited exclusive financial and other resources for 
the benefit of KKP, hence, had limited coercive influence on KKP. The main coercive 
influence of the GoG is the exercising of its regulatory control over the activities of 
NGOs in Ghana, in general and for that matter KKP in particular. However, the 
GoG’s regulatory power is not exercised effectively by the agency (DSW) tasked with 
that responsibility for logistical and other reasons. In effect, the coercive influence of 
government on KKP is limited.  
 
This finding is somehow contrary to what pertains in some developed countries 
(Chenhall et al., 2010). A research by Chenhall et al. (2010) undertaken in an 
Australian NGO ‘Carewell’ about social capital and management control systems 
revealed that contrary to what happens within KKP, Carewell and other Australian 
NGOs depend massively on the Government of Australia for the bulk of their 
funding: a situation that allows the government to coercively and easily impose 
conditionalities on Carewell and other NGOs in Australia. In fact, the ease with which 
the new public management (NPM) and other control mechanisms were introduced in 
Australia is an indication of the power of having access to resources and the wielding 
of coercive influence.  
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This suggests the existence of a direct relationship between the provision of resources 
by a dominant or compelling group of stakeholders and the relatively easier 
imposition of conditionalities on subordinates.  The difference in the findings is 
basically due to the main source of funds accessible by a particular NGO. Whereas 
‘Carewell’ and other NGOs in Australia, obtain the bulk of their funds from the 
Government of Australia, KKP heavily relies on donors. Thus, the difference in the 
research context, settings and location (developing against developed) and the source 
of funding could explain the differences in the coercive power of the different 
governments.  
 
It would be recalled that institutional theorists agree that whilst social actors might 
disappear, institutional structures exist to regulate societal behaviour (Giddens, 2013; 
Peters, 2000, 2011; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012).  The Department of Social Welfare 
(DSW) and the coalition of NGOs are the two main institutions that exert regulatory 
control to different degrees over the activities of NGOs in Ghana, including KKP. 
Whilst the regulatory role of the DSW is backed by law, and as such mandatory, the 
regulatory role of the coalition of NGOs is basically voluntary and self-regulatory in 
nature.   
 
The Department of Social Welfare (DSW) is the governmental agency solely 
responsible for overseeing the activities/operations of NGOs in Ghana: to ensure that 
NGOs operate within set regulations. In this regard, NGOs are required to comply 
with certain rules and standards, including among others, to register ‘a limited by 
guarantee’ organisation and to obtain/maintain a certificate of recognition to 
continuously operate in the country. In addition, NGOs are required to perform some 
periodic/annual ‘rituals’ like the submission of annual reports (audited accounts) and 
the renewal of their certificate of recognition as part of a contractual obligation 
between themselves and the Government of Ghana (GoG). In so doing, the GoG is 
able to monitor the social contract she has with NGOs and to impose sanctions where 
necessary on violating NGOs.  This conforms to the common thread linking the 
various types of institutionalism theorists: the existence of a higher or superior body 
that influences the operations of lower bodies operating under their jurisdiction and 
the recognition of the importance and persistence of structures in regulating social 
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behaviour (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Peters, 2000, 2011; Amenta and Ramsey, 
2010). 
 
Some institutionalists perceive institutions as having weaker structures with minimal 
effects on actors, whilst others see institutions as powerful structures that exert 
maximum influences on, and shape the behaviour of, social actors (Bjorck, 2004; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer, 2007, 2010; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012; Scott, 
2013).  However, the DSW is unable to play its regulatory role effectively and 
monitor the activities of NGOs nationwide due mainly to lack of resources (financial 
and logistical).  Indeed, this prevents them from identifying non-complying NGOs or 
to impose any meaningful sanctions on any NGO that violates set rules. In principle, 
any NGO that does not play by the rules is classified as ‘not in the good books’ of the 
agency and as such will have their certificate of recognition revoked by the DSW.  
This will effectively mean that the affected NGO could not operate anymore in the 
country. However, the lack of effective monitoring process cumulating from, among 
others, the lack of resources prevents DSW from exercising its mandate effectively 
and acting as a dominant force in regulating NGOs in Ghana. The springing up of so-
called ‘mushroom NGOs’ in Ghana is partly as a result of the inactive role of the 
DSW; and supports the argument that it is erroneous to assume that NGOs are 
unaccountable because of the lack of formal channels of accountability from the 
perspectives of private organisations (Gray et al., 2006; Smillie et al., 2013). 
  
As argued earlier, the primary view of new institutionalists is that society 
encompasses empowered, purposive, bounded social actors comprising individuals, 
states and organisations that operate therein; and that the social environment to a 
greater extent affects the behaviour of social actors (Meyer, 2007). It emerged from 
the study that although the media in Ghana is very vibrant and has the power to 
coercively influence the activities of NGOs (including KKP) their impact on NGO 
activities is very minimal and is basically informational in nature rather than to cause 
any accountability change. In fact, the media in Ghana to some extent are able to 
sensitise the Ghanaian public on the activities of NGOs (good or bad). Generally, 
their reportage either commends the good works of, and / or exposes the irresponsible 
activities of, some NGOs. To this end, most NGOs are somewhat scared of being 
victims of bad publicity from the media and seek to avoid that. However, the media 
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lacks the ability to cause ‘real change’ in NGO accountability relations.  This 
corroborates the argument that NGOs are different from private profit making 
organisations: as they are not profit oriented, they tend to interact more closely with 
their stakeholders and the environment within which they operate (Gray et al., 2006).   
 
7.2.1.2.  Mimetic Isomorphism and KKP’s Accountability Systems 
 
It would be recalled that organisations change as a result of influence of other similar 
organisations in their environment (refer to Chapter Five).  DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) see mimetic isomorphism as the influential forces that shape, in this case, the 
accountability relations within KKP via the act of benchmarking what is deemed as 
best practices either from within the NGO sector or from other sectors as and when 
necessary. The perception that the NGO sector is not accountable in comparison with 
other private sector organisations has raised the argument of forcing NGOs to mimic 
such acclaimed organisations.  However, there is the need to look at the argument by 
other analysts that NGOs are no different from other organisations, hence, formal 
analysis of stakeholders’ preparation of annual audited accounts and effective control 
mechanisms that apply to all other organisations should equally be applied in the 
discharge of NGO accountability (Gray et al., 2014). 
 
One major mimetic institution capable of influencing NGO accountability relation is 
the coalition of NGOs. In most cases, NGOs do not form coalitions; however, in 
recent times, the need for NGOs to form coalitions has been suggested (Abbu, 2014; 
Doh and Guay, 2006; Sidel, 2003; Songco, 2006).  For instance, in the Philippine, 
NGOs have developed a Network of NGO’s code of practice known as ‘CODE-NGO’ 
(Abbu, 2014; Hulme and Edwards, 2013; Songco, 2006).  This is the biggest 
coalition of NGOs in the Philippines and is assumed to be one of the first in the global 
NGO community (Abbu, 2014; Dressel, 2012; Sidel, 2003; Songco, 2006).   
 
Scholars theorise that mimetic isomorphism is the process by which organisations 
adopt and adapt institutional practices or the process of forcing member(s) of a 
population to behave and operate in an identical manner given similar environmental 
conditions: homogeneity is the outcome (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Dillard et al., 
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2004; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012).  Evidence gathered suggests that another 
regulatory group of forces capable of self-regulating the activities of NGOs was the 
‘coalition of NGOs’. The coalition of NGOs concept is basically the amalgamation of 
NGOs with a common purpose operating within a particular domain or sector like 
environment, education and health. The coalition concept is a relatively new 
phenomenon within the NGO sector that seeks to self-regulate its members to be good 
citizens. Several coalitions exist in Ghana, including: Ghana Coalition of NGOs in 
Health; Coalition of NGOs for the Prevention of Malaria; Ghana HIV and AIDs 
Network; and Coalition of NGOs in Water and Sanitation.  
 
Some of the benefits that accrue to coalition members include: a platform to 
collaborate and benchmark each other for best practices and to share accountability 
experiences (on financial and non-financial management and reporting, disclosures 
and stakeholder participation); an opportunity to exclusively access certain funding 
and project options; provision of recommendation and referral credentials to donors 
where necessary; opportunity for building capacity and the representation of members 
at certain forums with a common voice during policy engagement; advocacy; and 
resource mobilisation. However, the coalition has the power to expel members that 
‘misbehave’ from the group. The research argues that KKP ranks very high in terms 
of accountability among most of the coalition members as a result of which several 
other coalition members are encouraged to mimic KKP’s experience.  
 
KKP, has always been a good and active member, especially 
with regards to its accountability relations with its stakeholders. 
(C2)  
 
Some researchers argue that the essence of accountability is equivalent to the 
principal-agent relationship in which the principal holds the agent into account for 
their actions (Ebrahim and Weisband, 2007).  The study observed that, as a result of 
the perceived benefits to member NGOs and the ability of the coalition to dismiss 
NGOs with questionable characters, the coalitions of NGOs are able to exert some 
self-regulatory accountability pressures on its members via monitoring and evaluation 
to ensure compliance. In this regard, the coalitions of NGOs is able to regulate its 
members on diverse accountability issues via the demand for periodic reports and the 
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continual demonstration of high levels of credibility, accountability and the 
maintenance of cordial relationship with stakeholders. In fact, one major tool in this 
regard is the encouragement of coalition members to benchmark perceived good 
accountable masters. In some instances, the coalition is able to match accountability 
experienced NGOs like KKP with inexperienced ones for possible knowledge and 
experience sharing and for learning purposes.  
 
These forms of arrangements in effect breed accountability mirroring where 
inexperience NGOs are guided to account just like the others. Any member who is 
unable to meet the coalition’s demands is deprived of any credible third party referral 
or recommendation. In fact, the power of the coalition to expel members from the 
group and the consequences thereof, generally, inspires NGOs to maintain good 
relationship with the coalition and to be accountable.  This somehow negates the 
assertion that NGOs’ accountability is difficult because the variables involved are 
multiple, complex and diffused with limited tools for enforcement; and lacks a formal 
clearly defined constituent membership to whom they are required to be accountable 
(Burger and Owens, 2010; Ferejohn, 1999; Jordan and  van Tuijl, 2006; Kilby, 2006; 
Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2010).  
 
The research argues that the influence of donors on NGO accountability relations 
goes beyond coerciveness and that donors are able to influence the accountability 
relations of NGOs mimetically as well. It became evident during the interview 
process that donors sometimes instruct KKP to benchmark other NGOs deemed 
superior in some aspects of accountability and vice versa. These kind of mimetic 
interactions are referred to as “best practices” which NGOs, including KKP, are 
encouraged to adopt for purpose of accountability improvements irrespective of 
whether their strategies are acceptable or not. It emerged that a donor once mandated 
a potential NGO partner operating in the northern part of Ghana to understudy KKP 
for some best practice approaches on accountability relations as a prerequisite for the 
contract. This occurred because the donor had previously engaged the services of 
KKP and considered its accountability system ‘appropriate’.  Because the donor 
wanted the new partner to behave exactly like KKP this sort of arrangement was 
made just for that purpose. Had this potential partner NGO not heeded the donor’s 
advice, the donor would not have engaged its services. 
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Just recently, a donor we’ve worked with in the past sent another 
NGO from the Northern part of the country to come and 
understudy how we implement our projects and do other things 
including accountability. They came in for a week just to study 
us. So we took them through our best practice approaches… 
(MEO)  
 
Another institutional force that tends to influence NGOs accountability relations are 
professional firms. These institutions are able to impose formalities and standard 
operational procedures on organisations for adoption. With donors backing, 
professional firms mostly design the financial and other templates for use within KKP 
for data capturing, reporting and for disclosures. In some cases these bodies could be 
empowered to suggest changes and / or improvements to existing ones for adoption 
and subsequent implementation within the NGO sector. Such influences are mimetic 
in nature (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) as they generally impress on NGOs to 
abandon previously held practices in favour of ‘acceptable’ ones. The mimetic impact 
of professional firms on NGO accountability in Ghana is insignificant. However, 
evidence gathered demonstrates the impact of the international accounting firms to be 
significant. These firms do exercise some level of influence on the KKP’s upward 
accountability relations.  
 
As already indicated most donors are remote from project implementation sites, and 
to ensure the efficient utilisation of their resources employ and empower accounting 
firms to oversee KKP accountability process including,: templates design and 
implementation; and auditing of accounts and reports. Due to the high level of trust 
between donors and the accounting firms the implementation recommendations of the 
latter by the former is great to the extent that funds and other resources could be 
withheld from KKP if the latter says so.  
 
…they provide various reporting and accounting formats that 
must be adhered to. Donors usually take their reports as the 
‘gospel’ and therefore their recommendations are also taken very 
seriously. In certain cases they recommend withholding of 
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project funds, which is done by the donors until anomalies 
identified are corrected (PD). 
 
The operating structure of this arrangement is such that if KKP really wants to remain 
in the good books of donors and continue to have a good relationship with them, it is 
very essential to mirror perfectly the recommendations of these accounting firms and 
behave exactly the way they want them to. The impact of these accounting firms on 
KKP’s accountability relations to donors cannot be over emphasised and failure on 
the part of KKP to implement their recommendation wholesale could have serious 
consequences for KKP.  
 
…it is only when they [accounting firm] are satisfied with our 
reports that they advise/instruct JHU [the donor] to release funds 
to us. We [KKP] deal with JHU through a powerful intermediary 
[accounting firm]. FM. 
 
As explained above, professional firms, particularly the international accounting 
firms, are able to exert mimetic influences on KKP’s accountability relations towards 
donors.  
 
7.2.1.3.  Normative Forces and KKP’s Accountability Systems 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that normative isomorphism appears where 
societal pressures entreat organisations to adopt certain modes of behaviour and 
practices.  The study shows that, although the impact of normative isomorphism on 
the observed accountability within KKP was somewhat minimal, it still partly 
explains why KKP had come to adopt the observed accountability relations regulated 
by professional bodies via the use of rules and standards that must be abided by these 
organisations within the industry. The research argues that several ‘other groups’ i.e. 
institution including the media, local authorities, communities, opinion leaders, 
traditional authorities, volunteers, the Internet, and academic researchers among 
others have an impact on KKP accountability relations.  
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The study unravelled that the forces of the ‘other group’ to a greater extent have a 
minimal effect on KKP’s accountability relations, with the media as the main 
normative force. The media is one social institution capable of pressurising KKP to 
adopt certain practices particularly in their downward accountability relations. The 
media (print/electronic or voice) seeks to represent the masses and bring social issues 
into focus and in so doing pressurises NGOs to change their ways. In fact, the World 
Bank recognises the importance of CSOs and the media in the developmental efforts 
of Africa. This view was echoed by Bank’s Vice President for Africa, Makhtar, at a 
Civil Society Policy Forum dialogue session held in Washington for the World Bank, 
the IMF and over 50 CSO leaders from Africa (World Bank, 2014).  
 
Media houses abound in Ghana reporting on the activities of NGOs both positively 
and negatively. However, there is a perception that NGOs do not generally get the 
attention of the media unless they pay for coverage or when the news about them is 
negative (USAID, 2010). The Public Agenda newspaper, for example, reports 
extensively on NGO activities in Ghana (USAID, 2010). Most media houses have 
social media platforms including Skype, WhatsApp, and phone-in sessions that 
provide opportunities for communities to instantly report and discuss ‘unacceptable 
behaviours’ of NGOs on air publicly without fear. Although KKP as an organisation 
had not had the experience of changing its accountability practices due to societal 
pressures, interviewees particularly [PO3] recounted situations that other NGOs 
operating elsewhere in Ghana had to change course due to social pressures 
spearheaded by the media.  
 
An NGO was to distribute mosquito nets freely to a community 
but when they got to the ground they decided to charge each 
household one cedi (GHS). Apparently the community had 
earlier been told that the mosquito net distribution was free. This 
prompted huge community anger. However, the local FM station 
was able to pressure the NGO to rescind its decision and also 
apologised to the community for the lapses (PO3). 
  
Realising the power of the media to normatively influence NGO accountability 
relations, KKP is careful not to get to the wrong side of the media and are mindful of 
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the media’s perception NGO’s in general. The reason is that KKP and for that matter 
any NGO has no control on what other stakeholders report in the media.  
 
The normative effect of the media on downward accountability issues in Ghana could 
be improved in comparison to, for example, that of Ireland where Ministers and top 
management of NGOs openly debate and take an active role for improvements in 
downward accountability relations (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008). Efforts towards 
improving the influence of the media on, among others, NGO accountability in Ghana 
has recently intensified with the award of $2 million grant to 21 media outlets 
including 7 television stations and 11 radio stations by a multi-donor funding agency 
(Issah, 2013).  
 
7.3. KKP’s Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures 
 
This section examines the strategic responses adopted by KKP in dealing with the 
identified institutional pressures.  It would be argued that contrary to the assertion that 
organisations have non-choice options and passively adhere to established 
institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the counter argument that 
organisations actively respond/react to institutional pressures also holds (Crilly et al., 
2012; Elbers and Arts, 2011; Modell, 2001; Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010b). 
For example, in a study conducted within the health sector in Norway, Modell, (2001) 
argues that management proactively responds to institutional pressures of reforms in 
various ways using a continuum of possible responses (Oliver, 1991).  Relating this to 
the specific context of KKP, the study observes that KKP actively responds variedly 
to some institutional pressures as far as their accountability relations are concerned. 
KKP’s response to institutional pressures range from active conformance to partial 
resistance (Jamali, 2010; Munir et al., 2011; Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010b; 
Thorgren, at. al., 2012; Whelan, 2013). Evidence gathered indicates the constant 
application of strategic responses by KKP towards existing institutional pressures on 
their accountability relations.  
 
In effect and as observed elsewhere (Crilly et al., 2012; Elbers and Arts, 2011; 
Modell, 2001; Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010b), KKP generally develops and 
implements appropriate strategic responses to institutional pressures that are suitable 
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for their operations. This backs the argument that organisations actively respond to 
institutional pressures in diverse ways and do not simply accept the pressures 
passively (Boon et al., 2009; Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013; Oliver, 1991).  In fact, in a 
study involving 4,210 organizations in 70 districts, Brass (2012) argues that the siting 
of some NGOs in Kenya is strategically made in response to several factors, including 
easy access to both beneficiaries and donors. The implication of the findings to this 
present study is that the application of strategic response to institutional pressures 
varies.  
 
The existence of diverse institutional pressures necessitates the application of 
organisational distinctive characteristics and effective strategic responses, including 
negotiation for legitimacy and survival (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz and Block, 
2008; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012; Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010). The study observes 
that there was the use of all five strategic response options identified by Oliver 
(1991), at varying degrees within KKP. Specifically, KKP normally acquiesces, 
compromises, avoids, defies and manipulates institutional pressures on their 
accountability relations similar to what is documented in the literature (Batley, 2011; 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2004; Elbers, 2011; Modell, 2001; Oliver, 1991; Rauh, 
2010; Wallace et al., 2006).  Some of these responses have been enumerated below. 
  
It became clear during the interview process that KKP does not adopt accountability 
requirements as exactly as stipulated in their contractual obligations with third parties, 
particularly with donors. Evidence gathered demonstrates that KKP tries to ‘design 
ways and means’ to circumvent some of the imposed accountability requirements. 
Perhaps this is why Rauh (2010) argues that in spite of the power wielded by donors 
within the NGO arena and the imposition of upward accountability and other 
restrictive mechanisms, some SNGOs are able to strategically resist donor dictates 
via, among others, acquiescence, defiance and active negotiations (Canning and 
O’Dwyer, 2013; Elbers and Arts, 2011; Funnell and Wade, 2012; Pache and Santos, 
2010b).  
 
Generally, KKP actively acquiesces to institutional pressures towards their 
accountability relations primarily due to their reliance on institutional constituents, 
particularly donors and the GoG for operational and survival support. It was observed 
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that KKP mostly complies with donors’ reporting and other accountability demands 
(Burger and Seabe, 2014; Rauh, 2010). As part of their accountability mandates, and 
irrespective of the type of donor, KKP simply provides the required reports using 
prescribed templates in line with their contractual obligations. The willingness of the 
organisation to develop and timely submit reports and other documentary evidence to 
the most compelling group of forces to demonstrate their accountability compliance is 
unreal. The timely submission of such documents is seen as a ‘taken for granted’ 
practice (habit) within KKP to the extent that it is inculcated into the culture of the 
organisation. In fact, KKP has come to accept reports as critical for the compelling 
group of forces and a necessary ‘evil’ towards their continuous survival and growth. 
As a result, KKP has tactically inculcated report development and submission into its 
culture such that it is seen as a ritual passed on to new recruits:   
 
As an organization, report writing is part of our routine activities. 
Even without any pressure from donors, we write reports on 
every activity carried out. This has become an organizational 
culture and every staff that joins the organization acquires this 
habit/norm. In fact, during interviews for new staff, a 
requirement we look for is the prospective employees’ ability to 
write and submit reports on time (PO2).   
 
In addition, KKP tactically imitates some best-practiced accountable organisations in 
response to institutional pressures to enhance their funding/contract competitiveness 
and on their accountability relations (Jamali, 2010; Rauh, 2010). Occasionally, KKP 
strategically selects donors to partner in project implementation (Elbers and Arts, 
2011). KKP solicits inputs from other NGOs during the selection of volunteers. This 
approach allows them to avoid volunteers with questionable characters. Evidence 
gathered suggests the presence of a practice where KKP inquires from other NGO 
Coalition members with previous working relationship with certain donors. Such 
actions are strategically employed by KKP to reveal the accountability characteristics 
and requirements of donors and the eventual decision to apply for a project. These 
tactical selections have implications on KKP’s accountability relations, as they are 
able to select accountability compatible donors/volunteers and sometimes project 
locations capable of positively influencing their accountability relations (Brass, 2012).  
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The institutional accountability pressures and the number of constituents that KKP 
must satisfy are many and each has different and sometimes conflicting demands 
(Elbers and Arts, 2011; Fransen, 2012; Pache and Santos, 2010a, b). As a result, the 
organisation strategically responds to institutional pressures to minimize the effect on 
their accountability relations. There is pressure from donors for KKP to be upwardly 
accountable and from other stakeholders to improve downward accountability 
(Agyemang et al., 2012; Baur, and Schmitz, 2012; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012); a 
difficult dilemma that requires strategic response. As a result, KKP on the one hand 
promptly responds to constituents such as donors and the GoG who have the power to 
influence their accountability relations and on the other hand, appease the less 
powerful and unsatisfied stakeholders like beneficiaries (Elbers and Arts, 2011; Pache 
and Santos, 2010a, b; Raul, 2010).  
 
However, to minimize criticisms of beneficiary neglect, KKP tactically balances and 
sometimes pacifies these unsatisfied stakeholders via, for instance, the use of 
consultative community selection of project volunteers. The willingness of KKP to 
involve community opinion leaders in projects, the institutionalisation of community 
project teams and the collaborative selection and use of community volunteers are 
tactical attempts to appease neglected beneficiary communities.  
 
We select community volunteers in collaboration with opinion 
leaders to help us implement projects. At least it signifies our 
intention to involve them (FO7) 
 
Another way through, which KKP tactically pacifies neglected beneficiaries is the 
provision of the barest minimum information where possible, especially as they are 
not mandated to submit reports and make disclosures to beneficiaries. However, in 
their quest to satisfy beneficiaries, KKP tends to placate them with occasional report 
extracts.    
 
Similar findings about the use of compromise as a strategic option and their attendant 
tactics among reputable NGOs with multiple donor funding sources have been 
recorded elsewhere in the literature (Pache and Santos, 2010b; Rauh, 2010). For 
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example, Rauh (2010) reports of the ability of a Mexican NGO to successfully 
negotiate/bargain funding terms and conditions with donors because of their unique 
credibility characteristics. KKP has limited unique characteristics in the eyes of 
donors and are therefore, unable to bargain/negotiate effectively with them.  
 
Although KKP works with several donors on different projects, the decision and 
implications of adding donors/projects for their portfolio is tactically assessed and 
bargained to ensure that the organisation does not incur the wrath of existing donors 
or impact negatively on their accountability relations. KKP is more likely to sacrifice 
a project/donor if their inclusion will negatively impact on their operations.  
 
Similar findings are recorded elsewhere in the literature where some NGOs have 
rejected the temptation to apply for funding from perceived restrictive donors 
(Andrews, 2014; Elbers and Arts, 2011; Rauh, 2010). Such NGOs claim to be better 
off with limited and non-restrictive funding options than to be restricted in every stage 
of project implementation. For example, Rauh (2010) reports of the willingness of a 
Mixican organisation: Comité Fronterizo de Obreras to reject donors ‘unacceptable’ 
funding conditionalities even though the NGO seems to be struggling financially 
(Rauh, 2010). 
 
Evidence gathered suggests the limited use of avoidance as a strategic response to 
institutional pressures and the accompanying tactics in the operations and 
accountability relations within KKP. The organisation cannot simply avoid any of its 
compelling group of stakeholders because of their overreliance on them for resources 
for survival. KKP has limited scope to conceal non-conformance, loose institutional 
attachments and/or quit its operational domain. KKP has difficulties to hide or 
conceal its operations and accountability relations from the public domain. The ever 
presence of donors and their representative, the regulatory powers of the government 
and the existence of vibrant a media makes it impossible for KKP to embark on any 
meaningful avoidance strategy. In addition, the inquisitorial/policing attitude of 
donors, media, governmental agencies and other stakeholders make it virtually 
impossible for NGOs to shun their accountability responsibilities except to escape 
from the industry, something they are not willing to do. The requirement of the annual 
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renewal of operational/recognition certificates with the DSW to operate legally in 
Ghana makes concealment even more challenging for KKP.  
 
The inability of NGOs to conceal their operations from public scrutiny is perhaps one 
reason for the proliferation of ‘mushroom NGOs’ with no governmental recognition 
and operating illegally in Ghana. As a result, NGOs that are unable to cope with the 
intensity of the public scrutiny on their operation are compelled to quit the sector, 
change focus or operate illegally.  
 
In spite of the high levels of public scrutiny, KKP does not intend to quit from the 
NGO sector. This is because the organisation is committed to its founding principle of 
helping the poor and the needy. As a result, KKP occasionally, conceal its activities. 
It emerged from the study that KKP employ two types of employees: core 
(permanent) and casual. The core staff work with the organisation on a permanent 
basis irrespective of project availability whilst the casual staff are employed for 
specific projects. Sometimes, and depending on the project, donors might impress on 
KKP to employ new employees for specific positions. However, if KKP feels that an 
existing core staff can conveniently occupy such positions, KKP would conceal non-
conformance and present an existing core staff for the purpose. 
 
Evidences of the use of avoidance strategies and their associated tactics exist in the 
literature (Pache and Santos, 2010b; Wallace et al., (2006). For example, Wallace et 
al. (2006) unravelled the widespread use of decoupling tactics among NGOs. The 
researchers suggest the presence of massive disconnection between accountability 
reports sent by NGOs to donors and the evidential realities on the ground. NGOs 
made up values and assumptions and reported them as achievements but the reality on 
the ground was completely false and did not reflect the contents of the reports. 
Although decoupling (false claim) breed donor dishonesty towards NGOs, some 
NGOs strategically adopt it just to survive (Wallace et al., 2006).  
 
Similarly, researchers Elbers and Arts (2011) in their study involving 41 SNGOs in 
Ghana and India observed the constant use of avoidance among SNGOs as a strategic 
option with tactical manoeuvrings of selecting, rejecting and exiting in dealing with 
donors perceived as stringent and uncompromising in their project and reporting 
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requirements. Elbers and Arts (2011) argue that some SNGO were very selective to 
the extent that they even reject donor-funding offers or terminate existing ones where 
necessary. Perhaps, the difference in the findings could be attributed to the level and 
extent of donor reliance (Elbers and Arts, 2011).   They argue that when an 
organisation depends on donors for support, rejection as a tactic is not ideal but its 
adoption could send a non-compromising stance of the NGO to donors.  
 
It also emerged from the study that defiance and manipulations as strategic options 
are sparingly used by KKP in their accountability relations. The nature of most 
contractual obligations stipulated in the operational and accountability requirements 
make it difficult and sometimes impossible for strategic defiance or manipulation. 
One reason for this state of affairs is the dependence of KKP on donors for resources 
and on governments for operational rights, the lack of which KKP would cease to 
exist. The submission of mandatory and ad-hoc reports is necessary and non-
negotiable accountability requirements that cannot be easily defied or manipulated is 
adhered to. In fact, the organisation cannot defy donors and perhaps submit reports 
and other documents late. Delays are not permitted and their occurrences are difficult 
to contest no matter how genuine the excuse might be; their best bet is to negotiate. 
Similar observations were made by (Elbers and Arts, 2011) who recounts the inability 
of another Ghanaian NGO to defy or manipulate its main donor for fear of resource 
drought.  
 
This is contrary to what Wallace et al., (2006) observed in a study in South Africa and 
Uganda. The researchers identified that as a result of the hostile nature and approach 
of particularly some UK-based donors, some NGOs in South Africa and Uganda in 
particular strategically employed a range of defiance strategic options towards these 
donors, including the deliberate late submission of poor quality reports to register 
their displeasure. The difference in the findings in relation to that of KKP might be as 
a result of the level of their dependence on donors for support. Perhaps, the 
aforementioned NGOs in South Africa and Uganda did not depend so much on the 
donors concerned for the bulk of their funding needs. As a result the NGOs could still 
survive without the donors. However the same cannot be said about KKP, who are 
virtually at the mercy of donors. KKP depends exclusively on five donors and the 
withdrawal of any one could impact negatively on the operational capabilities of the 
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organisation. This explains why the organisation does not consider defiance as a 
strategic option. 
 
The closest KKP could get in terms of manipulating institutional pressures is when 
they ride on the wings of the coalition of NGOs as a collective unit to influence 
institutional pressures on accountability requirements. The option to belong to 
Coalitions of NGOs is a tactical move by KKP to seek protection from a bigger 
authority on accountability and other issues. The inability of the GoG to introduce the 
Trust Bill for example has been attributed to the collective efforts of some NGO 
umbrella bodies particularly, the Ghana Association of Private Voluntary 
Organizations in Development (GAPVOD).  
 
However, it was evident that KKP occasionally co-opt other institutional forces to win 
contracts:  
 
We sometimes co-opt other institutional constituents towards 
winning projects. Depending on the type of donor and the 
amount of contract money and the nature of project, we 
occasionally co-opt others just to meet donors’ expectations and 
requirements to win contracts. We have actually co-opted even 
former staff of donor agencies to support and lead us through 
some contract submission processes. (PD) 
 
Similar occurrences have been recorded elsewhere (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 
2004; Rauh, 2010). For example, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2004) report of the 
ability of some NGOs in India to contest some World Bank imposed reporting 
formats for a period of about 6 months until a consensus was agreed. However, 
manipulation is generally unlikely because of the level of dependence (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). 
 
In spite of the limited use of defiance and manipulation strategic options on the 
compelling group of forces, it was clear that KKP regularly defy and manipulate 
beneficiaries at any given opportunity.  
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Beneficiaries in the past have made very useful suggestions in 
terms of project implementation but because our hands are tight 
we also always ignore them. In fact, as far as donors get their 
reports and what they want, we are okay (CRPC). 
The above analysis shows that KKP is able to respond strategically to some if not all, 
of the pressures brought to bear upon it by its funders and regulators. 
 
7.4. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has presented discussion of the findings of the research on NGO 
accountability relations in Ghana, using KKP as the case organisation: the findings 
have been explained using available literature and theoretical frameworks. The 
chapter was organised under three main sections namely: an understanding of the 
accountability relations within KKP; theoretical explanation(s) to the observed 
accountability relations in terms of the effects of the institutional pressures on those 
accountability systems; and the strategic responses adopted by KKP in dealing with 
the identified institutional pressures. Evidence gathered suggests that the main 
‘compelling group’ of actors (donors) control major project decisions made within 
KKP. In addition, it was observed that donors again are the main actors behind the 
dominance of upward accountability practices within KKP because they control key 
resources required by KKP to function.  These notwithstanding, KKP are also able to 
devise certain strategic responses to mitigate the pressures brought to bear on its 
accountability systems.  The next chapter presents the conclusions where the key 
findings are related to the set objectives of the study.   







This final chapter presents the main conclusions, limitations, recommendations, as 
well as the direction for further studies. The chapter is divided into six sections. The 
first section discusses the overview of the study in relation to its motives and the 
research questions that the study sought to answer. Section Two reflects on the case 
study methodology and the research strategies adopted whilst Section Three focuses 
on the major findings that emerged out of the study. Section Four then looks at both 
the theoretical and practical contributions of the study to existing knowledge. Section 
Five of the chapter reflects on the personal experiences of the researcher throughout 
the course of the doctoral programme.  The chapter then ends with a discussion of the 
limitations of the study and the recommendations for future research in Section Six. 
 
8.1. Overview of the Study 
 
The main purpose of the research was to investigate the accountability relations 
within an NGO and how such an organisation will respond to various institutional 
pressures. The study uses an NGO in Ghana hypothetically referred to as KKP, as a 
case. To help the researcher achieve the research objectives and the reader to 
comprehend the direction of the arguments, some specific research questions were 
asked.  In this regard, a qualitative methodology and a case study approach were 
adopted (Bryman, 2008; Cavaye, 1996, Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Zucker, 2009). 
Empirical data were collected and the results interpreted through the lens of 
institutional theory particularly new institutional sociology (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Oliver, 1991).  
 
8.2. Overview of Research Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
 
The case study approach was adopted for the study due to its ability to satisfy the 
three main suitability tenets of qualitative research of describing, understanding, and 
explaining issues (Myers, 2013; Silverman, 2013; Yin, 2011). Thus, since the 
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objective of the research was to explore, describe and explain the accountability 
relations within NGOs, the use of a case study approach is justified.  
 
The methodology ensured completeness in observation and analysis of the socially 
constructed nature of NGO accountability from the perspectives of the various actors 
within their natural settings. It also provided the researcher the opportunity to 
understand the accountability relations within KKP via the use of several evidence 
gathering options including interviews, observations and documentary reviews in 
detail (Crowe et al., 2011; Gray, 2013; Ryan et al., 2002; Silverman, 2013; Stake, 
2013; Yin, 2014). 
 
The use of case study approach for research is generally criticised for time wasting 
(Cohen et al., 2013; Creswell, 2012; Yin, 2009) and to circumvent this criticism and 
make its application effective, the researcher made extensive use of interview 
schedules as a guide to capture data. Interviews were recorded using a tape recorder 
and by taking notes. The flexible nature of the case study approach allowed the 
researcher to reschedule interview appointments with interviewees, incorporate 
emerging issues and vary interview styles appropriately whenever necessary.  
 
The research adopted the new institutional sociology (NIS) to understand the effects 
of the institutional forces on KKP’s accountability relations (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983, 2003) and how KKP responds to these pressures. Whilst NIS argues that 
organisations passively reacts to the three main institutional forces namely: coercive, 
mimetic and normative, Oliver (1991) argues in her analysis of strategic responses of 
the active deployment of strategic options to counteract these pressures.  
 
8.3. Summary of the Major Findings 
 
The aim of the research was to examine the accountability systems of KKP and to 
explore their strategic responses to institutional pressures. As a result, this section 
summarises the main findings of the study. For easy reading and understanding, these 
major findings are structured along the same lines as the research questions (see 
Section 1.3) and discussed below.  
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8.3.1. What is the nature of accountability relations within the case NGO?  
 
8.3.1.1.  Upward Accountability in NGOs 
 
It emerged from the study that the accountability relations between KKP and the main 
compelling stakeholder i.e. donors is predominantly upward in nature. This 
observation is in agreement with existing literature as equally observed by other 
researchers who affirm the dominance of upward accountability as the most 
established accountability mechanism within the NGO sector (Agyemang et al., 2009; 
Burger and Seabe, 2014; Chenhall et al., 2010; Ebrahim, 2003a; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2008; Salkeld, 2009; Sinclair, 2010; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). 
 
The level and extent of KKP’s upward accountability obligation to donors is 
demonstrated via, among others, disclosures and reports, review meetings, external 
monitoring and auditing; however, disclosure statements and reports are the most 
uncompromising and widely used and is similar to what is observed elsewhere 
(Ebrahim, 2003b; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010).  
 
Disclosure statements are potential tools used by donors to select project-
implementing partners. As part of the initial process towards any possible project 
implementation, KKP is required to disclose certain information including legal 
status; membership in networks; annual turnover; and audited accounts among others 
in an ‘expression of interest document’  (appendix G) and failure to do so could ruin 
the chances of KKP securing such contracts. KKP disclosures to donors do not end at 
the initial expression of interest stage but continues throughout the course of the 
project implementation if KKP emerges as the eventual project implementer. Related 
to the use of disclosures is the submission of periodic (weekly, monthly, quarterly, 
half-yearly, and annual) narrative / activity and financial reports as well as ad-hoc 
reports to donors as a way of upwardly accounting to donors (Ahmed et al. 2011; 
Roberts, 2001).  
 
The narrative report describes the activities undertaken within a period towards the 
completion of the overall objective of the project and the financial reports provide 
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surety to donors in relation to the efficient usage of the assigned financial resources. 
In most cases, and as dictated by donors, such financial reports are sometimes 
scrutinised and certified by donor elected auditing firms before monies for subsequent 
project phases could be released to KKP. Similar findings have been reported 
elsewhere in the literature (Edwards and Hulme 2002; Ebrahim 2003a, 2003b; 
Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2010). 
 
KKP is required to submit such reports to demonstrate their commitment to contract 
implementation terms as well as the efficient utilisation of resources. In fact the 
reporting formats / templates as well as the frequency are mostly embedded in the 
contract with limited room for negotiations. This is in line with the views of other 
researchers who attest to the use of reports and disclosures as an upward 
accountability tool in NGOs and the inflexible nature of such reporting principles 
(Agyemang et al., 2009; Ebrahim, 2010; Jordan, 2005; Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2006). 
Donors do not compromise on reports and KKP have to fully incorporate donor 
comments (minor or significant) into their draft reports for it to be accepted as a final 
report. One can only imagine the volume of work that needs to be done as far as 
reporting is concerned. In fact there is a direct relationship between the number of 
donors an NGO has and the number of reports (contractual or ad-hoc) to be developed 
and submitted. KKP had five donors at the time of the investigation and each of these 
donors bring different formal reporting standards and requirements which eventually 
affect project implementation.  
 
It was observed that because KKP is mostly able to fulfil donor-reporting 
requirements, they are able to attract other funding options via donor referrals and 
other benefits (Goddard and Assad, 2006; Wallace, 2009).  
 
The upward accountability relations between KKP and donors are also demonstrated 
in the latter’s ability to demand pictorial evidence and also visit the former’s offices 
on their own or through an externally contracted agent including diplomatic missions, 
international auditing firms, and coalition of NGOs sometimes unannounced for 
verification purposes. In fact in most cases, KKP is mandated to share its work 
programmes with donors or their representatives for purposes of upward monitoring 
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and evaluation affirming the external and internal dimensions of accountability 
(Chisolm, 1995; Ebrahim, 2003b; Fry, 1995). 
 
It can be argued that because of the dual role played by the GoG in the operations of 
KKP either as a donor or as a regulator, the GoG is able to demand sometimes-
uncompromising upward accountability from KKP. The GoG is one of the major fund 
providers to KKP and like all donors is able to demand periodic/ad-hoc reports and 
other disclosure statements from KKP affirming the fact that NGO accountability 
could carry political connotations (Naidoo, 2004; SustainAbility, 2004). The GoG 
regulates the activities of all NGOs in the country via the DSW as a result of which 
she is able to demand full compliance to set regulatory standards and guidelines 
including the submission of annual reports and the annul renewal of operational 
certificates. The ability of the GoG to revoke certificates, annul benefits including tax 
exemptions, and impose punitive on measures on NGOs including KKP make them 
capable of demanding upward accountability from KKP (Ebrahim, 2010). 
  
8.3.1.2. Downward Accountability in NGOs 
 
Evidence gathered demonstrate that in comparison with upward accountability, 
downward accountability from either KKP or donors to beneficiaries does not enjoy 
the same level of prominence within the NGO sector. One of the main reasons for this 
state of affair is the lack of any serious donor commitment to ensuring its adoption 
and implementation and the view that the perceived benefactors of downward 
accountability i.e. beneficiaries have nothing much to bring to the table in terms of 
resource provision towards the effective operations of NGOs such as KKP (Assad and 
Goddard, 2010). The energy exerted by donors and other compelling group of 
stakeholders to ensure KKP complies with established and contractually binding 
upward accountability conditions is not exhibited in the case of downward 
accountability to beneficiaries.  The lack of donor commitment towards downward 
accountability culminates in the lack of the provision of any guidelines or any defined 
downward accountability format for use within KKP and other NGOs. In effect, there 
is no project contractual guidelines and enforceable mechanisms stipulating how 
KKP, for example, should account to beneficiaries. Considering the amount of power 
donors wield within the NGO sector specifically over KKP, they i.e. donors could 
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influence KKP and other project-implementing partners to render some level of 
accountability to beneficiaries (Kreidler, 2011). At best donors could encourage the 
flexible incorporation of identified issues observed downwardly during project 
implementation into upward accountability reports for the purposes of lessons learnt 
(Agyemang et al., 2009).  
 
Although KKP is not mandated in their contractual obligations with donors to report 
to or hold any meaningful review meetings with beneficiaries they (KKP) endeavour 
to do so no matter how small their effort may seem as in the Adwensan Community 
Health Community. This is so because KKP believes that there is a direct relationship 
between downward accountability to beneficiaries and project implementation 
success, a view shared by other researchers (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; 
O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2010).  
 
In that regard, as part of KKP’s organisational and operational philosophy and its 
mission, the organisation always strives to involve and account to beneficiaries at any 
given opportunity including: joint durbars; discussion; volunteering selection; the 
establishment of other community structures aimed at getting beneficiaries involved; 
community registers; the involvement of community project teams which mostly 
comprises representatives of the chiefs and elders of the community, opinion leaders; 
and the occasional provision of report extracts for beneficiary communities. KKP is of 
the view that it pays to actively involve the eventual recipients of any donor 
intervention. However, it is argued that the mere provision of project information at a 
durbar; the involvement of community project teams; the establishment of community 
structures; and other perceived downward accountability initiatives of KKP are sham 
(Najam 1996a). It can be argued that such measures do not reflect any meaningful 
community involvement in the real sense of it but as a means for KKP to indirectly, 
demonstrate its effectiveness to donors than to downwardly account to beneficiaries.  
 
It was revealed that donors pay lip services to downward accountability and have only 
recently attempted to show any commitment towards it via monitoring and evaluation 
initiatives (Andrews, 2014; Marilee, 2000; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). In fact 
because beneficiaries have no power, KKP’s efforts towards downward accountability 
are inadequate (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Burger and Seabe, 2014; Ulleberg, 2009). 
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This is in line with Najam’s 1996 assertion that downward accountability lacks the 
support and commitment from the powers that be, particularly donors; a view also 
shared by other researchers (Andrews, 2014; Assad and Goddard, 2010; Burger and 
Seabe, 2014; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). It is believed that donors are key to any 
improvements, in NGO accountability relations, particularly upward accountability 
and it is surprising why the same level of commitment and enthusiasm cannot be 
demonstrated towards downward accountability (Kreidler, 2011).  
 
In effect, on the question of the nature of NGO accountability relations in Ghana, it 
was revealed that it is predominantly upwards to donors and the GoG. NGOs 
unreservedly account to donors via the prompt submission of reports and other 
disclosures because donors are the main providers of the resources needed by NGOs 
to operate effectively. The reliance of NGOs on donors for virtually everything puts 
the latter in a supervisory position over the activities of the former culminating in the 
imposition of upward accountability mechanisms. Similarly, the regulatory powers of 
the GoG enable them to demand annual reports and other documents for the annual 
renewal of NGO certificates. The inability of NGOs to renew their certificate annually 
may deprive them of government support including tax exemptions and breaks.  
 
It was observed that, to the contrary, NGOs’ accountability to beneficiaries does not 
exist in any great extent. Beneficiaries are always at the receiving end of donor 
interventions via NGOs as a result of which they feel powerless to influence the 
accountability relations. This situation does not allow beneficiary communities to 
scrutinize the activities of NGOs within their communities.  
 
It is recommended that donors should show much more commitment towards 
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8.3.2. How are the accountability relations at KKP shaped by the various 
institutional forces? 
 
The study found that the institutional environment within which the NGO operates 
had significant influence on the observed accountability relations: upward and 
downward. Through the lens of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) new institutional 
sociology, the study identified the three main institutional isomorphic pressures: 
coercive, mimetic, and normative to be of influence in varying degrees on the 
observed accountability relations. Hussain and Hoque (2002), argue that 
governments, regulating agencies, and professional firms are some of the institutions 
that could exert such isomorphic pressures.  
 
Coercive forces apply where an organisation is forced to accept rules, standards of 
procedures and behaviours that otherwise would not be observed or undertaken. It 
was identified that KKP practices upward accountability systems in almost all aspects 
of their project implementation decisions because they are, to a large extent, coerced 
to do so by the most compelling group of stakeholders operating within the sector. 
Most of the major decisions in relation to projects undertaken by KKP such as project 
conceptualisation, selection of implementing partners, reporting formats and 
frequencies among others are highly influenced and controlled by donors mainly 
because they provide the necessary resources. Thus, although KKP is given the 
mandate to implement projects, they basically have minimal authority over the project 
implementation. It is clear that donors have the power to coercively ‘push through’ 
certain practices and standards including reporting and disclosures because of KKP 
reliance on donors for financial and other resources.  
 
In most cases KKP is coerced to comply with donor dictates for fear of funding 
withdrawal, and one way this can change is for KKP to limit its dependence on 
donors (Assad and Goddard, 2010). The ‘imposition’ of other donor-preferred 
auditors on KKP is an indication of the level of donor influence and the extent to 
which KKP can go to secure funding from donors. In addition, KKP’s dealings with 
several donors have led to the coercive adoption of auditing schedules and conditions, 
which hitherto was not the case. This is in line with the argument that coercive 
isomorphism could be manifested in several forms including the use of annual and 
	   250	  
other reports, standards and regulations, performance evaluation, accounting practices 
and policies on subsidiaries (Sedlak, 1981; Yazdifar et al., 2008; Yazdifar and 
Askarany, 2011). 
 
Another stakeholder that the research identified to exert a relatively lesser coercive 
influence on KKP is the Government. This is because, in comparison with donors, the 
government provides resource support for the activities of KKP. The main area that 
the Government could exercise coercive influence on KKP is through its regulatory 
wing: the Department of Social Welfare. However, in other parts of the world such as 
Australia and Russia, governments have a higher coercive influence on the activities 
of NGOs because they either provide much of the financial and other resource support 
(Chenhall et al., 2010; Kilby, 2006) or, as in the case of Russia, are suspicious of their 
activities. Thus, the research found that there does exist a direct relationship between 
resource provision and the extent of coercive force applied. 
 
The research found that a coalition of NGOs has the potential to exercise coercive 
pressures on member NGOs because of their ability to influence funding options or 
supply or deprive benefits to members.  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describe mimetic isomorphism as a force that influences 
organisations to behave similarly to a presumed ‘best practiced’ organisation via 
benchmarking. To ensure standardisation and improvements in members’ 
accountability systems, the coalition of NGOs is able to identify members with good 
accountability track records with the view to matching them with those with 
questionable accountability records for knowledge and experience sharing purposes. 
The essence of the matching arrangement is to promote accountability mirroring 
among members. The research found the coalition of NGOs to be a mimetic force 
capable of influencing KKP accountability relation (Abbu, 2014; Sidel, 2003; 
Songco, 2006). The coalition has the ability to identify coalition members with 
impeccable accountability records with the view to encourage others to emulate them. 
The mimetic influence of the coalition of NGOs is possible because of their ability to 
withdraw perceived benefits and also punish disobedient and non-complying 
members.  
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Another stakeholder/institution found to possess mimetic accountability influences 
are donors. The research found that as a demonstration to their mimetic isomorphism 
prowess, donors could instruct KKP to mimic others with perceived credible 
accountability credentials. Related to donor’s own mimetic influence on KKP’s 
accountability relations are the professional firms, particularly the international 
accounting firms, on KKP’s accountability relations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
With authority from donors, professional firms could be mandated to monitor and 
evaluate KKP’s accountability systems for possible updates or modifications, impose 
new accountability formalities, templates, and standard operational procedures as well 
as introduce new ones for KKP’s adoption. In effect, the professional firms do exert 
mimetic influences on KKP’s accountability relations towards donors.  
 
Normative isomorphism emanates from the influence of societal pressures that cause 
organisations like KKP to adopt certain modes of behaviour and practices in line with 
some acceptable societal norm (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The research found the 
media, local authorities, communities, opinion leaders, traditional authorities, 
volunteers, the Internet, and academic researchers to be the main normative forces 
that influence NGO accountability relations. The media, for example, use their 
available medium including print or voice to sensitise society to demand certain 
practices that hitherto were not practiced.   
 
8.3.3 What strategic responses are adopted by the studied NGO to cope with 
the institutional pressures? 
 
The study concludes that KKP applies different strategies in responding to the 
accountability systems imposed on it by its major funders, especially, donors. Thus, 
there was the use of all five strategic response options identified at varying degrees 
within KKP (Oliver, 1991). What this means is that KKP normally acquiesce, 
compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate institutional pressures on their accountability 
relations.  Similar conclusions have been demonstrated in the literature (Rauh, 2010; 
Wallace, et al., 2006) 
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The study concludes and argues that KKP actively respond variedly to some 
institutional pressures as far as their accountability relations are concerned. For 
instance, the study argues that KKP’s response to institutional pressures range from 
active conformance to partial resistance.  Indeed, does constant application of 
strategic responses towards existing institutional pressures on their accountability 
relations similar to conclusions documented in the literature (Jamali, 2010; Munir et 
al., 2011; Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010b; Thorgren, at. al., 2012; Whelan, 
2013).  The study concludes that KKP normally initiates and implement appropriate 
strategic responses to institutional pressures that are suitable for their operations.  
Researcher Brass (2012), has made a similar conclusion.   
 
The study concludes and argues that KKP does not adopt accountability requirements 
as exactly as stipulated in their contractual obligations with third parties, 
predominantly with donors. The organisation tries to design methods to sidestep some 
of the imposed accountability requirements. This corresponds with earlier conclusions 
(Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013; Elbers and Arts, 2011; Funnell and Wade, 2012; Pache 
and Santos, 2010b).  
 
The study argues that KKP purposefully, imitates some best-practiced accountable 
organisations in response to institutional pressures to enhance their funding/contract 
competitiveness and on their accountability relations.  That is to say that KKP is able 
to identify stringent accountability requirements and volunteers with questionable 
character(s) through a practice where KKP inquires from other NGO Coalition 
members with previous working relationship with certain donors.  This is equal to the 
evidence revealed by other researchers (Brass, 2012). 
 
In addition, the study concludes that KKP strategically balances and occasionally 
pacify unsatisfied stakeholders through the use of consultative community selection 
of project volunteers. Invariably, the willingness of KKP to involve community 
opinion leaders in projects, the institutionalisation of community project teams and 
the collaborative selection and use of community volunteers are tactical attempts to 
appease neglected beneficiary communities.  Comparable conclusion has been 
revealed in earlier studies (Rauh, 2010). 
 
	   253	  
Furthermore, the study argues that KKP cautiously use defiance and manipulations as 
strategic options in their accountability relations. The reality is that the nature of most 
contractual obligations stipulated in the operational and accountability requirements 
make it difficult and sometimes impossible for strategic defiance or manipulation.  On 
the other hand, the study concludes that KKP regularly defy and manipulate 
beneficiaries at any given opportunity.  This has a relationship with earlier 
conclusions (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2004; Elbers and Arts, 2011). 
 
8.4.  Contributions of the Study to Knowledge 
 
The study makes a significant contribution to knowledge, particularly in respect of 
practice and theory, as discussed below.   
 
8.4.1.  Contribution to Practice 
 
The importance of the study on NGO accountability relations and its strategic 
responses to institutional pressures in the specific context of KKP the case NGO in 
Ghana, cannot be overemphasized as far as the major stakeholders (donors, NGOs, 
GoG, beneficiaries and academics) are concerned. Ghana is a developing country with 
many developmental challenges that neither the public sector (GoG) nor the private 
sector alone can handle. In fact, the majority of the people depend on limited 
resources for survival (Cervantes-Godoy and Dewbre, 2010; Quaye et al., 2009; 
World Bank, 2008). In view of this, NGOs have over the years been supplementing 
the economic development of Ghana, through ensuring the provision of unmet public 
goods and services; and acting as the mouthpiece for the poor and marginalised in 
society (Yarrow, 2011; Weger, 2012).  To ensure compliance with regulations, donors 
and regulators of NGOs have instituted measures, including accountability 
mechanisms, to guarantee the judicious use of their resources, including financial, 
entrusted into their hands for the benefit of people in the beneficiary communities in 
the country and elsewhere (Agyemang et al., 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Unerman 
and O’Dwyer, 2012).  Different policies in this regard appear to promote an upward 
accountability and to a lesser extent, downward accountability as documented 
(Ahmed et al., 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Burger and Seabe, 2014).   
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While the introduction of such policies has better chances of survival in advanced 
countries or even in Europe, the findings of the study using KKP as a case study 
suggest that implementation of these policies in developing countries, including 
Ghana, is saddled with challenges.  Thus, due to implementation difficulties as a 
result of the complex environment within which NGOs operate in Ghana, these NGOs 
adopt certain strategies so as to be able to accept some aspects of the imposed upward 
accountability mechanism; while ignoring what appears to be unrealistic in terms of 
implementation.  Similar observations have been noted (Jamali, 2010; Munir et al., 
2011; Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010b; Thorgren, et al., 2012; Whelan, 2013).  
However, such a posture adopted by the NGOs could strain relations between them 
and the major stakeholders such as the government and donors.  There is, therefore, 
the need to provide a space for the harmonisation of accountability relations between 
NGOs and all other stakeholders in this environment.  This could be possible if 
attempts were made to devise accountability systems that have relevance to the 
specific context within which NGOs operate in Ghana.  This confirms earlier findings 
(Agyemang et al., 2012; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012).   
 
Thus, the findings of this study based on evidence and an in-depth knowledge and 
understanding of the accountability relations and strategic responses to institutional 
pressures, helps to provide some safeguards regarding the sustainability and survival 
of the NGO sector.  The findings also provide the basis for sustaining NGOs and 
serves as a platform for stakeholders to discuss suitable accountability relations for 
NGOs. This would ensure their continuous existence and ability to render 
unparalleled services to the less privileged people in society. For example, it emerged 
that there was minimal downward accountability within KKP and this highlights a 
major sustainability problem for NGOs in general and KKP in particular.   
 
Consequently, this study contributes to practice in that the researcher has discussed 
the findings of the study with the management of KKP (case study NGO) who have 
agreed to improve their own accountability process, in particular relating to 
beneficiaries. The management of the studied NGO has also agreed to share the 
findings with other members of the various coalitions to which they are a member. 
Again, the management of one coalition of NGOs has been briefed about the findings 
of the study, particularly regarding the need to rollout efforts towards the collective 
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sensitisation of its members towards improving beneficiary accountability within the 
sector. Thus, the study highlights the importance of developing an accountability 
system based on greater involvement of beneficiaries to ensure effective project 
delivery. Since beneficiaries are the eventual users of most donor-led interventions, 
their honest involvement in accountability issues could help reduce project 
duplication and wastage. This supports the findings of studies conducted by other 
researchers (Agyemang et al., 2012; Andrews, 2014; Burger and Seabe, 2014; 
Chenhall, 2012). For instance, the study emphasises that an active involvement of 
beneficiaries in the project’s conceptualization, implementation, and closure has the 
potential to reassure donors of the efficient and effective utilization of resources. Even 
though such initiatives have the potential to enhance transparency through effective 
accountability, previous researchers had not explored them in-depth (Edward and 
Hulme, 1996b; Fox and Brown, 1998). It is therefore suggested that the awareness 
created among some of the key project implementers, particularly KKP, could mark 
the beginning of a responsive drive that is aimed at improving NGO accountability, 
particularly to beneficiaries.  This agrees with the suggestion made by other analysts 
(Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Boomsma and O’Dwyer, 2014; Burger and Seabe, 2014; 
Hoque and Parker, 2014; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2012). 
 
8.4.2. Contribution to Theory 
 
Although new institutional sociology (NIS) had been used to explain findings of 
studies in other academic disciplines elsewhere (Burns and Nielsen, 2006; Dillard et 
al., 2004; Hopper and Major, 2007; Hussain and Hoque, 2002; Jalaludin et al., 2011; 
Moll et al., 2006a; Scapens, 2006b; Scott, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2006), it is among 
the few theories applied in studies on NGOs accountability. That is to say, NIS’s 
theoretical framework adopted to explain the findings of this study helped to provide 
an understanding of why KKP primarily practices upward accountability in 
comparison to downward accountability.  Thus, it helps to explain the influence of 
institutional forces i.e. coercive, mimetic and normative on NGOs’ accountability 
relations.  The application of this theory in explaining the findings of this study has 
shown that it could be applied successfully to explain such studies in the future.   
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Again, while NIS argues that professional bodies such as the IASB, ISO, lawyers, 
medicine and human resource professionals normally influence and promote 
normative pressures because of the power they command (Andrews, 2009; Antwi, 
2010; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012), the study found otherwise. In fact, it was 
discovered that the media, although not a professional body in the context of NIS, 
exert normative influences on the accountability systems of KKP. Furthermore, the 
study identified limited normative influences of the local authorities; district 
assemblies; community opinion leaders; traditional authorities; project volunteers and 
sometimes the various district directorates of health to somehow exert some subtle 
normative pressures on KKP. These realisations extend the NIS theory, particularly 
the normative forces elements to include the media and the other identified bodies. 
The definition of what constitute normative pressures therefore depends on the sector 
and context.  
 
In addition, the study contributes to knowledge in the sense that very few studies have 
examined strategic responses in relation to NGOs’ accountability systems.  Thus, the 
use of strategic responses to institutional processes as an extension to NIS has also 
helped to explain the reaction of NGOs to institutional pressures. This contribution 
negates the previously held assertion that NGOs are passive respondents to 
institutional pressures (Elbers and Arts, 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010b; Rauh, 2010).  
This helped to give a further understanding of how NGOs are able to devise strategies 
to deal with pressures brought to bear on them while at the same time showing 
diplomacy towards major funders such as donors and the government.  
 
Therefore, the study makes a major contribution to knowledge in terms of theory. For 
instance, while the NIS as a theoretical framework was used to explain how 
institutional forces impact on the accountability relations within the NGOs sector in 
Ghana, the strategic response argument also helps further to explain how NGOs could 
also initiate their own suitable responses to deal with such pressures. Furthermore, it 
is suggested that other agents that are outside the remit of ‘professional bodies’ such 
as the media could exert normative pressures on NGOs. Crucially, the study 
contributes to knowledge by arguing that there is the need to extend NIS to include 
strategic responses so as to ensure a balanced assessment of NGOs’ accountability 
systems. The adopted approach ensures complementarity between the two theoretical 
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frameworks.  Thus, complementarity is enhanced when NGOs adhere to the 
accountability mechanisms imposed on them by their funders and are able to react to 
same to ensure some leverage in their relationships.   
   
Generally, the research is significant to academicians both as a research support / a 
point of reference and for provoking ideas for further research.  Future researchers 
could either identify the limitations to this study to assess them or build upon the 
contributions of this study to the academic discipline that it relates to in their own 
research.   
 
8.5.  Limitations of the Study 
 
The first limitation to the study was the challenge encountered in gaining access to the 
case study site to conduct the field study.  Prior to going to the field, the researcher 
had followed the due diligence process and had formally and informally contacted the 
management of the case study organisation to explain the purpose of the research. 
However, on arriving at the site, the management rescinded their decision and 
deprived the researcher access citing publication concerns, among others. This 
necessitated the researcher to quickly arrange an alternative case to conduct the 
research. Apart from delaying the data collection stage of the research process, the 
withdrawal of the initial case organisation from the research did not affect the 
research in any way since the management and staff of the second case study 
organisation provided unlimited access to the researcher and also made available all 
the relevant documentary evidence requested. Besides, the second case study 
organisation was equally good in terms of the selection criteria for qualified NGOs for 
the research.   
 
The second limitation to the study was the difficulties in making appointments with 
interviewees and the difficulties encountered in organising focus group discussions. 
The challenge faced by the researcher during the course of the research was the actual 
conduct of the fieldwork itself. Once access was granted, the researcher agreed 
interview schedules with the identified interviewees. This notwithstanding, some 
interviewees had to reschedule their interviews at the last minute or could not spend 
the stipulated time with the researcher due mainly to other work commitments, 
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particularly ad-hoc reporting demands. Where time to interview became an issue, the 
researcher ensured that the salient questions were discussed first.  
 
In addition, the organisation of the focus group discussions was challenging as some 
identified participants were either not well or had not as yet returned from their daily 
activities at the time of the exercise. The researcher was able to circumvent these 
challenges such that it had no effect on the findings of the research. The Greater 
Accra focus group meeting for example had to be rescheduled on two occasions to 
accommodate for ill health and lateness. The researcher was patient and flexible 
enough to readjust his time to circumvent the challenges posed by interviewees to 
achieve his objectives.  To ensure that the quality of the interviews/focus group 
discussion was not compromised, other information gathering sources, including 
documentary reviews were used to supplement where possible.  
 
Related to the above limitation was the issue of gaining access to the other institutions 
and donor representatives to organise interviews. The nature of the research 
participants selected necessitated that the researcher interviews some of the donor 
representatives and other governmental agencies like the Department of Social 
Welfare.  However, gaining access to some of these establishments was quite 
challenging but with perseverance the researcher was able to overcome these 
challenges and was able to interview the authorities involved.   
 
The use of an interpretive case study in a single NGO may impose some limitations 
on the results of the study since case studies in general do not support the 
generalisation of research findings to the general population. Although, the research 
on NGO accountability relations offers in-depth insights, its findings cannot easily be 
replicated in other organisational settings. Since the researcher used the case study 
approach for this research, it presupposes that generalising the findings to other NGOs 
may not be appropriate. However, the use of KKP is large enough to represent the 
other NGOs operating in Ghana, and to help affirm theoretical/analytical 
generalisation (Scapens, 2004; Yin, 2009) as opposed to statistical generalisation.  
 
A complementary limitation emanating from the use of interpretive case study for the 
research was the likelihood of introducing subjective interpretation and biasness of 
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the researcher into the data analysis process. However, the adoption of a system of 





8.6. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
For the identified limitations to be overcome, further research might be required to 
address them as discussed below.  
 
Since the findings of the research on NGO accountability relations and their strategic 
responses focused on a detailed investigation of a single NGO in Ghana, generalising 
the findings may not be appropriate because of the nature of the sample size, thus 
impacting on the validity of the research findings.  As a result, there is the need for 
further replication of the studies in other NGOs to substantiate or otherwise, the 
findings of this study for possible generalisation.  
 
The research found that the coalitions of NGOs could have a significant role to play in 
shaping the accountability relations as well as the strategic responses of NGOs. The 
coalition of NGOs concept is a relatively new phenomenon within the NGO sector 
and there is the need for a detailed study into the specific impact of NGO coalitions 
on NGO accountability relations. 
 
Another area worth further investigation is the influence of the media on NGO 
accountability relations. The level of media involvement in all aspects of life is on the 
increase. The media are seen to play an active advocacy role in shaping NGO 
accountability issues and it will be interesting to investigate the extent of their 
influence on NGOs. 
 
It has been suggested that beneficiary communities are reluctant to partake willingly 
in downward accountability relations for several reasons, including lack of requisite 
skills, and low levels of education and commitment (Agyemang et al., 2009; Manor, 
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2011; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2009). These claims need to be further investigated to 
determine their authenticity and credibility.  
 
Research into why donors and the other compelling group of stakeholders are 
reluctant to fully support downward accountability relations despite claims that the 
adoption of it could improve aid and other deliveries for the poor and marginalised 
people in society particularly, in Africa and other developing countries.   
 
Finally, research into the collective design and implementation of an accountability 
mechanism with the potential of serving the needs of all stakeholders is 
recommended.  
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Assistance (ODA) Agencies 
• Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAID) 
• Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
• Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ/Germany) 
• Department for International Development (DFID/UK) 
• European Union (EU) 
• Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
• Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) 
• United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
United Nations Agencies • International Labor Organization (ILO) 
• United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
• United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
• United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) 
• United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
• World Health Organization (WHO) 
• United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) 
Multilateral Development 
Banks 
• African Development Bank (based in Cote d'Ivoire but on Temporary 
Relocation to Tunis, Tunisia) 
• Asian Development Bank (based in the Philippines) 
• European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (based in the United 
Kingdom) 
• Inter-American Development Bank (based in the United States) 
• Islamic Development Bank (based in Saudia Arabia) 
• Japan Bank for International Cooperation (based in Japan) 
• World Bank (based in the United States) 
International Foundations • Asian Development Trust (Japan) 
• W.K. Kellogg Foundation (United States) 
• Kaiser Family Foundation (United States) 
• Ford Foundation (United States) 
• Bernard van Leer Foundation (Netherlands) 
• Fundación CODESPA (Spain) 
• John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (United States) 
• Rockefeller Brothers Foundation (United States) 
• Wellcome Trust (United Kingdom) 
• Fondation de France (France) 
• Fondation Roi Baudouin (Belgium) 
• Soros Network of Foundations/Open Society (United States) 
• Aga Khan Foundation (Switzerland) 
Global Corporations • ABB ASEA Brown Boveri Ltd., (Switzerland) 
• Aegon NV (Netherlands), Bertlesmann AG (Germany) 
• Robert Bosch (Germany) 
• Citibank (United States) 
• Coca-Cola (United States) 
• Deutsche Bank (Germany) 
• H. B. Fuller (United States) 
• Honda (Japan) 
• Grand Met (United Kingdom) 
• Imetal (France) 
• Levi Strauss & Company (United States) 
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• Microsoft (United States) 
• J.P. Morgan (United States) 
• Odebrecht (Brazil) 
• Shell (Netherlands) 




• ActionAid (United Kingdom) 
• CARE (United States) 
• Concern Worldwide (Ireland) 
• Helvetas (Switzerland) 
• Intermon (Spain) 
• Norwegian People's Aid (Norway) 
• Groupe Developpment, (France) 
• Medecins Sans Frontieres (France) 
• Oxfam (United Kingdom) 
• PLAN International (United Kingdom) 
• Save the Children (United States) 
• Terra des Hommes (Swizerland) 
International Church-Based 
or Religious Organizations 
• Adventist Development and Relief Agency (United States) 
• Christian Aid (United Kingdom) 
• Caritas (Germany) 
• Catholic Relief Services (United States) 
• Evangelische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshife 
• EZE (Germany) 
• Interkerkelijke Organisatie Voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
(Netherlands) 
• Brot für die Welt (Germany) 
• World Vision (United States) 
 
Source: Researcher’s own construct 
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Appendix C: Interview Schedule 
 
No Designation Day/Date Time Duration 
1 Programmes Director of KKP (PD) Monday, 2nd April 2012 09:00 – 11:00 120 minutes 
2 Regional Accounts Officer (RAO) Wednesday, 4th April, 2012 14:00 - 15:00 60 minutes 
3 Finance Manager of KKP (FM) Wednesday, 4th April 2012 08:00 - 09:20 80 minutes 
4 Central Regional Programme Coordinator of KKP (CRPC) Monday, 9
th April 2012 07:00 - 09:00 120minutes 
5 Greater Accra Regional Programme Coordinator (GARPC) Tuesday, 10
th April 2012 08:00 - 09:30 90 minutes 
6 Project Officer (PO1) Tuesday, 17th April 2012 08:00 -09:00 60 minutes 
7 Field Officer (FO1) Tuesday, 17thApril 2012 15:00 – 16:05 65 minutes 
8 Senior Officer of the Registrar General’s Department (SORGD) Monday, 23




9 Director of the Department of Social Welfare (DDSW) Monday, 23




10 Field Officer (FO2) Friday, 27th April 2012 9:00 -10:20 80 minutes 
11 Project Officer (PO2) Friday, 27th April 2012 12:00 -13:10 70 minutes 
12 Field Officer (FO3) Wednesday, 2nd May 2012 10:00 - 10:40 40 minutes 
13 Project Officer (PO3) Wednesday, 2nd May 2012 14:00 -15:20 80 minutes 
14 Executive Director of KKP (ED) Thursday, 10th May 2012 11:00 - 12:30 90 minutes 
15 Project Officer (PO4) Monday, 14th May 2012 11:00 – 12:10 70 minutes 
16 Field Officer (FO4) Monday, 14th May 2012 14:00 - 14:50 50 minutes 
17 Project Officer (PO5) Thursday, 17th May 2012 09:00 - 09:40 40 minutes 
18 Field Officer (FO5) Thursday, 17th May 2012 12:00 -13:00 60 minutes 
19 Project Officer (PO6) Monday, 21st May 2012 16:30 - 17:20 50 minutes 
20 Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (MEO) Wednesday, 23
rd May 2012 13:00 - 15:00 120 minutes 
21 Field Officer (FO6) Thursday, 24th May 2012 12:00 -12:50 50 minutes 
22 Field Officer (FO7) Thursday, 24th May 2012 15:00 - 16:00 60 minutes 
23 Field Officer (FO8) Wednesday, 16th May 2012 14:20 -15:20 60 minutes 
24 Field Officer (FO9) Wednesday, 30th May 2012 07:00 - 07:50 50 minutes 
25 Field Officer (FO10) Wednesday, 30th May 2012 09:07 – 09:30 23 minutes 
26 Field Officer (FO11) Tuesday, 5th June 2012 12:20 -13:00 40 minutes 
27 Field Officer (FO12) Tuesday, 5th June 2012 13:00 - 13:45 45 minutes 
28 Programmes Director – PD (2nd Time) Friday, 15th June 2012 11:00 - 12:30 90 minutes 
29 Senior Member of an NGO Coalition (C1) Monday, 18
th June 2012 09:00 - 10:40 100 minutes  
30 Chief Executive of an NGO Coalition (C2) Wednesday, 20
th June 2012 11:00 - 13:10 130 minutes  
31 
Senior Officer of Ghana Association of 
Private Voluntary Organisations in 
Development (GAPVOD) 
Friday, 22nd June 2012 11:00 - 12:10 70 minutes  
32 First Donor (D1) Monday, 25th June 2012 09:00 -11:00 120 minutes 
33 Second Donor (D2) Friday, 29th June 2012 12:00 -13:20 80 minutes 
34 Focus Group 1 Friday, 6th July 2012 15:00 - 18:00 180 minutes 
35 Focus Group 2 Thursday, 12th July 2012 14:00 - 16:00 120 minutes 
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Appendix D: Interview Guides 
 
Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) accountability systems and the strategic responses to 
the institutional pressures on their accountability systems. 
 
Introduction 
The questions below served only as a guide for the engagement of participants’ 
towards the research on accountability systems of NGOs: case study from Ghana. 
Reactions from participants will be treated as confidential and their responses will 
only be summarised as evidence for the research.  
 
The participants 
The participants for the research were all adults with in-depth practical knowledge on 
NGO operations. A total of thirty-five (35) participants with knowledge in NGO 
operations were involved in the research process.  
 
The participants were selected with the following criteria in mind: 
 
Participants Inclusion/Exclusion criteria 
1. An adult with high intellectual ability, an extensive knowledge in NGO 
operations and must be willing to take part in the research. 
2. Must be a key personnel within the organisation - Directors, Finance 
Managers, Programme Directors, Project officers, functional heads and other 
senior managers. 
3. Focus group members must come from communities that have benefited from 
some NGO intervention(s). 
4. Donors/employees of donor agencies. 
 
Interview Guide: KKP 
1. What project(s) are you implementing currently? 
2. Who are your main donors/funders? 
3. What is your relationship with these donor agencies? 
4. To what extent do these donor agencies involve your NGO in project’s 
selection decisions, planning and implementation? 
5. How are project(s) selected, planned and implemented? 
6. What is the level of management involvement in project decisions? 
7. Are there any specific issues that these donor agencies involve your NGO in?  
8. Do donors set certain conditions that must be met? 
9. What happens if you are unable to meet these set conditions? 
10. What are the some of the benefits of meeting these conditions? 
11. What are the basic types of reports and other documents generally demanded 
by donors? 
12. How different are these reports and other documents among the various 
donors? 
13. What form does the various reports take? 
14. Who do you provide your reports to? Are there other establishments? 
15. How do you obtain the templates / formats for the various reports? 
16. Do your donors in anyway restrict the areas and levels of your operational 
activities?  
	   325	  
17. Do donors or their representatives visit your NGO during project 
implementation?  
18. How frequent/often are these visits? 
19. How do you demonstrate to your donors that you are performing as schedule? 
20. Does this demonstration differ from donor to donor?  
21. Have you ever designed/suggested projects for donors to fund? What was the 
outcome? 
22. Does KKP involve beneficiaries in project decisions: planning, 
implementation, evaluation? 
23. If yes, what is the level of involvement? 
24. Is there any way you report to beneficiaries? If so how? 
25. How do you ensure accountable to beneficiary communities of the project? 
26. What structures are in place to ensure effective project implementation and 
beneficiary accountability? 
27. Does your NGO collaborate/partner with other local NGOs on projects 
implementation?  
28. If yes, what is the relationship between your NGO and these local NGOs? 
29. To what extent do you involve these local NGOs in project’s selection 
decisions, planning and implementation? 
30. Why do you practice such accountability system? 
31. Do you think the environment within which your NGO operate have any 
influence on your accountability systems?  
32. What are some of the institutions within the environment that affect your 
accountability relations?   
33. Does the NGO belong to any organised professional or regulatory group?  
34. What role does such groups in your operations?  
35. What benefits do you obtain for being a member? 
36. What is the effect of such professional/regulatory groups on your 
accountability systems?  
37. To what extent does professional bodies influence your decisions?  
38. Do the government or any group tend to impose conditions on your 
operational activities?  
39. To what extent are you made to benchmark other organisations? 
40. Could you please tell me how the performance of your NGO is measured? 
41. What is the relationship between the performance of your NGO and donor 
funding policies?  
42. Do you think regulation and legislation have any effect on your NGOs 
accountability systems? 
43. If yes, how does regulation and legislation affect your organisation? 
44. Are there any differences in the accountability requirements of the different 
sources of funding available and the projects that are supposed to be funded?  
45. Does your organisation belong to other organisation? 
46. Has beneficiaries’ ever-proposed project(s) that they feel could help them to 
an NGO/donor for implementation? 
47. What was the outcome of such beneficiary project initiative(s) 
48. Do you just accept and do whatever the donor tells you? If no how…. 
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Interview Guide: Donor Representatives 
1. What are some of the projects funded (past and present)?  
2. How do you call for proposals from NGOs – newspapers, advertise etc.?   
3. Please describe the processes including documents required used in selecting 
NGOs for funding? 
4. Do you involve partner NGOs in project selection, planning and 
implementation or you just do it yourselves and call for proposals? 
5. As a donor, how do you ensure partner NGOs are accountable? 
6. What is the frequency of reporting/other documentations – weekly, 
monthly…? 
7. What sanctions are available if reports and other documents from NGOs are 
late or an M&E visit reveals that an NGO is not accountable to donors? 
8. Is there any case in point where an NGO is sanctioned for not delivering the 
required reports or not doing something right (contract termination, non-
renewal etc.)? 
9. Does any external body like the Accountancy professional have any role to 
play in ensuring that partner NGOs are accountability to your organisation? 
10. How do you ensure that NGOs are accountable to beneficiaries of the project? 
11. Do you mandate partner NGOs to produce any reports or other documentation 
to the beneficiary communities? Please explain 
12. How do you ensure that partner NGOs do what you require? 
13. Do you solicit the services of other bodies in that regard? 
 
Interview Guide: Department of Social Welfare (DSW) 
1. How is NGO defined in the context of Ghana? 
2. What categories of NGOs operate in Ghana? 
3. What does it take for an organisation to operate as an NGO in Ghana? 
4. Could you please describe the process/mode of registration? 
5. Is registration temporal or permanent? 
6. What does it take to renew an Ngo certificate? 
7. Roughly how many NGOs are registered to operate in Ghana at the moment? 
8. How does the agency monitor all these NGOs to ensure compliance? 
9. What does your agency do to registered NGOs that decide not to renew their 
registration? 
10. What are some of the challenges faced by your department in regulating 
NGOs and performing your activities efficiently? 
  
Interview Guide: NGO Coalition 
1. What are the main objectives of the Coalition? 
2. How is the coalition regulated? 
3. Is membership to the coalition compulsory? 
4. What does it take to become a member of the coalition? 
5. How are member NGOs regulated? 
6. What are some of the benefits that accrue to member NGOs? 
7. Are there any sanctions for members who ‘misbehave’? 
8. Is the coalition able to secure funding/projects from donors for member 
NGOs? 
9. Describe the processes involved in securing funding/projects for members? 
10. How are members selected to partner the coalition in the implementation of 
donor-secured projects?  
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11. How do you ensure effective accountability from member-NGOs to the 
coalition? 
12. How does the coalition ensure that members are accountability to 
beneficiaries? 
13. What is your relationship with the external institutions within which you 
operate?  
14. How does the above bodies contribute to NGO accountability? 
 
Interview Guide: Focus Group 
1. What are the main economic activities in this area? 
2. How did you get to know this NGO in this community? 
3. Do you know of any projects undertaken by an NGO? 
4. How do you see the influence/impact of NGOs in the area? 
5. Are you aware of any project undertaken by any Ngo in this community? 
6. How useful was this project to you? 
7. Did the project meet your needs? 
8. Were you involved/consulted in anyway before the commencement or during 





9. If yes to any of the above, what was your level of involvement? 
10. Did you know how much the project costs? 
11. What about the duration of the project? 
12. Did the NGO concern give you any form of report or other documentation in 
relation to the project?  
13. What was the relationship between the project officers and you? 
14. Were there something else you would have preferred or suggested if you were 
consulted? 
15. What was your relationship with the project officer(s) associated with the 
project? 
16. How did they account to you? 
17. Did you take part in any project(s) review meetings? 
18. Were you involved in the project(s) closure? 
19. Did you receive any report or document in relation to the project(s) during the 
course or after the project (s)? 
20. Did you ever get the chance to read any report from these officers/sources? 
21. What could have been done differently? 
22. Did you know who was behind the project in terms of support provision 
(financial and logistical)? – Donors 
23. Did you ever get the chance to meet those behind the project? If yes how often 
and what did they come to do? 
24. In your view, how should the relationship between the NGO and you be? 
25. In your view, how should the relationship between the sponsor of the project 
and you be? 
26. What could have been done differently in the project implementation? 
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EXHIBIT A 
TO SERVICE AGREEMENT 
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Appendix F: Eligible Criteria 
 
Eligibility Criteria 
• Should be able to state clearly the results and outcomes that will be achieved 
from the project. 
• Demonstrate a track record in delivering results and timely reports; 
• Must be legally registered in Ghana; 
• Must demonstrate standards of good organisational governance; 
• Must practically demonstrate real and actual inclusion/diversity and gender 
sensitivity across the organisation; 
• Must have appropriate procedures for (financial/administrative) management, 
monitoring and reporting; 
• Must show at least two previous annual statements of accounts audited by a 
suitably certified person(s) or body; 
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Project Number and Title  
Duration  
Latest Approval   
Location  
Strategic Theme and Result Area*  
Executing Agency  
Government Implementing Agency   
Total Budget  
In-Kind Contributions**    
 








Contributions to Results Achievement: 
 
 












Results achieved based on indicators: 
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III. Risk Analysis (Assumptions) 
 




IV. Project Management 
 










VI.      Evaluation 
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RESULTS FRAMEWORK TEMPLATE 




Lead Organisation’s Name: 
 
Name of Coalition/Network (if applicable):  
Project Title:  
 
Overall Expected Outcome: 
What you hope to achieve by the end of this project 
 
Overall Baseline: 
What is the existing situation by which your overall 
outcome(s) can be measured or compared 




An intermediate outcome that is critical to 
achieving the overall objective 
 
Baseline for Result 1: 
What is the existing situation you seek to improve? 
 
Year 1 :  
Milestone 1 (quarter 
one) 
Disaggregate your 
results by gender and/or 
social group as 
appropriate 
Milestone 2 (quarter 
two) 
Disaggregate your 
results by gender and/or 
social group as 
appropriate 
Milestone 3 (quarter 
three) 
Disaggregate your 
results by gender and/or 
social group as 
appropriate 
Target (quarter four) 
What is the cumulative 
result for each year 
 
Year 2 :  
Milestone 1 (quarter 
one) 
Disaggregate your 
results by gender and/or 
social group as 
appropriate 
Milestone 2 (quarter 
two) 
Disaggregate your 
results by gender and/or 
social group as 
appropriate 
Milestone 3 (quarter 
three) 
Disaggregate your 
results by gender and/or 
social group as 
appropriate 
Target (quarter four) 
What is the cumulative 
result for each year 







An intermediate outcome that is critical to achieving the overall 
objective 
 
Baseline for Result 2: 
What is the existing situation you seek to improve? 
 
Year 1 :  
Milestone 1 (quarter Milestone 2 (quarter Milestone 3 (quarter Target (quarter four) 
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one) 
Disaggregate your 
results by gender 




results by gender 




results by gender 
and/or social group as 
appropriate 
What is the cumulative 
result for each year 
    
 
Year 2 :  
Milestone 1 (quarter 
one) 
Disaggregate your 
results by gender 
and/or social group as 
appropriate 
Milestone 2 (quarter 
two) 
Disaggregate your 
results by gender 
and/or social group as 
appropriate 
Milestone 3 (quarter 
three) 
Disaggregate your 
results by gender 
and/or social group as 
appropriate 
Target (quarter four) 
What is the cumulative 
result for each year 










EXPRESSION OF INTEREST FORMAT 
 
Expressions of Interest not submitted in this format will be rejected. The whole Expression of 
Interest should be no more than 2 pages long (please note that we are unable to process anything 
exceeding 2 pages) 
Organization/Secretariat Name  
Acronym (if any)  
Contact Details 
Address Location: 
Head Office:  
Mailing: 
Web Site  









Legal status and year of 
incorporation 
 
Membership in networks (max:1,200 characters) 
 
Please provide below details of contact person for this project. 
First  & Last Names  





Phone numbers  
Email  
Past and Ongoing Projects (summary of current/past projects by your organization in the health sector) 










      
      
      
	   336	  
Financial Information 
Can your organization submit two annual audits 
by a certified auditor for the two preceding 
years? YES 
 
Estimated Annual turnover for 
 
How are gender equality and social inclusion 
issues incorporated in your programmes and at 
your workplace? 
(max:1,200 characters) 
What key outcomes (results) do you seek to 
achieve in the area of gender equality and 
social inclusion? (max:1,200 characters) 
Project Title:  Target geographic region of focus:  
Concept Note: 
(Brief description of proposed project and expected results) 
(max:1,500 characters) 
 





                                                                                                      Proposed Project 
 (what are the measurable benchmarks that will show progress towards achieving the results over the stipulated 
project period?) 
(max:1,200 characters per entry) 
Objective(s) Key Activities Key Results/Outcomes Ultimate Results/Impact 
 •   
 
 
 •   
 •   
   
Please Note:  This should not exceed one page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
